

A  
DISSERTATION  
UPON  
PARTIES;

IN SEVERAL LETTERS TO  
CALEB D'ANVERS, Esq;

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Dedicated to the RIGHT HONOURABLE  
Sir ROBERT WALPOLE.

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The TENTH EDITION.

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Multa Me dehortantur a vobis, *Quirites*, ni Studium Reipublicæ omnia superet; Opes Factionis, vestra Patientia, Jus nullum, ac maxime, quod Innocentiæ plus Periculi, quam Honoris est. Nam illa quidem piget dicere, his Annis XV. quam Ludibrio fueritis Superbiæ paucorum; quam fæde, quamque inulti perierint vestri Defensores; uti vobis Animus ab Ignavia atque Socordia corruptus sit; qui ne nunc quidem, obnoxii Inimicis, exsurgitis, atque etiam nunc timetis Eos, quibus vos decet Terrori esse. Sed quanquam hæc tallia sunt; tamen obviam ire Factionis Potentiæ, Animus subig't. Certe Ego Libertatem, quæ mihi a Parente meo tradita est, experiar; verum id frustra, an ob Rem faciam, in vestra Manu situm est, *Quirites*. Neque Ego vos hortor, quod sæpe Majores vestri fecere, uti contra Injurias armati eatis. Nihil Vi, nihil Secessione opus est. Necesse est, suomet ipsi more præcipites eant.

SALLUST. *Bell. Jugurth. in Memmii Orat.*

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D U B L I N,  
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To the RIGHT HONOURABLE

Sir *ROBERT WALPOLE*,

KNIGHT of the most noble Order of the GARTER, Chancellor and Under-Treasurer of the EXCHEQUER, first Commissioner of the TREASURY, and one of his MAJESTY's Most Honourable PRIVY COUNCIL, &c,

S I R,

**A**S soon as the Demand of the Publick made it necessary to collect the following Papers together, and to prepare a second Edition of them, I took the Resolution of addressing them to *You*. The *Style* of my Dedication will be very different from That, which is commonly employed to Persons in your Station. But if you find nothing agreeable in the *Style*, you may find perhaps something useful, something that will deserve your serious Reflection, in the *Matter* of it. I shall compare you neither to *Burleigh* nor *Godolphin*. Let me not prophane the Tombs of the Dead, to raise Altars to the Living. I shall make you no Compliments on the Wisdom of your *Administration*, nor on the Wonders you have perform'd to the Honour and Advantage of this Kingdom, in the Course of *fourteen* or *fifteen Years*,

either at home, or abroad. I shall leave these copious Themes to others, and shall confine myself to Reasons of another kind, that induced me to *this Dedication*. If these Reasons prove sufficient to convince the Publick of the extreme Propriety of it, I have all that I propose to myself.—Give me Leave to present to you, in one short View, the general Design of these little Essays.

They are designed then to expose the Artifice, and to point out the Series of Misfortunes, by which We were divided formerly into *Parties*, whose Contests brought even the fundamental Principles of our *Constitution* into Question, and whose Excesses brought *Liberty* to the very Brink of Ruin.

They are designed to give true Ideas of *this Constitution*, and to revive in the Minds of Men the true Spirit of it.

They are designed to assert and vindicate the Justice and Honour of the *Revolution*; of the *Principles* established, of the *Means* employed, and of the *Ends* obtained by it.

They are designed to explode our *former Distinctions*, and to unite Men of all Denominations in the Support of *these Principles*, in the Defence of *these Means*, and in the Pursuit of *these Ends*.

They are designed to shew how far *these Ends* were answered at the *Revolution*, or have been answered since; and by Consequence how much, or how little is wanting, to render that glorious Work compleat, according to the original Plan, and agreeably to the Engagements taken, at that Time, with the Nation.

Let me now appeal to You, Sir. Are These Designs, which any Man, who is born a *Briton*, in any Circumstances, in any Situation, ought to be ashamed

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ashamed of, or afraid to avow? You cannot think it. You will not say it. That never can be the Case, until We cease to think like *Freemen*, as well as to be *free*. Are these Designs in Favour of the *Pretender*? I appeal to the whole World; and I scorn, with a just Indignation, to give any other Answer to so shameless, and so senseless an Objection. No; they are Designs in Favour of the *Constitution*; Designs to secure, to fortify, to perpetuate that excellent System of Government. I court no other Cause; I claim no other Merit.

*Stet Fortuna Domus, et Avi numerentur Avorum.*

Let the *illustrious and royal House*, that hath been called to the Government of these Kingdoms, govern them till Time shall be no more. But let the Spirit, as well as the Letter of the *Constitution*, they are intrusted to preserve, be, as it ought to be, the sole Rule of their Government, and the sole Support of their Power; and whatever happens in the various Course of human Contingencies, whatever be the Fate of particular Persons, of Houses, or Families, let the *Liberties of Great Britain* be immortal.

They will be so, if *that Constitution*, whose genuine Effects they are, be maintained in Purity and Vigour. A perpetual Attention to this great Point is therefore the Interest and Duty of every Man in *Britain*; and there is scarce any Man, who may not contribute to the Advancement of it, in some Degree. The old may inform the young, and the young may animate the old. Even They, who are most retired from the Scene of Business, may be useful, in this Cause, to Those, who are in it; to Those, who are heated by the Action, distracted by the Cares, or dissipated by the Pleasures of the World. I say, They may be



useful ; and I add, that They ought to be so to the utmost, that their Situation allows. *Government* is the Business of Those who are appointed to govern, and of Those who are appointed to controul Them. But the *British Constitution* is the Business of every *Briton*. It is so more particularly, indeed, of Persons raised, like *You*, to the highest Posts in the Government. *You* lie under particular Obligations of this kind, besides the general Engagements of Interest and Duty, that are common to All ; and a Neglect in *others* would be a Breach of Trust in *You*. We say that *our King can do no Wrong*. The Maxim is wisely established, and ought to be followed, no Doubt, as far as the Conduct of *Princes* renders the Observance of it practicable. But from the Establishment of this Maxim results the Necessity of another, without which the Exercise of the *executive Power* would remain under no Controul. Though *our Kings can do no Wrong*, and though they cannot be called to Account by any Form our *Constitution* prescribes, their *Ministers* may. They are answerable for the *Administration of the Government* ; each for his *particular Part*, and the *prime, or sole Minister*, when there happens to be one, for the *whole*. He is so the more, and the more justly, if He hath affected to render Himself so, by usurping on his *Fellows* ; by wrigling, intriguing, whispering, and bargaining Himself into this dangerous Post ; to which He was not called by the *general Suffrage*, nor perhaps by the deliberate Choice of his *Master* himself. It follows then that *Ministers* are answerable for every Thing done to the Prejudice of the *Constitution*, in the same Proportion as the Preservation of the *Constitution* in its Purity and Vigour, or the perverting, and weakening it,

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are of greater Consequence to the Nation than any other Instances of *good*, or *bad Government*.

Believe me, *Sir*, a Reverence for the *Constitution*, and a conscientious Regard to the Preservation of it, are in the political, like *Charity* in the religious System, a Cloak to *hide a Multitude of Sins*; and as the Performance of *all other religious Duties* will not avail in the Sight of God, without *Charity*, so neither will the Discharge of *all other ministerial Duties* avail in the Sight of Men, without a faithful Discharge of *this principal Duty*. Should a *Minister* govern, in various Instances of *domestick* and *foreign Management* ignorantly, weakly, or even wickedly; and yet pay this Reverence, and bear this Regard to the *Constitution*, He would deserve certainly much better Quarter, and would meet with it too from every Man of Sense and Honour, than a *Minister*, who should conduct the Administration with great Ability and Success, and should at the same Time procure and abet, or even connive at such indirect Violations of the Rules of the *Constitution* as tend to the Destruction of it, or even at such Evasions as tend to render it useless. A *Minister*, who had the ill Qualities of both These, and the good ones of neither; who made his *Administration* hateful in some Respects, and despicable in others; who sought that Security by ruining the *Constitution*, which He had forfeited by dishonouring the *Government*; who encouraged the profligate, and seduced the unwary, to concur with Him in this Design, by affecting to explode all *publick Spirit*, and to ridicule every Form of our *Constitution*; *such a Minister* would be looked upon most justly as the Shame and Scourge of his Country; sooner or later He would fall without Pity; and it is hard to say what Punishment would be proportionable to his Crimes.——To con-

clude this Head therefore ; since the Obligations of Interest and Duty on every Man, especially on every *Minister*, and more especially on a *prime*, or *sole Minister*, to reverence the *Constitution*, to conform his Conduct to it, and neither to invade, nor suffer it to be invaded by others, are so undeniable, and so strong ; and since the Means, which the *Minister's* Power gives him to preserve it in Purity and Vigour, or to corrupt and weaken it, are so many ; nothing could be more proper than a Dedication to one in your exalted Station, of *Papers*, that are written to explain this Interest, and to enforce this Duty, and to press them on the Understanding and Conscience of every Man in *Britain* ; but of *Him* most, who is most concerned.

After the general Reasons, that have been given, and suggested, for addressing this Dedication to *You*, give me Leave to descend into some, that are a little more particular, and that regard the *Man*, as well as the *Minister*.

If the *Principles of the Revolution*, and the *Means* employed in it, have not been vindicated by *me*, with as great Force of Reason and Eloquence, as they were by *You*, in a famous Oration you made at *Sacheverel's* Tryal, they have been vindicated however to the best of my Power. The *Cause* is the same, though the *Performances* are not equal ; and since the *Cause* is the same, the *Cause* will recommend *my Writings* to your good Opinion, how little soever you may like the *Advocate*. But I have something more to urge in my own Favour. You had a *Sermon* to condemn, and a *Parson* to roast (for That, I think, was the decent Language of the Time) and, to carry on the Allegory, you roasted *Him* at so fierce a Fire, that you burnt yourselves. Your Arguments being confined to the

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Propositions *this Preacher* had advanced, you may seem rather to have justified *Resistance*, or the *Means* employed to bring about the *Revolution*, than the *Revolution*; for though the *Principles of the Revolution* were, and must for ever remain true, and though the *Means* were just, and will for ever be so, in Cases of the like Nature; yet *true Principles*, and *just Means*, require to be farther sanctified by their *Ends*. The Man, who should affect the greatest Zeal for the *Principles* then established, and the *Means* then used, would deserve, I think, to be ranked among the *false Brethren*, and would prove Himself a treacherous and a mercenary Friend to the *Revolution*, if He shewed any Indifference about the *Ends* obtained, or endeavoured in any Manner to defeat Those, that were intended to be obtained by it. The People, who run so great a Risque, and bring about so great an Event, in order to restore their *Constitution*, and to secure their *Liberties* against Dangers of every Kind, and especially against Those, which recent Experience hath taught Them to apprehend, have surely a good Right to the whole Benefit of *such a Revolution*; and They cannot be deprived of any Part of this Benefit, or left exposed to any Shadow of the same Dangers, by any Rule of Justice, or good Policy.

Such Considerations as These made Me think, that, to assert and vindicate fully the *Honour and Justice of the Revolution*, it was necessary that the *Ends of the Revolution* should be insisted upon in my *Arguments*, whether they were so or not in yours; and that the Importance of the *Subject*, as well as the Difference of the *Occasions*, (for the whole lay open before me) would be a sufficient Reason for supplying in the *Copy* what was wanting in the *Original*. I have endeavoured therefore to shew



how much our *Constitution* hath been improved, how far our *Liberties* have been better secured by the *Revolution*, and how little is wanting to complete that glorious Design, and to render the *British Constitution* the most perfect System of a free Government, that was ever established in the World. If *all the Ends of the Revolution* are already obtained, it is not only *impertinent* to argue for obtaining any of them, but *factious Designs* might be imputed, and the Name of *Incendiary* be applied with some Colour, perhaps to any one, who should persist in pressing this Point. On the other hand, if *any of these Ends* have not been fully obtained, the Reproach of *Faction* and the Title of *Incendiary*, will belong to every Person, who raises a Contest by his Opposition to these Instances, and who endeavours to make the *Friends of the Constitution* pass for *Enemies to the Government*. Thus it is easy to join Issue; and when Issue is once joined, it cannot be difficult to decide. If a *principal End of the Revolution* was to secure the Nation for the future against all the Dangers, to which *Liberty*, as well as *Religion*, had been exposed before the *Revolution*; if one of these Dangers arose from the *Corruption*, that had been employed to create a *Dependency of the two Houses of Parliament on the Crown*; if *this Corruption* might have succeeded very probably then, had the *Means* been sufficient to support it; if no Provision was made, at the *Revolution*, to secure the *Independency of the two Houses* and the *Freedom of Elections*, against *Corruption*; if no Provision hath been made against this Danger, since the *Revolution*, proportionable to the Increase of the *possible Means of Corruption*, which hath happened since the *Revolution*, by the Increase of the *Revenue of the Crown*, of *Debts*, of *Taxes*, and of *Officers*, and *Powers to raise these Taxes*; if all This be so,

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(and the whole Merits of the Cause be safely rested there) how can it be pretended that *all the Ends of the Revolution* have been already obtained? They have not most certainly. When, and in what Manner, they shall be obtained, it would be Presumption in any *private Persons* so much as to insinuate. They may represent such Things as They judge to be of use to the Publick, and may support their Representations by all the Reasons, that have determined their Opinions. Thus far their Province extends. All beyond This belongs to their *Superiors*; and, in the Case before us, to the Wisdom of the Nation assembled in *Parliament*. This however I would add; that as a Consistency of Character seems to exact from *You* a Zeal for obtaining *all the Ends of the Revolution*, suitable to That, which you have expressed for the *Principles* it established, and the *Means* it employed; so the particular Obligations *You* lye under to promote the Honour and Interest of his *present Majesty*, and of his *royal Family*, seem to exact the same; for, after all, the *Revolution* is the Foundation of the *present Settlement*; whatever strengthens the *Superstructure*; and there can be no need of going about to prove that to obtain *all the Ends of the Revolution* is to strengthen *that Foundation*. The Arguments, that prevailed formerly with many against the *Principles* and *Means of the Revolution*, are quite exploded; the Prejudices against them are quite worn out. We may therefore persuade, without flattering ourselves, that the Foundation of our *present Settlement*, and of all our future natural Happiness, is laid immoveably in these two Respects. Shall it not be so, and does it not become *You* in a particular Manner to endeavour that it should be so, in every Respect? Could you forgive yourself, if you neglected the first Opportunity of concurring to remove the least Pre-

tence from the disaffected, nay from the well-affected, to say that the *Ends of particular Men*, of *Parties*, and of *Families*, have been answered by the *Revolution*, even beyond their several Expectations ; but that the *national Expectations* have not been so fully answered, nor the *Ends of the Revolution* intirely obtained ? No Man knows better than *You* the Truth and Force of what hath been here advanced. No Man therefore is able to make a juster Application of it to the most important Interest of *your Country*, to the true Interest of *your royal Master*, and to *your private Interest* too ; if That will add, as I presume it will, some Weight to the Scale ; and if That requires, as I presume it does, a Regard to *Futurity*, as well as to the *present Moment*. Upon the whole Matter therefore, I cannot but expect that *You* should receive favourably an *Address*, made so properly, and in which, if I have pressed *You* a little warmly, yet I have done it with the Decency, that every *Gentleman* owes to *another*, at least to *Himself*. *You* will allow Me, and every Friend of the *Revolution* and of *Liberty*, Leave to hope that the Time is coming, when you will not oppose, or shall have it in your Power to oppose, the Endeavours of Those, who promote the intire Completion of *all the Ends* proposed by the *first*, and the full Security of the *last*. Whenever This happens ; whenever the *Independency of the two Houses of Parliament*, and the *uninfluenced and uninfluenceable Freedom of Elections*, are once effectually secured against the Dangers, that may arise possibly hereafter from the Growth of *Corruption* ; then will all our *future Kings* be reduced to the agreeable Necessity of establishing their Thrones, as We are obliged to acknowledge that the Throne is *now* established, not on the narrow and sandy Foundations of *Court-Craft*, and *uncon-*  
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*stitutional Expedients*, but on the *Popularity of the Prince*, and the *universal Affection of the Subjects*; Foundations of the *Kingly Authority* so evidently supposed by our *Constitution*, that a *King*, who will add Weight to his Sceptre, must govern by them, or govern against *this Constitution*, against the very *Rule of his Government*.

I am now come to the last Reason, drawn from the Subject of *these Writings*, that I shall trouble You with, for dedicating them to You. The Attempt to extinguish the Animosities, and even the Names of *those Parties*, that distracted the Nation so long, so fatally at first, and so foolishly at last, intitles this Volume to your *kind Reception of it*, at least, as properly as the Attempt to expose the Dangers, that may possibly arise hereafter, from *Corruption*, to the *Independency of Parliament*, and to the *Freedom of Elections*. Whilst a real Difference of *Principles and Designs* supported the *Distinction*, We were divided into *national Parties*; and this was Misfortune enough. It was lamented as a great one, at the Time, by every good Man of every Party. But if the *Distinction* should remain, Then the *Difference* subsists no longer, the Misfortune would be still greater; because They, who maintained the *Distinction*, in this Case, would cease to be a *Party*, and would become a *Faction*. *National Interests* would be no longer concerned, at least, on *one Side*. They would be sometimes sacrificed, and always subordinate to *personal Interests*; and That, I think, is the true Characteristick of *Faction*. This Attempt therefore ought to have your *Approbation*. To dedicate it to You may be construed to suppose that it will have your *Approbation*; and He, who supposes that it will, makes you no indifferent Compliment.

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When the *Court* fomented our *national Divisions*, the very worst Designs were carried on ; for to *divide* can never be an Expedient for good Purposes, any more than to *corrupt* ; since the Peace and Prosperity of a Nation will always depend on *uniting*, as far as possible, the Heads, Hearts and Hands of the whole People, and on improving, not debauching, their Morals. *Divide et impera*, is a Maxim often quoted. How are We to apply it ? There is no Place for it, in *arbitrary Governments* ; for in *Them*, the Interest of the *Governors* requires that a *servile Union*, if it may be called an *Union*, should be maintained by the Weight of *Power* ; like that of Slaves in a *Galley*, who are united by their *Chains*, and who tug the Oar together, at the Sound of a *Whistle*. In *free Governments*, it can have Place as little, whilst *They*, who are at the Head, intend the Maintenance of *Liberty*. To what Case then can it be applyed ? There is but one, and That is the Case of *Those*, who aspire at more than a *free Constitution of Government* gives *Them*. Such *Governors* must divide and incense *Parties* one against another, that *They* may be always able to bribe the Passions of *one Side*, and so usurp on *both*. But the *Prince*, who pursues this Method, risques the Power He hath for a Power He does not want. He would be the more inexcuseable, under *such a Constitution as ours* ; because, if He could not gain Esteem by his *great*, He might gain Affection by his *good Qualities* ; and *this Principle* would carry Him, even better perhaps than the *other*, to the Power he would obtain. What can a *Prince* desire more than to be placed at the Head of an *united People* ; among whom He may have as many *Friends* as He pleases, and can have no *Enemies*, unless He creates *Them*, by supposing *Them* to be *such*, and by treating *Them* accordingly ? If the Designs of a *Prince*, in fomenting

ing the *Divisions*, are to invade the *Liberties* of his *People*, his Designs are laid in the utmost Iniquity ; and if *These* are not his Designs, they must be laid in the utmost Folly. When a *People* submits quietly to *Government*, and is willing to obey on the *Terms*, on which alone *their Prince* hath a Right to command, how extravagant must his Demands be, and how unaccountable his Conduct, to divide such a *People* ? Shall he expect, for Instance, that *all his People* should think like *Him* and *his Council*, about every Occurrence, about every Measure He takes, and every Man He employs ; and since This is too much to ask of *Freemen*, nay of *Slaves*, if his Expectation be not answered, shall He form a *lasting Division* upon such *transient Motives* ? Shall He proscribe every Man, as an *Enemy to his Government*, who dislikes the *Administration* of it ? *Proscriptions* are abominable, and inhuman, when they are backed by a Fulness of *arbitrary Power*. But to hang up the *Tables of Proscription*, without the Power of sending *Centurions* to cut off every Head, that wears a Face disliked at Court, would be Madness in a *Prince*. Such a Conduct cannot suit his *Interest*, however it may his *Passions*, in any Circumstance whatever. There are indeed Circumstances, wherein it may suit the Interest of a *Minister*. Till the Sword of *civil War* be drawn, a *Prince* can scarce become irreconcilable with his *People*, and be reduced, for want of *national Strength*, to support his Power and Dignity by the Force of *Faction*. But a *Minister* may fall easily, and soon, into this desperate State ; and after fomenting, as long as He could, the *Divisions of Parties*, He may have no Refuge but in *Faction*. There may be such a Conduct, as no *national Party* will bear, or at least will justify. But *Faction* hath no Regard to *national Interest*. *Faction* therefore will bear any  
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Thing, share in any Thing, justify any Thing. If the *Minister*, who takes this Method to support Himself, hath any Art, He will endeavour to disguise his *Faction* under the Name and Appearance of a *national Party*. But even this Disguise will soon fall off. The best of Those, who were engaged in the *Party*, will quit the *Faction*, and then the *latter* must stand confessed to publick View. But it is not only the *criminal Conduct of a Minister*, and the Fear of resting his Administration on the *national Judgment*, that may oblige Him to govern by *Division*, and by *Faction*. As the most opposite Notions are often united in the Head, so are the most contrary Sentiments in the Heart of Man. *Incapacity* often begets *Sufficiency*; and yet a *Consciousness of Incapacity* often begets a *Jealousy of Power*, grounded on a Sense of the *superior Merit of other Men*. The *Minister*, who grows less by his *Elevation*, like a little *Statue* placed on a *mighty Pedestal*, will always have this *Jealousy* strong about Him. He must of Course select a *Faction* to Himself; and this *Faction* must be composed, to answer his Purposes, of Men *servilely obsequious*, or *extremely inferior to Him by their Talents*. Whenever This happens, the Reign of *Venality*, of *Prostitution*, of *Ignorance*, of *Futility*, and of *Dulness* commences. The *Minister* will dread to see the *Persons* employed, whom He *secretly esteems*, for this very Reason, because He esteems Them; *Abilities to serve the Commonwealth* will be an Objection sufficient to outweigh the strongest Proofs of *Attachment to the Person of the Prince* and of *Zeal for his Government*; nay, even the Merit of a *whole Life spent in giving these Proofs*. In short, the very Reasons, that should determine the *Prince* to employ Men, will determine the *Minister* to proscribe Them. Dislike, or Contempt of Him, will pass with his  
*Master*

*Master* for Disaffection to the Government; and under this pompous Name of *Government*, will nothing but the poultry Interest, or Humour, of the *Minister* be couched. The *Minister* will reap, perhaps, (for even that may be doubtful) the immediate Benefit of *dividing*, or maintaining the *Divisions of the Nation*, and of nursing up *Faction*, by continuing longer in Power, his sole Security, and by deferring, if not escaping, the *evil Day*, the *Day of Account and Retribution*. But the *Prince* will reap, in this Case, the permanent Mischief of establishing *Division* and *Faction*; and may possibly make the lamentable Exchange of his *own Popularity*, for his *Minister's Impunity*. I need not finish up this Picture of Imagination, since I wrote to *You*, who know so much better than I pretend to do the *Characters of Men*, and the *Arts of Government*. It is sufficient that I have hinted at the general Causes and Effects of the Endeavours, that are sometimes used, and to which *Great Britain* hath not been a Stranger; to foment *national Divisions*, and to Govern by the *Faction of a Minister*, armed with the Power of a *Prince*, against the Sense and Spirit of a *Nation*, and the Interest of the *Prince* himself. This may serve, and it is all I shall say, to bespeak your Approbation of the Papers that follow, on Account of the *Matter* they contain.

But, *Sir*, the Reasons I have given, how pertinent soever they may be, are not the only Reasons I had for addressing myself, in this Manner, and upon this Occasion, to *You*. There are Reasons of another Kind; Reasons, that come still more home to *Yourself*; Reasons, that appear very important to *Me*, and that will appear so to *You*, perhaps, when *You* have reflected duly on them, and have weighed impartially the Consequences of them. I shall press these Reasons with all the Plainness  
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and Force, that Decency permits, in so publick, and personal an Application ; because, though *Truth* may sometimes offend, I am very indifferent to Offences taken with *Truth* on my Side. If You hearken to *Truth*, which Men in your Station seldom hear, You may be the better for it. If You do not, the *Author of this Dedication* cannot be the worse ; for I will add, upon this Occasion, that whoever He is, He is one You cannot impose upon, in your *private Capacity*, neither as a Man, nor as a Gentleman ; and that you can as little do it, in your *publick Capacity*. You cannot disappoint Him ; because the Temper of his Mind gives You no Hold on Him. He hath neither *Avarice* to make Him desire *Riches*, nor *Ambition* to make Him desire *Power*, nor *Vanity* to make Him desire *Honours*. You cannot oppress Him ; because He is free from *Guilt*, and from every *probable* (for no Man is free from every *possible*) *Imputation of Guilt*. The *Laws of his Country* are his Protection ; and they are sufficient to protect every *Briton*, who reverences and obeys them ; in how *peculiar a Situation* soever He may be found. They, who act against *these Laws*, and They alone, may have Reason to fear, let their *Situation be never so high*, or their *present Power never so great*.

Having said This, I proceed to observe to You, that you are in the right most certainly to report by *Yourself*, or *Others*, in the best and smartest Manner that *You*, or *They* can, whatever the Writings published in the *Craftsman* may contain, which You judge to be injurious to *Yourself*, or reflecting on your *Administration*. The Publick will judge uprightly upon the whole Matter. The Laughters will be for Those, who have most *Wit*, and the serious Part of Mankind for Those, who have most *Reason* on their Side. Again. As to  
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Affairs of Peace, or War, publick Occurrences, domestick Management, foreign Negotiations, in short, the News of the Day, and the current Business of the Time, *weekly and daily Papers*, or *more elaborate, anniversary Treatises*, are properly employed by You to explain, in your own Favour, the Series of your Conduct; to refute *Caleb*; or, which is still more easy, and by some thought as useful, to keep up the Cavil on *one Point*, till a *new one* is started, that draws off the Attention of the World. All This may be called *fair War*; and whoever prevails in the Judgment of the Publick, the Publick will reap Information from the Contest, and will have Reason to be pleased with *these Appeals*, which present an Image of the Custom, that obtained in the antient Commonwealths of *Greece*, and at *Rome*, where the greatest Interests of the State were debated, and the greatest Men in those Governments were accused and defended, in Publick Harangues, and before the whole People.

But the Writings of the *Craftsman* have not been confined to these Subjects, that are *personal or temporary*. The Cause of the *British Constitution* hath been pleaded through the whole Course of *these Papers*; every Danger to it hath been pointed out; every Security, or Improvement of it, hath been explained and pressed.—Now here, Sir, begins my Complaint. I said that the Cause of our *Constitution* hath been pleaded in the *Craftsman*; and I am sorry that the Expression is so precisely just, that no other would come up to the Case. The Cause of the *Constitution* hath been pleaded; for the *Constitution* hath been *attacked*; openly, insolently *attacked*, and is so every Day by Those, against whom the *Craftsman* so often employs his Pen.

Who

Who could have expected, (for I will give an Instance or two) who could have expected, at this Time, and under the *present Establishment*, to hear the Necessity of maintaining *standing Armies*, in Times of Peace, even against the *People of Britain*, who maintain them, contended for and asserted? Who could have expected to hear a *Dependency*, a *corrupt Dependency of the Parliament on the Crown*, contended for and asserted to be a necessary Expedient to supply a *Want of Power*, which is falsely supposed, *in the Crown*; as if our Fathers had opposed, and at length destroyed that Chimæra, called *Prerogative*, formerly so dangerous to our *Liberties*, for no other Reason but to furnish Arguments for letting loose upon us *another Monster*, more dangerous to our *Liberties* by far? Who could have expected that Attempts to revive the Doctrines of *old Whiggism*, and the Principles and Spirit of the *Revolution*, in Opposition to such manifest Contradictions of them all, would give any Umbrage, or cause any Alarm, among Men, who still affect to call Themselves *Whigs*, and pretend Zeal for a *Government*, that is founded on the *Revolution*, and could not have been established without it? This could not have been expected, I think; and yet so it is.

There are Persons, who take to Themselves the Title of *ministerial Writers*, and have sometimes the Front to assume That of *Writers for the Government*. These Persons are not content to ring, in daily Panegyrick, Encomiums on the Wisdom and Virtue, the Justice and Clemency, the Success and Triumphs of *your Administration*, and to answer, or attempt to answer, the almost innumerable Objections, that have been made (it matters not here whether justly, or unjustly) to your *Conduct at home, and your own*,  
and

and that of *your Brother abroad*; but they take Fire, they shew an Alarm, and they grow angry, whenever any Thing is written, nay when a Word is dropt, in Favour of the *fundamental Articles of British Liberty*. Sometimes they argue directly, and in plain Term, against them. Sometimes they perplex and puzzle the Cause; evade what they cannot deny; and when they cannot impose a Fallacy, endeavour at least to hinder Men from discerning a Truth. Thus, Sir, they mingle *your Justification* with the *Condemnation of our Constitution*; and labour, as much as in them lies, to make *your Preservation* and the *Destruction of this Constitution* a common Cause. If you could possibly doubt the Truth of what is here advanced, I might refer you to the *particular Pamphlets and Papers*, which are known at least by the *Answers*, that have been given to them; till such Time as an Extract of all the Passages, hinted at here, be made publick, as I hope it will; and whenever it is, I dare appeal beforehand to your private Thoughts, whether the *Principles* they contain, and the *Consequences* deducible from them, would not destroy, if they were to take Place, the whole Scheme of the *British Constitution*. It hath been asked, why do the *Writers on one Side* eternally harp on *Liberty*, and the *Constitution*? Do they mean to instill *Jealousy* and *Distrust*, and to alienate the *Minds of the People*? In what Instances have the *Laws* been broken, or hath the *Constitution* been invaded by those who govern? These Questions deserve an Answer; and I shall answer the *first*, by asking another Question. Why do the *Writers on one Side* eternally labour to explain away *Liberty*, and to distinguish us out of our *Constitution*? If nothing had been said of *this Kind*, I am persuaded that much less would have been said  
of



of the *other*; and I can assure you with great Truth, that the Publick had not been troubled particularly with *this Dissertation upon Parties*. As to the *other two Questions*, they may be taken together. There is a plain and real Difference between *Jealousy* and *Distrust*, that may be observed in the present Case. Men may be *jealous*, on Account of their *Liberties*, and I think they ought to be so, even when they have no immediate *Distrust* that the Persons who govern, design to invade them. An Opportunity of invading them opened, is Reason sufficient for awakening the *Jealousy*; and if the Persons, who have *this Jealousy*, apply to those who govern, to help to cure it, by removing the Opportunity, the *latter* may take This, if they please, as a Mark of *Confidence*, not *Distrust*; at least, it will be in their Power, and surely it will be for their Interest, to shew that they deserved *Confidence*, in this Case, not *Distrust*. But it will be always trifling and foolish, to ask what *Laws* have been broken, what *Invasions* on the *Constitution* have been made; because as nothing of this Sort will be done, when there are no Designs dangerous to the *Constitution* carried on; so when there are *such Designs*, whatever is done of this Sort will be private, indirect, and so covered, that the greatest moral Certainty may be destitute of Proof. Whenever any of these Things are done publicly, directly, and in a Manner to be easily proved, the Danger will be over, the *Constitution* will be destroyed, and all Fear for it and Concern about it will be impertinent, because they will come too late. If ever that old, trite Maxim, *Principiis obsta*, was well apply'd, it is so in the Case We speak of here.

The

The Reasons I have given for mentioning *these Writers* ought to excuse me for it ; at least to *You* ; and even to *You* I shall say very little more about Them. The Flowers They gather at *Billingsgate*, to adorn and enliven their Productions, shall be pass'd over by Me, without any Reflection. They assume the Privilege of *Watermen* and *Oysterwomen*. Let Them enjoy it in that good Company, and exclusively of all other Persons. They cause no Scandal ; they give no Offence ; they raise no Sentiment but Contempt in the Breasts of *those* they attack ; and it is to be hoped, for the Honour of *those*, whom they would be thought to defend, that they raise, by this low and dirty Practice, no other Sentiment in *them*. But there is another Part of their Proceeding, which may be attributed by malicious People to *You*, and which deserves for that Reason alone some Place in *this Dedication*, as it might be some Motive to the writing of it. When *such Authors* grow scurrilous, it would be highly unjust to impute their Scurrility to any Prompter ; because they have in themselves all that is necessary to constitute a *Scold* ; *ill Manners*, *Impudence*, a *foul Mouth*, and a *fouler Heart*. But when they menace, they rise a Note higher. They cannot do this in their own Names. Men may be apt to conclude therefore that they do it in the Name, as they affect to do it in the Behalf, of the *Person*, in whose Cause they desire to be thought retained. Many Examples of *these Menaces* might be quoted, and most of them would be found directed against *one particular Person*. After employing the whole Impotence of their Rhetorick against Him, and venting for many Years together, almost without Notice on his Part, as much Calumny as their Imaginations could furnish,

a Pam-

a Pamphlet hath been lately published, the profess'd Design of which is to call for a *vigorous Proceeding in Parliament against THIS MAN*. To introduce this Proposal, it is preceded by a long Series of Facts; some notoriously false; some, which it is impossible should be true; others, which it is impossible *this Writer* should know to be true, if they were so; and others again, not only destitute of Proof, but even of Probability. Such *Accusations* must be brought by some \* *Creature of so notoriously prostituted a Conscience*, that *his Evidence would be rejected in any common Cause*, and should not be refuted therefore by Me, if I was concerned to refute Him. But, Sir, if I take Notice of *this Libel*, or refer to *others of the same Kind*, it is not done out of Regard to *these Authors*, whom I despise, as I am persuaded the Person does, against whom all the Virulence of their Malice is directed. My Concern, upon Occasion, is for *You* alone, and you will allow me to represent what that Concern dictates. It is possible that You may have shewn *yours*, and He may have shewn *his*, according to the different Circumstances you have been in, and the different Opportunities You have had. But This will not become a *Matter of State*, though you are a *Minister of State*. The Publick will espouse *your* Passions no more than *his*; nor concern itself to enquire who gave the first Occasion to *these Resentments*; who hath acted the Part of a *fair*, and who of a *treacherous Enemy*. It is, I doubt, too certain that the Publick hath been employed sometimes to revenge *private Quarrels*, and to serve the low Turns of *Envy or Jealousy*. But, in all these Cases, the publick

\* See the Grand Accuser, &c. p. 77.

Publick hath been imposed upon ; *these Motives* have been concealed ; *others* have been pretended ; and the *others* have been of a *publick Nature* alone ; because the bare Suspicion of any *private* Interest, or Passion, in a *publick* Prosecution is sufficient, and most justly so ; to create invincible Prejudices to it. The *Scribblers* I speak of, have laid You therefore under great Disadvantages, notwithstanding your Elevation, and your Power, whether you design any Thing against the Person so obnoxious to You, or not. They should have concealed industriously, what They have affected to proclaim ; since it is certain that, how great soever your Popularity in the Nation may be, They will never bring up Mankind to think that any Person should be prosecuted by Methods *extraordinary*, or even *ordinary*, purely for your Ease, your Pleasure, or your Safety. If They could prove, what they frequently throw out, that every Man is a *Friend to the Pretender*, who is not a *Friend to you* ; and that He, who objects to your *Conduct in the Administration*, endeavours to pull down the *present Government*, and set up *another* ; then, indeed, they might raise a Spirit against many others, of much greater Consequence, who appear every Day, in the Face of the World, not to be your *Friends*, and who make no Scruple of objecting, with the utmost Freedom, to your *Conduct*. But such Assertions as these will only serve to make Men angry, or laugh. They, who have the best Opinion of your *Abilities*, will no more agree that the *present Establishment* is supported, than that it was made by You. They will never be wanting in their Respect to the Crown so much as to confound the Cause of his *Minister* ; or to suppose that the Reins of Government would grow weaker



in his Majesty's Hand, if *You* was out of Power, or out of the World.—In short, *Sir*, you may pass, and I believe you do pass justly, for a *Man of extreme good Parts*, and for a *Minister of much Experience*; but *You* would not desire, I think, to be represented as the *Atlas*, who supports this State; and *your Brother* will not certainly pass for the *Hercules*, who relieves *You*, and who sustains, in his Turn, the important Burthen.

I know very well that something is added to supply, if That were possible, this Defect, and to make the Cause more plausible. It is pretended that the Writings imputed to *this particular Person*, and several others published in the *Craftsman*, contain Reflections of a very *extravagant, indecent, and even seditious Nature*; such as they alone, who are capable of supposing them, are capable of making. But then these Reflections are to be proved by the *Constructions*, which the *Accusers* make of the Expressions employ'd by *those*, whom they accuse; Constructions as arbitrary, and as forc'd as many of those, by which some of the best Men at *Rome* were brought within the Interpretation of the *Law of Majesty*, by some of the worst. Examples of much the same Sort have been set even in *Britain*, whilst the Practice prevailed of supposing *Innuendo's*, and *Parallels*, and *oblique Meanings*, and prosecuting and condemning Men on *Suppositions*, and *Interpretations*. But there is no Room to fear that any such Examples should be renewed, whilst \* a BRITISH SPIRIT prevails in a BRITISH PARLIAMENT. Whilst *that* Spirit prevails, no Parliament will condemn any Man upon Principles, which

\* See Some Considerations concerning the publick Funds, &c. p. 98.

which Parliaments have always condemned as unjust and tyrannical. Less than any will they condemn those, who write in Defence of *this Constitution*, at the Request and on the Instances of those who attack it. A *British* Spirit and the Spirit of the *British Constitution* are one and the same; and therefore † *if ever there arises a BRITISH SPIRIT in a BRITISH PARLIAMENT*, of which I presume no Doubt ought to be made at this Time, *Vengeance will not overtake the former*; it may be the latter.

What hath been said might suffice to shew how foolish and vain it is to throw out Menaces against *those*, who have nothing to fear, at a Time when Zeal to preserve the *Constitution* in every Part inviolate seems daily to increase. But since I have entered on the Subject, and the Matter seems of some Concernment to *You*, give me Leave to add one Consideration more, that may serve to shew how foolish and vain such a Proceeding would be, even at any other Time. Let us suppose that the very Person pointed at was, and could be proved to be, the Author of *this Dissertation upon Parties*, for Instance, which I now dedicate to You. Let us even suppose that We lived in an Age, when Parliaments were brought, in some Degree, under that very *Dependency*, against which so much is said in *this Dissertation*. In short, let us suppose that the most innocent Man, who was obnoxious to those in *Power*, might have reasonable Grounds to fear an exorbitant Exercise of *this Power* against Him. But then let us make one single Supposition on the *other Side*. Let us suppose that *this* obnoxious Man was really in earnest; that He wrote from his Heart; and that He felt there the same Warmth for the *British Constitution*, which He expressed

in his Writings, and laboured to infuse into the Breast of every other Man. I would ask you, *Sir*, do you think *such a Man* would be ashamed to avow, in the Face of his Country, the Contents of the following *Sheets*, or be afraid to suffer for them? Could any Eloquence, even *yours*, if you would employ it so unworthily, expect, by the Help of false Surmises, and invidious Comments, (the base Inventions of *little Railers*) to make Him pass for an *Enemy to the present Establishment*, who had proved Himself a *Friend to that Constitution*, in Consequence of which, and for the Sake of which alone, *this Establishment* was made? Would his Endeavours to reconcile Parties, and to abolish *odious Distinctions*; would pleading for the Attainment of *all the Ends* proposed by, and promised at the *Revolution*; for securing the *Independency* of the two Houses of *Parliament*, and the *Freedom of Elections*, as effectually against *Corruption*, as they are already secured against *Prerogative*; would This, I say, make Him pass for the *greatest of Criminals*? No, *Sir*, not in the Breasts even of Those, who gave Sentence against Him, if Men capable of giving such a Sentence could be found. Among the rest of Mankind his Innocency would be acknowledged; his Constancy would be applauded; his *Accusers*, and his *grand Accuser* in the first Place, would pass alone for *criminal*. He might fall a Victim to Power; but *Truth* and *Reason*, and the Cause of *Liberty* would fall with Him; and He, who is buried in their Ruins, is happier than He, who survives them. Thus I am persuaded the Person here intended would be found, upon Trial, to think. The Event therefore of *such a Prosecution*, whatever it might be, could not turn to his Disadvantage; and consequently

# D E D I C A T I O N. xxix

quently to threaten Him with it would be ridiculous, even at such a Time as We have supposed, much more at the present. Void of all Ambition, execept the Ambition of honest Fame, He might stand the Efforts of Violence in *such a Cause*, not only with little Concern, but with much inward Complacency. Weary of the World, determined and preparing to retire totally from it, He would surely suspend his Retreat to face the *Persecution*; and whatever his Persecutors might imagine, They would erect a Sort of *triumphal Arch* to the Man they hated. He would leave the World with more Honour than they would remain in it. By suffering in Defence of the *Constitution* of his *Country*, They, who had thought favourably of Him would think that He crowned the *Good*, and They, who had entertained Prejudices against Him, that He atoned for the *Ill*, which had been imputed to Him. Such different Judgments, You know, *Sir*, will attend every Man's Character, who acts on our divided Stage; and He is happy, who can reconcile them so nearly. It never happens that there is a Man, of whom all *speak well*; as it rarely, very rarely, happens that there is a Man, of whom all *speak ill*, except those who are hired to *speak well*.

I find it hard to leave off, when I have the Honour of writing to *You, Sir*; but having now explained the principal Reasons, that induced Me to address this Dedication to *You*, it is Time that I should force my self to a Conclusion, and should conclude by recommending the following *Sheets* to your serious Perusal. I recommend them to nothing else. I do not apprehend that they will want your Patronage any more than



the Person who wrote them. Let them stand, or fall in the publick Opinion, according to their Merit. But if You should find any Thing in them, that deserves your Notice, You will have an Obligation to *One*, from whom You least expected any ; to,

S I R,

*Your most humble Servant,*

THE AUTHOR OF THE DISSERTATION  
UPON PARTIES.

A

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DISSERTATION

ON

PARTIES.

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LETTER I.

S I R,

**T**O CORRUPT and to DIVIDE are the trite and wicked Expedients, by which *some Ministers* in all Ages have affected to govern ; but especially such as have been least capable of exerting the true Arts of Government. There is however a Difference to be made between *these two Expedients*, to the Advantage of the *latter*, and by Consequence between the Characters of *Those*, who put them in Practice.

Every busy, ambitious Child of Fortune, who hath himself a *corrupt Heart*, and becomes Master of a *large Purse*, hath all that is necessary to employ the Expedient of CORRUPTION with Success. A *Bribe*, in the Hand of the most *blundering Coxcomb*, that ever disgraced Honour, and Wealth and Power, will prevail as much as in the Hand of a *Man of Sense*, and go farther too, if it weigh more. An *intriguing Chamber-Maid* may slip a Bank-Note in-

to a griping Paw, as well as the most subtle Demon of Hell. *H—e* may govern as triumphantly by *this Expedient* as the *great Knight*, his Brother, and the *great Knight* as *Burleigh* Himself.

But every Character cannot attempt the other Expedient of *Dividing*, or *keeping up Divisions*, with equal Success. There is, indeed, no Occasion for any extraordinary Genius *to divide*; and true Wisdom despises the infamous Task. But there is need of that left-handed Wisdom, called *Cunning*, and of those Habits in Business, called *Experience*. He, that is *corrupted*, co-operates with Him, that *corrupts*. He runs into his Arms at the first Beckon; or in order sometimes to raise the Price, he meets him but half Way. On the other Hand, to *divide*, or to maintain and renew the *Divisions of Parties* in a State, a System of *Seduction* and *Fraud* is necessary to be carried on. The *Divided* are so far from being accessory to the Guilt, that They would not be *divided*, if they were not first *deceived*.

From these Differences which I have observed between the *two Expedients*, and the Characters and Means, proper to put them in Practice with Success, it may be discovered perhaps why, upon former Occasions, as I shall hereafter shew, the Expedient of *Dividing* prospered so much better than That of *Corrupting*; and why, upon some later Occasions, the Expedient of *Corrupting* succeeds so well in those Hands, which are not, and I trust, will not be so lucky in maintaining, or renewing our *Party-Divisions*.

Much hath been written by you, Mr. *D'Anvers*, by your Correspondents and others, who have drawn their Pens in the Cause of *Truth*, *Virtue* and *Liberty*, against the Right Reverend, as well as undignify'd, the noble as well as the ignoble Assertors of *Corruption*; enough surely to shame Those, who  
have

have not lost all Sense of Shame; out of so ignominious a Crime; and to make Those, who have not lost every other Sense, tremble at the Consequences of it. We may flatter ourselves that these honest Endeavours have had some Effect; and have Reason to hope that far greater will follow from those illustrious Examples of Repulses, which have been lately given to the *grand Corrupter*, notwithstanding his frequent and insolent Declarations that he could seduce whomsoever he had a Mind to gain. These Hopes are farther confirmed to us by repeated Declarations of the Sense of Parliament, and will be turned, we doubt not, into Certainty, whenever the Wisdom of the two Houses shall again think it proper to raise new Barriers of Law against *this encroaching Vice*.

In the mean Time, I think nothing can better Answer the Design of *your Papers*, nor promote the publick Good more effectually in the present Conjunction, than to put our Countrymen frequently on their Guard against the Artifice, which is clumsily, but industriously employed to maintain, and, if it be possible, to create *new Divisions* among them. That Day, which our Fathers wished to see and did not see, is now breaking upon us. Shall We suffer this Light to be turn'd again into Party-Darkness by the Incantations of *Those*, who would not have passed for Conjurers, even in the Days of Superstition and Ignorance? The Nation is not only brought into an Uniformity of Opinion concerning the *present Administration*, by the Length and the righteous Conduct of it; but We are grown into an Unanimity about *Principles of Government*, which the most sanguine could scarce have expected, without Extravagance. *Certain Association of Ideas* were made so familiar to us, about half an Century ago, and became in the Course of Time so ha-



bitual, that we should not have been able, even a few Years ago, to break them, nor have been easily induced to believe, on the Faith of any Prediction, that *Experience* and the Evidence of *Facts* would, in a few Years more, break them for us, destroy all our Notions of *Party*, and substitute *new ones* in their Room.

*The Power and Majesty of the PEOPLE, an ORIGINAL CONTRACT, the Authority and Independency of PARLIAMENT, Liberty, Resistance, Exclusion, Abdication, Deposition;* These were Ideas associated, at that Time, to the Idea of a *Whig*, and supposed by every *Whig* to be incommunicable, and inconsistent with the Idea of a *Tory*.

*Divine, hereditary, indefeazable Right, lineal Succession, Passive Obedience, Prerogative, Non-Resistance, Slavery,* nay and sometimes *Popery* too, were associated in many Minds to the Idea of a *Tory*, and deemed incommunicable, and inconsistent, in the same Manner, with the Idea of a *Whig*.

But now That, which *neither Side* would have believed, on the Faith of any Prediction, is come to pass ;

——— *quod Divum promittere nemo  
Auderet, volvenda Dies en ! attulit ultro.*

*These Associations* are broken ; *these distinct Sets of Ideas* are shuffled out of their Order ; *new Combinations* force Themselves upon us ; and it would actually be as absurd to impute to the *Tories* the Principles, which were laid to their Charge formerly, as it would be to ascribe to the *Projector* and *his Faction* the Name of *Whigs*, whilst They daily forfeit that Character by their Actions. The Bulk of *both Parties* are really united ; united on Principles of Liberty, in Opposition to an obscure Remnant of *one Party*, who disown those Principles, and  
a mer-

a mercenary Detachment from the *other*, who betray them.

How *this Change for the better* comes to have been wrought in an Age, when most Things have *changed for the worse*; and since it hath been wrought, why the *old Distinctions* are kept up in some Measure, will I think be accounted for in treating this Subject farther. At present, what shall we say to those, who publickly speak of this *national Union* as impracticable and chimerical; yet privately act against it, with all their Might, as a practicable Thing, and a real Evil to them? If it be as compleat and as well cemented, as I imagine it is, and as every honest *Briton* wishes it may be; nay, if there be nothing more than a strong Tendency on all Sides towards it, which no Man of the least Observation and Candour will deny; it is surely the Duty of every one, who desires the Prosperity of his Country, to seize the Opportunity, to cultivate and improve it. If Men are to be known by *their Works*, the Works of those, who oppose *this Union*, denote them sufficiently. Wicked and unhappy Men! who seek their *private Safety*, in opposing *publick Good*. Weak and silly Men! who vainly imagine that *They* shall pass for the *Nation*, and the *Nation* for a *Faction*; that *They* shall be judged in the *Right*, and the whole Body of the People in the *Wrong*—On whom would they impose?—How long do they imagine that so unequal a Contest can last?

There is no Complaint, which hath been more constantly in the Mouths, no Grief hath lain more heavily at the Hearts of all good Men, than those about our *national Divisions*; about the Spirit of *Party*, which inspires Animosity and breeds Rancour; which hath so often destroyed our inward Peace; weakened our national Strength, and sullied

our Glory abroad. It is Time therefore, that all, who desire to be esteemed good Men, and to procure the Peace, the Strength and the Glory of their Country by the only Means, by which they can be procured effectually, should join their Efforts to heal our *national Divisions*, and to change the narrow Spirit of *Party* into a diffusive Spirit of *publick Ben-volence*.

That we may be more encouraged to do so, it will be of Use perhaps to consider, in some Particulars, what Advances are already made towards that *national Union*, without which no *national Good* can be expected in such Circumstances as ours.

Let us begin with the present Temper of the Members of the *Church of England* towards the *Dissenters*. Those Laws, by which the latter were debarred from serving God after their own Way, have not been these many Years a Terror to them. Those which were designed to hinder the Propagation of their Principles, and those, which shut the Door of all publick Preferment, even to such amongst them as *conformed occasionally*, are repealed. Far from desiring to impose any new Hardships upon them, even *Those*, who have been reputed their Enemies ; and who have acted as such on several Occasions, acknowledge their Error. Experience hath removed Prejudice. They see that *Indulgence* hath done what *Severity* never could ; and from the Frankness of *These*, if I was a *Dissenter*, I should sooner entertain Hopes of future Favour, than from the double Dealing of *Those*, who lean on the *Dissenters*, when they are *out of Power*, and who esteem them a Load upon them, when they are *in it*. We are now in the true and only Road, which can possibly lead to a perfect Reconciliation among *Protestants* ; to the Abolition of all their *Differences*, or to Terms of *Difference* so little essential,

tial, as to deserve none of *Distinction*. These happy Ends must be obtained by *mutual good Will*. They never can be obtained by *Force*. It is true, indeed, that *Force*, which is the Effect of a Majority and superior Power, may support a Rivalship and erect even *Counter-Establishments*. But then by the same Means, our ancient Disputes will be revived; the Church will be thought really in Danger; and religious Feuds, which have been so long and so beneficially kept down will once more disturb the Peace of the State. It is a certain Truth, that our *religious* and *civil Contests* have mutually, and almost alternately, raised and fomented each other. *Churchmen* and *Dissenters* have sometimes differed, and sometimes thought, or been made to think, that They differed, at least, as much about *civil* as *religious Matters*. There can be therefore no Way so effectual to compose their Differences on the *latter*, as to improve the growing Union between them on the *former*. *Idem sentire de Republica*, To think alike about publick Affairs, hath been esteemed necessary to constitute and maintain *private Friendships*. It is obviously more essential in *publick Friendships*. Bodies of Men in the same Society can never unite, unless they unite on this *Principle*; and if they once unite on this *Principle*, they will unite on all *others*, or they will readily and chearfully make one another easy about them. — Let me speak plainly. It becomes a Man to do so, who means honestly. — In our political Divisions of *Whig* and *Tory*, the *Dissenters* have adhered to the *former*, and they want no Apology for doing so. They joined themselves to those, with whom they agreed, and stood in Opposition to those, with whom they differed in *Principles of Government*. There could be no Objection brought against them, on this Account. They certainly did not follow  
Power.



*Power.* They did not act like a *Sect*, or a *Faction*, who had, and pursued an Interest distinct from the Interest of the Whole. Their *Non-Conformity* hath nothing to do here. They concurred with *Conformists*; and if they had been *Conformists* themselves, as they were *Dissenters*, they would have acted in the same Manner. But if *this Division of Parties*, on the same Principles, subsists no longer; if there be in Truth neither a *Tory*, nor a *Whig*, as I have said above, but a *Court* and a *Country-Party* in Being; if the political Principles, which the *Dissenters* have formerly avowed, are manifestly pursued on *one Side*; and those, which they have opposed, or others equivalent to them in their Effects, are pursued on the *other*; can the *Dissenters* hesitate about the Option they are to make? I am persuaded they cannot. I know that several amongst them do not. What might be, and certainly would be said, if they made their Option to stand by the *M—r*, I will not so much as suggest. What must be the Consequence of their standing by the *Nation*, in Opposition to *Him*, (for between *these two Powers* the present Contest lies) it is easy to tell, and impossible to deny. They will prove, in this Case, to the whole World, that the *Spirit of Liberty* animates, and *Conscience* alone determines their Conduct. They, who could never brook a *Regal*, will have the Merit of saving their Country from the Danger of a *Ministerial Tyranny*; and their Country will owe them all the Acknowledgments, which are due from good and grateful Citizens of the same Commonwealth.

As to the other great and national Division of *Whig* and *Tory*; He, who recollects what hath passed in *Parliament*, and observes what passes out of it, can differ very little in his Opinion from what hath been said concerning it. The principal Ar-  
ticles

ticles of *your civil Faith*, published some Time ago, (or, to speak more properly, the *civil Faith of the old Whigs*) are assented and consented to by the *Country-Party*; and I say, upon good Authority, that if *this Creed* was made a Test of *political Orthodoxy*, there would appear at this Time but very few *Hereticks* amongst us. How different the Case is, on the *other Side*, will appear, not only from the Actions, but from the Principles of the *Court-Party*, as we find them avowed in their Writings; Principles more dangerous to *Liberty*, though not so directly, nor so openly levelled against it, than even any of those, bad as they were, which *some of these Men* value themselves for having formerly opposed.

In short, the *Revolution* is looked upon by all Sides as a *new Æra*; but the *Settlement* then made is looked upon by the whole *Country-Party* as a *new Magna Charta*, from whence *new Interests*, *new Principles of Government*, *new Measures of Submission*, and *new Obligations* arise. From thence we must date both *King and People*. His Majesty derives his Title from *Acts*, made in Consequence of it. We likewise derive, not our Privileges, (for they were always ours) but a more full and explicit Declaration, and a more solemn Establishment of them from the same Period. On this Foundation all the *reasonable, independent Whigs and Tories* unite. They could unite on this alone; for the *Whigs* have always professed the Principles, which paved the Way for the *Revolution*; and whatever the *Tories* may have professed, they acted upon the same Principles, or they acted upon none, which would be too absurd to assert, when they brought about that great Event, in Concert with the rest of the Nation, as I shall some Time or other prove.

To

To this *Magna Charta*, and *these Principles*, let us adhere inviolably, in Opposition to the *two Extremes* mentioned by me at the Beginning of this Letter, viz. To *Those*, who *disown* them, and to *Those* who *betray* them.—Let neither the polemical Skill of *Leſly*, nor the antique Erudition of *Bedford*, persuade us to put on again those old Shackles of *false Law*, *false Reason*, and *false Gospel*, which were forged before the *Revolution*, and broke to Pieces by it.—As little let us suffer the arch Slyneſs of *G——don*, the dogmatical Dryneſs of *H——e*, or the ſoucing Proſtitution of *Sh——k*, to ſlip new Shackles on us, which are inconfiſtent with the conſtituent Principles of our Eſtabliſhment.—Let us maintain and improve the *national Union*, ſo happily begun, and bleſs God for diſpoſing the Temper of the Nation almoſt univerſally to it.—*Such a Coalition* hath been long wanted in this Kingdom, and never more than at this important Criſis; for on this it will depend whether *They*, who not only oppoſe the Progreſs of that *Corruption*, which had well nigh overſpread the Land, but endeavour to extirpate it by the Roots, ſhall prevail; or *They*, who nourish and propagate it, who eat themſelves, and tempt others to eat the baneful Fruit it bears.—On this it will depend whether *They* ſhall prevail, who conſtantly inſiſt againſt the Continuance of a *ſtanding Army in Time of Peace*, agreeably to the Principles of our *Conſtitution*; or *They*, who plead for it, and endeavour to make it a neceſſary Part of *that Conſtitution*, though incompatible with *publick Liberty*.—On this it will depend whether *They* ſhall prevail, who endeavour to conceal the *Frauds* which are practiſed, and to ſcreen the *Fraudulent*, at the Riſque of ruining *Credit*, and deſtroying *Trade*, as well as to monopolize in the Hands of a *Few* the whole Wealth of the

the *Nation* ; or *They*, who do their utmost to bring the *former* to Light, and the *latter* to Punishment at a Time, when *glaring Fraud*, or very strong Symptoms of *Fraud*, appear in so many Parts of publick Management, from some of the *greatest Companies* down to the *Turnpike* at *Hyde-Park* Corner.—On this it will depend, whether *They* shall prevail, who desire that *Great Britain* should maintain such a Dignity and prudent Reserve in the Broils of *Europe*, as become her Situation, suit her Interest, and alone can enable her to cast the *Balance* ; or *They*, who are ready on every Occasion, to prostitute her *Dignity*, to pawn her *Purse*, and to sacrifice her *Commerce*, by intangling her not only too much with the *other great Powers of Europe*, from whom they may sometimes want reciprocal Engagements, but even with *those diminutive Powers*, from whom it would be ridiculous to expect any.

*I am, SIR, Your's, &c-*

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## LETTER II.

SIR,

WHILST I was writing my last Letter to you, it came into my Thoughts that nothing would illustrate the Subject better, nor enforce more strongly the Exhortation of an *Union of Parties*, in Support of that Constitution, on the Terms of which alone all Right to govern us, and all our Obligation to obey, is now founded, than an Enquiry into the Rise and Progress of our *late Parties* ; or a short History of *Toryism* and *Whiggism* from their Cradle to their Grave ; with an introductory Account of their Genealogy and Descent.

Your



Your Papers have been from the first consecrated to the Information of the People of *Britain*; and I think they may boast very justly a Merit singular enough; that of never speaking to the Passions, without appealing to the Reason of Mankind. It is fit they should keep up this Character, in the strictest Manner, whilst they are employed on the most important Subject, and published at the most important Crisis. I shall therefore execute my Design with Sincerity and Impartiality. I shall certainly not flatter, and I do not mean to offend. Reasonable Men and Lovers of Truth, in whatever Party they have been engaged, will not be offended at Writings, which claim no Regard but on this Account, that they are founded in Reason and Truth, and speak with Boldness what Reason and Truth conspire to dictate. As for the *Drummers and Trumpeters of Faction*, who are hired to drown the Voice of Both in one perpetual Din of Clamour, and would endeavour to drown, in the same Manner, even the dying Groans of their Country, if she was already brought into that extreme Condition; they shall not provoke me to break a most contemptuous Silence. The Subject is too solemn. They may prophane it, by writing on it. Far be it from me to become guilty of the same Crime, by answering them.

If the Enquiry I am going to make into the Rise and Progress of our *late Parties* should produce in any Degree the Good, which I intend, it will help to confirm and improve the *national Union*, so happily begun, by taking off some Remains of Shyness, Distrust and Prejudice, which may still hang about Men, who think alike, and who press on from different Quarters to the same common Point of View. It will help to unmask more effectually the wicked Conduct of those who labour  
with

with all the Skill, and, which is much more considerable, with all the Authority they possess, to keep up the *Division of Parties* ; that each of these may continue to be, in its Turn, what all of them have been too often and too long, the Instruments and the Victims of private Ambition. It will do something more. A few Reflections on the Rise and Progress of our Cure, will help us of Course to make a true Judgment on our present State, and will point out to us, better perhaps than any other Method, the specifick Remedies still necessary to preserve our Constitution in Health and Vigour.—Having premised this, I come to the Point.

Queen *Elizabeth* designed, and the Nation called King *James* to the Throne, tho' the whole *Scottish Line* had been excluded by the Will of *Henry* the VIIIth, made indeed under the Authority of an *Act of Parliament*, and yet little regarded either by the *Parliament*, or the *People*. As soon as he was on the Throne, a flattering *Act of Recognition* passed ; for though all Princes are flattered on their first Accession, yet those Princes are sure to be flattered most, who deserve Panegyrick least. In this *Act* the *Parliament* acknowledged, on the *Knees of their Hearts*, (such was the Cant of the Age) the *indubitable Right*, by which they declared that the Crown descended to him immediately, on the Decease of Queen *Elizabeth*. Of this *Act* and of the Use which some Men, very weakly I think, endeavoured to make of it, I shall have Occasion to speak hereafter. I would only observe here that this is the *Æra of hereditary Right*, and of all those exalted Notions, concerning the *Power and Prerogative of Kings*, and the *Sacredness of their Persons*. All together they composed such a System of Absurdity as had never been heard of in this

this Country, till *that anointed Pedant* broached them. They have been spoken of pretty much at large in your Papers ; particularly in some of those, published under the Name of *Oldcastle*. To them I refer.

To assert that the extravagant Principles of *Ecclesiastical and Civil Government*, which began to be propagated in *this Reign*, and were carried still higher in the *next*, gave Occasion to those of another *Kind*, or of another *Extreme*, which were taught with Success, and gained by Degrees great Vogue in the Nation, would be too much. Opinions very different from those, which received the Sanction of a *legal Establishment in Church and State*, had crept about obscurely, if not silently, even whilst the Government of *Elizabeth* lasted. But this I say ; that the Principles, by which King *James* and King *Charles* the First governed, and the Excesses of *Hierarchical and Monarchical Power*, exercised in Consequence of them, gave great Advantage to the *opposite Opinions*, and entirely occasioned the Miseries which followed. Phrenzy provoked Phrenzy, and two Species of Madness infected the whole Mass of the People. It hath cost us a Century to lose our Wits, and to recover them again.

If our Grievances under King *Charles* the First had been redressed by a sober, regular, Parliamentary Reformation of the State ; or if, the civil War happening, a new Government had been established on Principles of the Constitution, not of Faction, of Liberty, not of Licentiousness, as there was on the Abdication of King *James* the II<sup>d</sup> ; we may conclude, both from Reason and Experience, that the absurd and slavish Doctrines I have mentioned would have been exploded early. They would have been buried in the  
recent

recent Grave of *Him*, who who first devised them; and the Memory of *Him* and of *Them* would have stunk together in the Nostrils of Mankind. But the Contrary fell out. The State was subverted, instead of being reformed; and all the Fury of Faction and Enthusiasm was employed to destroy the Constitution to the very Foundations. A natural Consequence followed. If the Principles of King *James's* and King *Charles's* Reigns had been disgraced by better, They would not have risen again; but They were only kept down for a Time by worse; and therefore they rose again at the *Restoration*, and revived with the Monarchy. Thus that epidemical Taint, with which King *James* infected the Minds of Men, continued upon us, and it is scarce hyperbolical to say, that *this Prince* hath been the original Cause of a Series of Misfortunes to this Nation, as deplorable as a lasting Infection of our Air, of our Water, or our Earth, would have been. The Spirit of his Reign was maintained in that of his *Son*, (for how could it well be otherwise, when the same Ministers continued in Power?) and the Events of both produced the Civil War. The Civil War produced the Death of the King, and the Exile of his Family. The Exile of these Princes reconciled Them to the Religion of *Rome*, and to the Politicks of *foreign Nations*, in such Degrees as their different Characters admitted. *Charles* sipped a little of the poisonous Draught, but enough however to infect his whole Conduct. As for *James*,

———*Ille impiger hausit  
Spumantem Pateram.*

He drank the Chalice off to the lowest and foulest Dregs.

That



That *Principles* as absurd as these in their Nature, and as terrible in their Consequences, such as would shock the common Sense of a *Samojede*, or an *Hottentot*, and had just before deluged the Nation in Blood, should come into Vogue again at the *Restoration*, will not appear strange to those who carry themselves back, as it were, to that Point of Time. The Wounds of the *Civil War* were bleeding, and the Resentments of the *Cavaliers*, who came into Power at Court and in Parliament, were at their Height. No wonder then if few Men had, in such a Ferment as This, Penetration enough to discern, or Candour enough to acknowledge, or Courage enough to maintain, that the *Principles* We speak of were truly and primarily the Cause of all their Misfortunes. The Events, which proved them so, were recent; but for that very Reason, because they were recent, it was natural for Men in such a Circumstance as This to make wrong Judgments about them. It was natural for the *Royal Party* to ascribe all their and their Country's Misfortunes, without any due Distinction, to the *Principles*, on which King *Charles*, and even King *James*, had been opposed; and to grow more zealous for *Those*, on which the Governments of *these two Princes* had been defended, and for which they had suffered. Add to This the national Transport, on so great a Revolution; the Excess of Joy, which many felt and many feigned; the Adulation employed by many to acquire new Merit, and by many to atone for past Demerit; and you will find Reason to be surprized, not that the *same Principles of Government*, as had threatened our *Liberties* once, and must by necessary Consequence do so again, were established; but that our *Liberties* were not immediately, and at once given up. That they were  
saved,

saved, We owe, not to *Parliament*, no not to the *Convention Parliament*, who brought the King home; but to those great and good Men, *Clarendon* and *Southampton*. Far from taking Advantage of the Heat and Fervour of the Times, to manage Parliaments into *scandalous Jobs*, and *fatal Compliances with the Crown*, to their immortal Honour, (with Gratitude and Reverence to their Memories be it spoken) They broke the *Army*, stinted the *Revenue*, and threw their Master on the *Affections of his People*.—But I return.

Besides these Reasons drawn from the Passions of Men, others of a more sober Kind may be given, to account for the making a Settlement at the *Restoration*, upon Principles too near a-kin to Those, which had prevailed before the War, and which had in Truth caused it. Certain it is, that although the *Non Conformists* were stunned by the Blow They had just received, and though their Violence was restrained by the Force of the present Conjunction; yet They still existed. Symptoms of this appeared, even whilst the Government was settling, and continued to appear long after it was settled. Now, every Symptom of this Kind renewed the *Dread* of relapsing into those Miseries from which the Nation had so lately recovered itself; and *this Dread* had the natural Effect of all extreme Fears. It hurried Men into every Principle as well as Measure, which seemed the most opposite to those of the *Persons feared*, and the most likely, though at any other Risk, to defeat their Designs, and to obviate the present Danger, real or imaginary. May We not fairly conjecture, for it is but Conjecture, something more? In such a Temper of Mind, and such a Situation of Circumstances, might not even Those, who saw how groundless and dangerous such extravagant

travagant Notions about the *Right, Power* and *Prerogative of Kings* were, imagine however that it was a Part of Prudence to give Way to them, and to countenance them, in the present Conjunction; to suffer the Opinions of the Nation to be bent too far on *one Side*, as They had been bent too far on the other; not that they might remain crooked, but that they might become straight.

The same Spirit and much the same Reasons as determined our Settlement, at the *Restoration*, upon such high Principles of *Monarchy*, prevailed relatively to our *religious Differences*, and the Settlement of the *Church*. I shall speak of it with that Freedom, which a Man may take, who is conscious that He means nothing but the publick Good, hath no Bye-Ends, nor is under the Influence of serving any particular Cause.

I say then very frankly that the *Church* and the *King* having been joined in all the late Contests both by Those, who attacked them, and Those, who defended them, *Ecclesiastical Interests, Resentments, and Animosities* came into the Aid of *Sæcular*, in making the *new Settlement*. Great Lenity was shewn at the Restoration, in *looking backwards*; unexampled and unimitated Mercy to particular Men, which deserved, no doubt, much Applause. This Conduct would have gone far towards restoring the Nation to its *primitive Temper* and *Integrity*, to its *old good Manners*, its *old good Humour*, and its *old good Nature*, (Expressions of my Lord Chancellor *Clarendon*, which I could never read without being moved and softened) if great Severity had not been exercised immediately after, in *looking forwards*, and great Rigour used to large Bodies of Men, which certainly deserves Censure, as neither just, nor politick—I say,  
not

not *just* ; because there is, after all, a real and a wide Difference between *Moral* and *Party Justice*. The *one* is founded in Reason ; the *other* takes its Colour from the Passions of Men, and is but another Name for *Injustice*. *Moral Justice* carries Punishment as far as Reparation, and necessary Terror require ; no farther. *Party Justice* carries it to the full Extent of our Power, and even to the gorging and sating of our Revenge ; from whence it follows that Injustice and Violence, once begun, must become perpetual in the successive Revolutions of *Parties*, as long as *these Parties* exist.——I say, not *politick* ; because it contradicted the other Measures, taken for quieting the Minds of Men. It alarmed all the *Sects* anew ; confirmed the Implacability, and whetted the Rancour of *Some* ; disappointed and damped a Spirit of Reconciliation in *Others* ; united Them in a common hatred to the *Church* ; and roused in the *Church* a Spirit of Intolerance and Persecution. This Measure was the more imprudent, because the Opportunity seemed fair to take Advantage of the Resentments of the *Presbyterians* against the other *Sectaries*, and to draw Them, without persecuting the *Others*, by the Cords of Love into the Pale of the Church, instead of driving them back by severe Usage into their antient Confederacies. But when Resentments of the *Sort* We now mention were let loose, to aggravate Those of the *other Sort*, there was no Room to be surprized at the Violences which followed ; and They, who had acted greater could not complain of these, great as they were, with any very good Grace.

If we may believe \* *One*, who certainly was not partial against *these Sects*, both *Presbyterians* and *Independents*

\* Dr. Burnet, afterwards Bishop of Salisbury, in one of his Tracts.



dependents *had carried the Principles of Rigour, in the Points of Conscience, much higher, and acted more implacably upon it, than ever the Church of England hath done, in its angriest Fits.* The securing Them-selves therefore against *Those*, who had ruined them and the Constitution once already, was a plausible Reason for the *Church-Party* to give, and I doubt not, the true and sole Motive of many for exercising, and persisting in the Exercise of great Severity. General, prudential Arguments might, and there is Reason to believe they did, weigh with particular Men ; but they could have little Force, at such a Time, on Numbers. As little could some other Considerations have then, whatever they have now. The Promises at *Breda*, for Instance, and the Terms of the *Declaration* sent from thence, could not be urged with Force to a *Parliament*, who had no Mind, and was strictly under no Obligation to make good such Promises as the *King* had made, beyond his Power of promising, if taken absolutely ; or from which, if taken conditionally, He was discharged on the Refusal of *Parliament* to confirm them.——Thus again, the Merit pleaded by the *Presbyterians*, on Account of the Share they had in the *Restoration*, which was very real and very considerable, could avail however but little. That they went along with the national Torrent, in restoring the Constitution of Church and State, could not be denied. But then it was remembered too that these Fruits of Repentance came too late ; not till they had been oppressed by *another Sect*, who turned upon them, wrested the Power out of their Hands, and made them feel, what they had made others feel, the Tyranny of a Party.

Such Reasons, and Motives, as I have mentioned, prevailed ; and worse than these would

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have been sufficient, when the Passions of Men ran so high, to lay the *Dissenters*, without any Distinction, under extreme Hardships. They seemed to be the principal Object of the Fears and Jealousies of *Parliament*. Addressses were continually made, and the Edge of the Law continually whetted against them, from 1660 to 1669, when the Law for *suppressing Conventicles*, and the last of these penal Statutes passed, as I remember. Experience will justify me for saying that this long and extreme Rigour was unwise, as well as unjust. It appears, indeed, from the Memorials of those Times, that They, who suffered, had given abundant Provocation, though not sufficient Excuse, to the Rigour, under which they suffered. Some former Hardships, which the *Dissenters* had endured from the *Church*, made them more violent against it, when they got Possession of an usurped Power. Just so the Violence which *They* exercised at that Time, stimulated the Severity they felt in their Turn, when the legal Constitution of the *Church* was restored. Notwithstanding all which, I incline upon very good Reasons, to think that this Severity was not in the first Design of the *Ministers*, nor would have been shewn, if another fatal Influence had not prevailed. The Influence I mean is that of *Papery*. It prevailed from the first Moments to the last of King *Charles the Second*. The best Ministers were frequently driven off their Byass by it. The worst had a sure Hold on their *Master*, by complying with it. On the Occasion now mentioned, this Influence and the Artifice of the *Popish Faction*, worked very fatally on the Passions of Parties, and the private Interests of Individuals; and the Ministers, and the Church, and the Dissenters, were Bubbles alike of their common Enemy. *Barefac'd Papery*

could ask no Favour, because *Papery* could expect none. Protestant Dissenters were therefore to serve as stalking Horses, that *Papists* might creep behind them, and have Hopes of being, some Time or other, admitted with them. The Church-Party was halloo'd on the *Dissenters*; whilst the *Dissenters* were encouraged to unite and hold out; whilst they were flattered with an high Opinion of their own Strength, and the King's Favour; and whilst some *leading Men* amongst them, who thought it better to be at the Head of a Sect, than at the Tail of an Establishment, were perhaps encouraged, and confirmed in that Thought, by the private Applications of the Court.

These Arts, these wicked Arts (for such they were) prevailed; and though the 2000 Ministers, who went out of their Churches on one Day, were far from being all of the same Mind, or having one positive, consistent Scheme; though many of Them must have lost their Benefices, even if they had complied with the *Act of Uniformity*, because they were *Intruders*; and in actual Possession of Benefices legally belonging to *others*; yet, by uniting in the Point of *Non-Conformity*, they appeared as *one Body*, and in some Sense they were so. Several of them were popular for certain Modes of Devotion, suited to the Humour of the Time; and several were Men eminent for true Learning, and unaffected Piety. They increased the Zeal of their Flocks, and created Compassion in others. Here the Court began to reap the Fruits of their Management, in the Struggle for a Toleration. I use the Word, though I know it may be simply cavilled at. The first Step made was an Application to the *King*, who declared Himself ready and willing to *dispense*, in their Favour, with several Things in the *Act of Uniformity*; and thus the *Dissenters* were made, by the

the Severity of the Parliament and the Intrigues of the Court, the Instruments of introducing a *dispensing Power*. Such Attempts were made more than once ; but happily failed, as often as made, through the vigorous Opposition of Parliament ; till at last the Scene began to open more, and the *Dissenters* to see that They were made the Tools of promoting, what They never intended, the Advancement of the *Prerogative* above Law, and the Toleration of *Popery* against it.

To conclude. By such Means, as I have described, the Constitution of Parties after the *Restoration* preserved unhappily too near a Resemblance to the Constitution of Parties before the *War*. The *Prerogative* was not, indeed, carried so high, in some Instances, as *James* and *Charles* the First had attempted to carry it. Nay, some Supports of it were bought off, and taken away ; and others more dangerous, as We have observed, were prevented by the Virtue of the *Men at that Time in Power*. But still the Government was established on *Principles*, sufficient to invite a King to exercise *arbitrary Power*, and support Him by their Consequences in the Exercise of it afterwards ; so that, in this Respect, the Seeds of *future Divisions* were sowed abundantly. The *Dissenters* had, indeed, lost much of their Credit and all their Power. But still They had Numbers, and Property, and Industry, and Compassion for them ; so that here was another Crop of *Dissenters* planted to nurse up, and to strengthen the other. They did not inflame the Contest, which followed, into a Civil War, as they had helped to do formerly ; but I think, that, without them, and the Disunion and Hatred amongst *Protestants*, consequent upon them, the Zeal against *Popery* could not have run into a Kind of *factious Fury*, as We shall be obliged to confess it did. I



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think that Fears of falling once more under *Presbyterian*, or *Republican Power*, could not have been wrought up in the Manner they were, towards the End of this Reign, so as to drown even the Fear of *Popery* itself; so as to form a Party, in Favour of a *Popish Successor*; so as to transport both Clergy and Laity into an Avowal of *Principles*, which must have reduced us to be at this Time *Slaves*, not *Freemen*, *Papists*, not *Protestants*, if the very Men, who had avowed *such Principles*, had not saved themselves and us, in direct Opposition to them. — But I am running into the Subject of another Letter, when This is grown too prolix already.

I am, SIR, Yours, &c.

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### LETTER III.

SIR,

THE Sum of what hath been said, concerning the *Settlement of Church and State*, and the *Divisions of Parties*, at the *Restoration*, amounts to This; that as the Attempts of King *James* and King *Charles* the First, against the Spirit of the Constitution, threw the Nation into a Civil War, and all the miserable Consequences, both necessary and contingent, of that Calamity; so the Fury, Enthusiasm and Madness of *those Parties*, which arose during that unnatural Ferment, frightened the Nation back, if not into all, yet more generally perhaps than before, into most of the *Notions*, that were established to justify the Excesses of former Reigns. *Hereditary, indefeazable Right, Passive Obedience*, and *Non-Resistance*, (those Corner-stones, which are an improper Foundation for any Superstructure but that of Tyranny) were made, even by Parliament, the Foundation of the *Monarchy*; and all

all Those, who declined an exact and strict Conformity to the whole Establishment of the *Church*, even to the most minute Parts of it, were deprived of the Protection, nay exposed to the Prosecution of the *State*.—Thus *one Part of the Nation* stood proscribed by the *other*; the *least*, indeed, by the *greatest*; whereas a little before the *greatest* stood proscribed by the *least*. *Roundhead* and *Cavalier* were, in Effect, no more. *Whig* and *Tory* were not yet in Being. The only two apparent Parties were those of *Churchmen* and *Dissenters*; and *religious Differences* alone, at this Time, maintained the Distinction.

Such was the State of *Party*, upon the Meeting of the *first Parliament* called by King *Charles* the Second, and for some Years afterwards, as nearly as I have been able to observe by what I have read in History, and received from Tradition.—How the *Notions* then in Vogue began to change, and *this Spirit* to decline, some Time after the *Restoration*; how the *Zeal* of *Churchmen* and *Dissenters* against one another began to soften, and a *Court* and *Country-Party* to form themselves; how *Faction* mingled itself again in the Contest, and renewed the former Resentments and Jealousies; how *Whig* and *Tory* arose, the furious Offspring of those inauspicious Parents *Roundhead* and *Cavalier*; how the Proceedings of *one Party* might have thrown us back into a *civil War*, *Confusion* and *Anarchy*; how the Success of the *other* had like to entailed *Tyranny* on the State, and *Popery* in the Church; how the *Revolution* did, and could alone, deliver us from the *Grievances* we felt, and from the *Dangers* we feared; how this *great Event* was brought about by a formal Departure of *each Side* from the Principles objected to them by the *other*; how *this Renewal of our Constitution*, on the Principles of *Liberty*, by the most solemn, deliberate, national Act, that ever



was made, did not only bind at least every one of those, who concurred in any Degree to bring it about ; (and that Description includes almost the whole Nation) but how absurd it is for any Man, who was born since *that Æra*, or who, being born before it, hath been bound by no particular, legal Tye to any *other Settlement*, to be willing to give up the Advantages of the *present Constitution*, any more than he would give up the Privileges of the *great Charter*, which was made and ratified so many Ages ago ; all these Points are to be now touched in that summary Manner, which I have prescribed to myself, and which will be sufficient, in so plain a Case, where Men are to be reminded of what they know already, rather than to be informed, and to be confirmed, not to be convinced.

I proceed therefore to observe, that the Nation began to be indisposed to the *Court*, soon after the *Restoration*. The Sale of *Dunkirk* helped to ruin a great and good Minister, though it be still doubtful at least, notwithstanding the Clamour raised, and the Negotiations with *d'Éstrades* so much insisted upon, whether he was strictly answerable for this Measure. — Who knows how soon the Re-establishment of the *same Port and Harbour* may be laid in Form to the Charge of *those two Men*, who are strictly and undeniably answerable for it, and who stagger already under the Weight of so many other just Imputations ?

The *first Dutch War*, which was lightly and rashly undertaken, and which ended ignominiously for the Nation, augmented the publick Indisposition. Nay Misfortunes, such as the *Plague*, and the *Burning of London*, as well as *Mismanagement*, had this Effect. But we must place at the Head of all a *Jealousy of Popery*, which was well founded, and there-

therefore gathered Strength daily. This soon heated the Minds of Men to such a Degree, that it seems almost wonderful the *Plague* was not imputed to the *Papists*, as peremptorily as the *Fire*.

The Death of my Lord *Southampton*, and the Disgrace and Banishment of my Lord *Clarendon*; made Room for new Causes of Jealousy and Dissatisfaction; and the Effects increased in Proportion. *These two noble Lords* had stood in the Breach against *Popery* and foreign *Politicks*; and what one of them said of the other, that is *Southampton* of *Clarendon*, may be applied with Justice to *Both*. They were true Protestants, and honest Englishmen. *Whilst they were in Place, our Laws, our Religion, and our Liberties were in Safety. When they were removed, England felt the ill Effects of the Change*; for when they were removed, all these were in Danger. How glorious a Panegyrick is this, in which the unanimous Voice of Posterity does and must agree? It is preferable surely to all the Titles, and Honours and Estates, which those *illustrious Patriots* left behind them; and so I persuade myself it is esteemed by the *young Noblemen*, who are Heirs to their Virtues, as well as their Fortunes.

King *Charles*, and more than him the *Duke* and the *Papish Faction* were now at Liberty to form new Schemes; or rather to pursue old ones, with less Reserve, against the Religion and Liberty of *England*. As soon as the famous *Cabal* had the whole Administration of Affairs, these Designs were pushed almost without any Reserve at all.—I am not writing the History of this Reign; nor have I undertaken any thing more than to make a few Observations on the several Turns of *Parties* in it. I need not therefore descend into particular Proofs of the Designs, which I attribute to the *Court*; nor into a Deduction of the Measures taken to promote them,

them, and the Efforts made to defeat them. That these Designs were real, can be doubted of by no Man; since without quoting many printed Accounts, which are in the Hands of every one, or insisting on other Proofs, which have not seen the Light, (and such there are) the Abbot *Primi's* Relation of the secret Negotiations between the *King* and his *Sister*, the *Dutchess of Orleans*, published in 1682, as I think, and immediately suppressed, as well as the History of the *Jesuit d'Orleans*, written on Memorials furnished to Him by King *James* the Second, put the whole Matter out of Dispute, and even beyond the Reach of Cavil. It is sufficient for my Purpose to observe that the Tide of *Party*, which had run so strongly for the *Court*, and had been seldom so much as slackened hitherto, began now to turn, and to run Year after Year more strongly the other Way.

When this *Parliament* sate down, (for it deserves our particular Observation that both *Houses* were full of Zeal for the present Government, and of Resentment against the late *Usurpations*) there was but one *Party* in *Parliament*; and no other *Party* could raise its Head in the Nation. This might have been the Case much longer, probably as long as King *Charles* had sate on the Throne, if the *Court* had been a little honefter, or a little wiser. No *Parliament* ever did more to gain their *Prince* than This. They seemed, for several Years, to have nothing so much at Heart as securing his Government, advancing his *Prerogative*, and filling his *Coffers*. The Grants They made Him were such as passed for Instances of Profusion in those Days; when 1,200,000 l. a Year for the *CIVIL LIST*, the *FLEET*, the *GUARDS* and *GARRISONS*, and all the ordinary Expences of the Government, was thought an exorbitant Sum; how little a Figure soever it would

would make in our Times, when *two Thirds of that Sum*, at least, are appropriated to the Use of the *Civil List singly*. But all This was to no Purpose ; a *foreign Interest* prevailed ; a *Cabal* governed ; and sometimes the *Cabal*, and sometimes a *Prime-Minister* had more Credit with the *King*, than the *whole Body of his People*. When the *Parliament* saw that They could not gain Him over to his own, and to their common Interest ; nor prevail on Him, by Connivance, Compliance, and other gentle Methods ; They turned Themselves to such as were rough, but agreeable to Law and the Custom of *Parliament*, as well as proportionable to the Greatness of the Exigency. That they lost their Temper, on some particular Occasions, must not be denied. They were Men, and therefore frail ; but their Frailties, of this Kind, proceeded from their Love of their Country. They were transported, when they found that their *Religion* and *Liberty* were constantly in Danger from the Intrigues of a *Popish Faction* ; and They would have been so transported, no Doubt, if *Liberty* alone had been attacked by a *Protestant Faction*. Then it was, that the *High-Church Parliament* grew favourable to *Protestant Dissenters*, and ready to make that just Distinction, so long delayed, between *Them* and *Popish Recusants*, that the *whole Protestant Interest* might unite in the Common Cause. Then it was, that the *Prerogative Parliament* defied *Prerogative*, in Defence of their own *Privileges*, and of the *Liberties of their Country*. Then it was, that this *Passive-Obedience, and Non-Resistance Parliament* went the utmost Lengths of *Resistance*, in a *Parliamentary Way* ; and the necessary Consequence of the Steps They made, in this *Way*, must have been *Resistance in another*, if the *King* had not dropt his *Ministers*, retracted his *Pretensions*, redressed some and given Expectation of redressing



dressing other Grievances. In fine, this *Pensioner*  
*Parliament*, as it hath been styled, with some Cor-  
 ruption in the House, and an *Army* sometimes at the  
 Door of it, disbanded the *Army* in *England*, and  
 protested against the *Militia*, settled in *Scotland* by  
 Act of Parliament, and appointed to march for any  
 Service, wherein the King's Honour, Authority and  
 Greatness were concerned, in Obedience to the Orders of  
 the *Privy Council*. That I may not multiply partic-  
 ular Instances, They not only did their utmost to  
 secure their Country against immediate Danger,  
 but projected to secure it against remote Danger,  
 by an Exclusion of the Duke of *York* from the  
 Crown, after they had endeavoured strenuously,  
 but in vain, to prevent his entailing *Popery* more  
 easily upon us by his Miscarriage with a *Popish Prin-*  
*cess*: for He had declared himself a *Papist* with as  
 much Affectation, as if He expected to grow po-  
 pular by it; had already begun to approve of his  
 Zeal, and exercise his Talent in Conversions, by  
 That of his *first Wife*; and was notoriously the  
 Agent of *Rome* and *France*, in order to seduce his  
 Brother into stronger Measures than King *Charles*  
 was willing to take. King *Charles*, to use an Ex-  
 pression of the Lord *Hallifax* of that Age, would  
 trot; but his Brother would gallop.

When I reflect on the Particulars here mentioned,  
 and a great many others, which might be mention-  
 ed to the Honour of this *Parliament*, I cannot hear  
 it called the *Pensioner-Parliament*, as it were by  
 Way of Eminence, without a Degree of honest In-  
 dignation; especially in the Age, in which We live;  
 and by some of *Those*, who affect the most to be-  
 stow upon it this ignominious Appellation. *Pen-*  
*sions* indeed, to the Amount of seven or eight thousand  
*Pounds*, as I remember, were discovered to have  
 been given to some Members of the *House of Com-*  
*mons*.

mons. But then let it be remembered likewise, that this Expedient of *corrupting Parliaments* began under the Administration of that boisterous, overbearing, dangerous Minister, CLIFFORD. As long as there remained any Pretence to say that the Court was in the Interest of the People, the Expedient of *Bribery* was neither wanted, nor practised. When the Court was evidently in *another Interest*, the Necessity and the Practice of *Bribing the Representatives of the People* commenced. Should a *Parliament of Britain* act in Compliance with a Court, against the Sense and Interest of the Nation, Mankind would be ready to pronounce very justly that *such a Parliament* was under the *corrupt Influence of the Court*. But, in the Case now before us, We have a very comfortable Example of a Court wicked enough to stand in Need of *Corruption*, and to employ it; and of a *Parliament* virtuous enough to resist the Force of *this Expedient*; which Philip of Macedon boasted that He employed to invade the *Liberties of other Countries*; and which had been so often employed by Men of less Genius, as well as Rank, to invade the Liberties of *their own*. All, that *Corruption* could do in *this Parliament*, was to maintain the Appearance of a *Court-Party*, whilst the Measures of the Court united a *Country-Party*, in Opposition to them. Neither *Places*, nor *Pensions* could hinder *Courtiers* in this Parliament from voting, on many signal Occasions, against the Court; nor protect either *Those*, who drew the King into ill Measures, nor *Those*, who complied with Him in them. Nay, this *Pensioner-Parliament*, if it must be still called so, gave one Proof of *Independency*, besides That of contriving a *Test*, in 1675. to *purge their Members on Oath from all Suspicion of corrupt Influence*, which ought to wipe off this Stain from the most corrupt. They drove *one of their Paymasters* out

out of Court, and impeached the *other*, in the Fullness of his Power ; even at a Time, when the King was so weak as to make, or so unhappy as to be forced to make, on Account of *Pensions* privately negotiated from *France*, the Cause of the *Crown* and the Cause of the *Minister* one, and to blend their Interests together.

What I have said to the Honour of the *long Parliament* is just ; because in Fact the Proceedings of *that Parliament* were agreeable to the Representation I have given of them. But now, if some severe Censor should appear, and insist that the Dame was *chaste*, only because she was not *enough tempted* ; that *more Pensions* would have made *more Pensioners* ; that *much Money* and *little Prerogative* are more dangerous to *Liberty* than *much Prerogative* and *little Money* ; and that the *worst and weakest Minister* King *Charles* ever had might have been absolute in *this very Parliament*, whose Character I defend, if *such a Minister* had been able to enlist, with Places, Pensions and occasional Bribes, not a *slender Majority*, which the Defection of a Few might at any Time defeat, but such a *bulky Majority*, as might impose on itself ; if any one, I say, should refine in this Manner, and continue to insist that *such a Minister*, with *such a Purse*, would have stood his Ground, in the Parliament I speak of, with how much Contempt and Indignation soever He might have been every where treated by the People ; I shall not presume to assert the contrary. It might have been so. Our Safety was owing as much, perhaps, to the *Poverty of the Court*, as to the *Virtue of the Parliament*. We might have lost our *Liberties*. But then I would observe, before I conclude, that if This be true, the Preservation of our *Religion* and *Liberty*, at that Time, was owing to these two Circumstances ; *first*, that King *Charles* was not parsimonious ;

nious ; but squandered on his Pleasures, what He might have employed to *corrupt this* Parliament ; *secondly*, that the *Ministers*, in that Reign, finger- ing no Money but the *Revenue, ordinary and extra- ordinary*, had no Opportunity to filch in the Pockets of every private Man, and to bribe the Bubbles very often with their own Money ; as might be done now, when *Funding* hath been so long in Fashion, and the *greatest Minister* hath the Means of being the *greatest Stockjobber*, did not the eminent Integrity of the *Minister*, and the approved Virtue of the Age, secure us from any such Danger.

We have now brought the Deduction of Parties very near to the *Æra* of WHIG and TORY ; into which the *Court* found Means to divide the Nation, and by this Division to acquire in the Nation a Superiority, which had been attempted ineffectually, even by *Corruption in Parliament*.——But This I reserve for another Letter, and am,

S I R, Yours, &c.

#### LETTER IV.

S I R,

**T**HERE is a Passage in *Tully* so extremely applicable to the mischievous, but transitory, Prevalence of *those Principles of Government*, which King *James* the First imported into this Country, that since it occurs to my Memory, I cannot begin this Letter better than by quoting it to you, and making a short Commentary on it. \* *Opinionum Commenta delet, Dies, Naturæ Judicia confirmat : Groundless Opinions are destroyed, but rational Judgments, or the Judgments of Nature, are confirmed by Time.*

\* *Lib. 2. de Nat. Deorum.*



*Time.* It is *Balbus*, who makes this Observation very properly, when He is about to prove the Existence of a supreme Being. The same Observation might have been employed as properly, on other Occasions, against *Balbus* himself; and the Truth of it might have been exemplified, by comparing the Paradoxes and superstitious Opinions of his *own Sect*, as well as the Tales of an *Hippocentaur*, or a *Chimæra*, with the eternal Truths of genuine Theism, and sound Philosophy. In short the Application of it might have been justly made then, and may be so now in numberless Instances, taken from the most important Subjects, on which the Thoughts of Men are exercised, or in which their Interest, as Men and Members of Society, are concerned.

The Authority of a *Sect*, and much more of a *State*, is able to inspire, and *Habit* to confirm the most *absurd Opinions*. Passion, or Interest can create *Zeal*. But nothing can give Stability and durable Uniformity to *Error*. Indolence, or Ignorance, may keep it floating, as it were, on the Surface of the Mind, and sometimes hinder Truth from penetrating; or Force may maintain it in Profession, when the Mind assents to it no longer. But *such Opinions*, like human Bodies, tend to their Dissolution from their Birth. They will be soon rejected in *Theory*, where Men can think, and in *Practice*, where Men can act with Freedom. They maintain Themselves no longer, than the same Means of Seduction, which first introduced them, or the same Circumstances, which first imposed them, attend and continue to support them. Men are dragged into them, by Chains of Circumstances. Break but these Chains, and the Mind returns with a Kind of intellectual Elasticity to its proper Object, *Truth*. This natural Motion

tion is so strong, that Examples might be cited of Men, embracing *Truth in Practice*, before they were convinced of it in *Theory*. There are Cases, where *Reason* freed from Constraint, or roused by Necessity, acts in some Sort the Part of *Instinct*. We are impelled by *one*, before We have Time to form an *Opinion*. We are often determined by the *other*, against our *Opinion*; that is, before We can be said properly to have *changed it*. But observe here the Perverseness of that rational Creature, Man. When this happens; when the *Judgment of Nature*, for so We may speak after Tully, hath prevailed against the habitual Prejudice of *Opinion*; instead of acknowledging the *victorious Truth*, which determined him to act, instead of condemning the *erroneous Opinion*, against which He acted, He is too often apt to endeavour, peevishly and pedantically, to reconcile his *Actions* to his *Error*; nay, to persist in renouncing *true*, and asserting *false Maxims*, whilst He reaps the Benefit, and maintains the Consequences of the *former*.

You see whither We are brought by these general Reflections. The *absurd Opinions*, (*fiœtæ & vanæ* our Roman Orator would have called them) about the *Right, Power, and Prerogative of Kings*, were so little able to take a deep Root, and to stand the Blasts of Opposition, that few of *those* who drew their Swords on the Side of King *Charles the First*, were determined to it by them. I assert this Fact on cotemporary Authority; on the Authority even of *Some*, who were themselves engaged in *that Cause*, from the Beginning to the End of our Civil Wars. A more recent Tradition assures us, that when the *same Opinions* revived at the *Restoration*, they did not sink deep even then into the Minds of Men; but floated so  
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superficially there, that the *Parliament*, (the very *Parliament* who had authorised them, and imposed them, as I observed in the last Letter) proceeded a great Way, and was ready to have proceeded farther, in direct Opposition to them. A Tradition still more recent will inform us, and that is to be the Subject of this Letter, that when *these Opinions* revived again, at the latter End of the same Reign, with an Appearance of greater Strength, and of a more national Concurrence than ever, they revived but to be exploded more effectually than ever. King *Charles* made Use of them to check the Ferment raised against his Government; but did not seem to expect that they would subsist long in Force. His *wiser Brother* depended much on them; but his Dependance was vain. They were at that Time, wearing out apace; and they wore out the faster by the extravagant Use which was made of them. They were in the Mouths of many, but in the Hearts of few; for almost all those, who had them in their Mouths, acted against them. Thus were *these wicked and ridiculous Principles of Government* twice revived, and twice destroyed again, in less than thirty Years from the *Restoration*.

*Ter si resurgat Murus abeneus,*  
~~Ter~~ *pereat!*

The *second Revival of these Principles*, (for enough hath been said of the first,) happened soon after the Dissolution of the *long Parliament*; and there, I think, We must place the Birth of WHIG and TORY, though *these Parties* did not grow up into full Maturity, nor receive their Names, till about two Years afterwards. The Dissolution of *this Parliament* was desired by Men of very different  
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Complexions ; by *Some*, with factious Views ; by *Others*, on this honest and true Maxim, *that a standing Parliament, or the same Parliament long continued, changes the very Nature of the Constitution in the fundamental Article, on which the Preservation of our whole Liberty depends.* But whatever Motives others might have to desire *this Dissolution*, the Motives, which prevailed on the King, were probably These. *This Parliament not only grew more reserved in their Grants of Money, and stiff and inflexible in other Matters, but seemed to have lost that personal Regard, which they had hitherto preserved for him.* They brought their Attacks home to his Family ; nay, to *Himself*, in the Heats, which the Discovery and Prosecution of the *Popish Plot* occasioned. That on the *Queen* provoked Him. That on his *Brother* embarrassed Him. But that which provoked and embarrassed him both, was the Prosecution of the Earl of *Danby*, in the Manner in which it was carried on. I will not descend into the Particulars of an Affair, at this Time, so well understood. This *Minister* was turned out, and might have been punished, in another Manner, and much more severely than I presume any one, who knows the Anecdotes of that Age, thinks that he deserved to be. But the *Intention* of this Attack, according to *Rapin*, was to shew *that the King, as well as his Brother, was at the Head of a Conspiracy to destroy the Government, and the Protestant Religion.* This is a very bold Assertion, and such a one as I do not pretend to warrant. But thus much is certain ; that if the Earl of *Danby's* Impeachment had been tried, He must have justified Himself by shewing, what every one knew to be true, that the secret Negotiations



tiations with *France*, and particularly that for *Money*, were the *Kings* Negotiations, not his.

Now, whether the King hoped, by dissolving the Parliament, to stop this Prosecution; or to soften that of the *Popish* Plot; or to defeat the Project of excluding the Duke of *York*; his Hopes were all disappointed. The following Parliaments trod in the Steps of This. How, indeed, could They do otherwise in those Days, when the Temper of the People determined the Character of the Parliament; when an *Influence on Elections*, by Prerogative was long since over, and private, indirect Means of gaining another more illegal Influence were not yet found, or the necessary Supports of such Means were not yet acquired; when any Man, who had desired People, who knew neither his Fortune, his Character, nor even his Person, to chuse Him *their Representative in Parliament* (that is to appoint Him *their Trustee*) would have been looked upon and treated as a Madman; in short, when a Parliament, acting against the *declared Sense of the Nation*, would have appeared as surprising a Phenomenon in the moral World, as a retrograde Motion of the Sun, or any other signal Deviation of Things from their ordinary Course, in the natural World.

There was indeed *one Point*, which this Parliament had taken extremely to Heart, and which was no longer open to the Parliaments, that followed; I mean the *Conduct of the King in foreign Affairs*, during the War between *France*, and *Holland* and her *Allies*, which ended by the Treaty of *Nimighen*. This War was not made in remote Countries. It was made at our Door. The Motives to it on the Part of the *Aggressor*, were neither Injuries received, nor Rights invaded; but a Spirit of Conquest, and barefaced Usurpation.

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The Interest *We* had in it was not such as depended on a long Chain of Contingencies, and required much Subtlety to find out, but plain and immediate. The Security, and, at one Time, the very Existence of the *Dutch Commonwealth* depended on the Event of it. No Wonder then, if the Conduct of the *King*, who joined openly with *France* at first, and served her privately to better Purpose at last, furnished ample Matter to the publick Discontent, and helped to increase the ill Humours of succeeding Parliaments on *two other Points*, which were still open, and continued to draw their whole Attention, as long as King *Charles* suffered any to sit, during the rest of his Reign.

*These two Points* were the Prosecution of Persons, involved in the *Popish Plot*, and the Exclusion of the Duke of *York*. The *first* of these had prepared Mankind for the *second*. The Truth is, that if nothing, which affected the *Duke*, had been produced, besides *Coleman's* Letters, these Proofs of his Endeavours to subvert the Religion and Liberty of the People he pretended to govern, joined to so many others of publick Notoriety, which shewed the whole Bent of his Soul, and the whole Scheme of his Policy, would have afforded Reason more than sufficient for sacrificing the *Interest*, or even the *Right* (if you will call it so) of *one Man* to the Preservation of *three Kingdoms*. I know how partial we are in the Judgments we make, concerning ourselves, and our own Interests. I know that this Partiality is the immediate Effect of Self-Love, the strongest Spring in the human, nay in the whole animal System; and yet I cannot help being surprized, that a Man should expect to be trusted with a *Crown*, because he is born a Prince, in a Country, where  
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he could not be trusted by Law, and ought not to be trusted in Reason, with a *Constable's Staff*, if he was born a private Person. Let me add, that such an Expectation must be deemed more unreasonable in a Descendant of *Henry* the Fourth of *France*, if possible, than in any other Man. The hereditary Title of the House of *Bourbon*, on the Extinction of that of *Valois*, was certainly as clear, and much better established by the Laws and Usages of *France*, than the hereditary Right of any Prince of the House of *Stuart* to the Crown of *England*; and yet *Henry* the Fourth, with all the personal Qualifications which could recommend a Prince to the Esteem and Love of his Subjects, would never have been received into the Throne by the *French* Nation, if He had not been of the *Religion of that Nation*. On what Foundation then could it be expected that a *Protestant* and a *free* People should be less animated by *Religion* and *Liberty* both, than their Neighbours had been by *Religion alone*, for *Liberty* had nothing to do in that Contest; Our Fathers were thus animated, at the Time I am speaking of. The long Parliament projected the *Exclusion*; and if the Design had been carried on, in the Spirit of a *Country Party*, it would probably have been carried on with a national Concurrence, and would consequently have succeeded in Effect, though not perhaps at once, nor in the very Form at first proposed.

The violent and sanguinary Prosecution of the *Popish Plot* was intended, no Doubt, to make the Success of the *Exclusion* more secure, by raising the Passions of Men so high, that no Expedient but an *absolute and immediate Exclusion*, in the Terms of the *Bill*, should be thought sufficient. I cannot help saying, on this Occasion, that I wish  
this

this laudable and just Design had not been pursued, by wading through the Blood of so many Men ; Enemies to our *Religion* and *Liberty*, indeed ; but convicted, for the most Part, on Evidence, which could hardly have passed at any other Time. I wish We had done nothing, which might be interpreted to the Disrepute of our *own Religion*, whilst We attempted to proscribe *theirs*. In fine, I wish, for the Honour of my Country, that the Prosecutions on Account of *this Plot*, and much more on Account of *another*, which was set up as a Kind of Retaliation for *This*, and which caused some of the noblest, as well as some of the meanest Blood in the Nation to be spilt, could be erased out of the Records of History. But there is still a farther Reason to wish that greater Temper had been joined, at this Time, to the same Zeal for *Religion* and *Liberty*. Men were made to believe that the *King*, who had yielded on so many *other Occasions*, would yield on *This* ; that *He*, who had given up so many *Ministers*, would give up his *Brother* at last ; and that if the *Parliament* would accept nothing less than the *Exclusion*, in their own Way, it would be extorted from Him. Now in *This* They were fatally deceived ; and I must continue to suspect, till I meet with better Reasons than I have yet found to the contrary, that they were so deceived by the Intrigues of *two very opposite Cabals* ; by the Duke of *York's*, who was averse to *all Exclusions*, whether *absolute*, or *limited*, but most to the *last* ; and by the Duke of *Monmouth's*, who could not find their Account in any but an *absolute Exclusion* ; nor in *This* neither, unless the *Bill* passed without any mention of the *Duke's Daughters*, as next in Succession ; to which, as Bishop *Burnet* tells us, the Prince of *Orange* was willing to comply, on the Faith of Assurances

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He had received from hence ; a Fact, which the *Bishop* might know, and We may therefore take on his Word, as extraordinary as it seems. I would only observe that King *William*, then Prince of *Orange*, could have no Reason for consenting that his *Wife's Pretensions to the Crown* should not be confirmed by an *Act*, which excluded her *Father*, except one ; and That was the Necessity, real, or apparent, of uniting different private Interests in the publick Measure of excluding the Duke of *York*. Now, if this was his Reason, the same Reason proves, what shall be farther confirmed in the next Letter, that a *Spirit of Faction* ran through the Proceedings of Those, who promoted the *Bill of Exclusion* ; and when *Faction* was opposed to *Faction*, there is no Room to wonder, if that of the *Court* prevailed. The *King*, who had not used to shew Firmness on *other Occasions*, was firm on *This* ; and the Consequence of pushing the *Exclusion*, in this Manner, was giving Him an Opportunity of breaking the *Country Party* ; of dividing the Nation into *Whig* and *Tory* ; of governing Himself without *Parliaments* ; and of leaving the Throne open to his *Brother*, not only without Limitations, or Conditions, but with a more absolute Power established than any Prince of his Family had enjoyed.

As soon as the *Court* had got, by Management, a plausible Pretence of objecting a *Spirit of Faction* to Those in the *Opposition*, the Strength of the *Opposition* was broken, because the *national Union* was dissolved. A *Country Party* must be authorized by the *Voice of the Country*. It must be formed on Principles of *common Interest*. It cannot be united and maintained on the particular Prejudices, any more than it can, or ought to be, directed to the particular Interests of *any Set of Men whatsoever*.

ever. A *Party*, thus constituted, is improperly called *Party*. It is the *Nation*, speaking and acting in the Discourse and Conduct of *particular Men*. It will prevail in all Struggles sooner, or later, as long as our *Constitution* subsists; and nothing is more easy to demonstrate than This; that whenever *such a Party* finds it difficult to prevail, our *Constitution* is in Danger; and when They find it impossible, our *Constitution* must, in Fact, be altered. On the other Hand, whenever the Prejudices and Interests of *particular Sets of Men* prevail, the Essence of a *Country Party* is annihilated, and the very Appearance of it will soon be lost. Every Man will resort in this Case to that Standard, under which He hath been marshalled in *former Divisions*; to which his Inclinations lead Him; or which, though He does not intirely approve, yet disapproves the least.

Such a Dissolution of a *Country Party* was brought about at the Period, to which We are now come in our Deduction of *Parties*, by the Passions, the publick Pique, and private Interest of *particular Men*, and by the wily Intrigues of the Court. The Dissolution of *this Party*, and the new Division of the Nation into *Whig and Tory*, brought us into extreme Danger, reunited the Nation again, and a *Coalition of Parties* saved the whole. Such an Experience might have shewed Them, that how opposite soever their *Professions* were, yet They really differed more on *negative* than on *positive Principles*; that they saw one another in a *false Light*, for the most Part, and fought with *Phantoms*, conjured up to maintain their *Division*, rather than with *real Beings*. Experience had not this happy Effect soon. The Swell of the Sea continued long after the Storm was over; and We have seen *these Parties* kick and cuff, like  
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drunken Men, when They were both of the same Side.——Let us hope that this Scene of tragical Folly is over, to the Disappointment of *Those*, who are conscious of *past Iniquity*, or who mediate *future Mischief*. There are no others, who wish and endeavour to prolong it.

*I am, SIR, Your's, &c.*

## LETTER V.

SIR,

NOTHING is more useful, nothing more necessary, in the Conduct of publick Affairs, than a *just Discernment of Spirits*. I mean here not only that *natural private Sagacity*, which is conversant about Individuals, and enables some Men to pry, as it were, into the Heads and Hearts of others, and to discover within them those latent Principles, which constitute their true Characters, and are often disguised in outward Action; but I mean principally that *acquired, publick, political Sagacity*, which is of the same Kind, though I think not altogether the same Thing as the *former*; which flows from Nature too, but requires more to be assisted by Experience, and formed by Art. This is that superior Talent of *Ministers of State*, which is so rarely found in those of *other Countries*, and which abounds so happily at present in those of *Great Britain*. It is by this, that they discover the most secret Dispositions of *other Courts*; and, discovering those Dispositions, prevent their Designs, or never suffer themselves to be surprized by them. It is by This, that they watch over the publick Tranquility *at home*; foresee what

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Effect every Event, that happens, and much more every Step they make themselves, will have on the Sentiments and Passions of Mankind. This Part of human Wisdom is therefore every where of Use ; but is of indispensable Necessity in *free Countries*, where a greater Regard is to be constantly had to the various Fluctuations of Parties ; to the Temper, Humour, Opinion and Prejudices of the *People*. Without such a Regard as this, those Combinations of peculiar Circumstances, which We commonly call *Conjunctures*, can never be improved to the best Advantage, by acting in Conformity, and in Proportion to them ; and without improving *such Conjunctures* to the best Advantage, it is impossible to atchieve any great Undertaking ; or even to conduct Affairs successfully, in their ordinary Course.

A Want of this *Discernment of Spirits*, if I am not extremely mistaken, defeated the Designs of those, who prosecuted with so much Rigour the *Popish Plot*, and the *Exclusion of the Duke of York*. Several of Them were Men of very great Abilities ; and yet We shall have no Reason to be surprized that they failed in this Point, if We reflect how unfit the greatest Genius is to *discern the Spirits of others*, when He hath once *overheated his own*. All Men are fallible ; but here lies the Difference. *Some Men*, such as I have just mentioned, crossed by Difficulties, pressed by Exigencies, transported by their own Passions, or by the Passions of Those, who fight under their Banner, may now and then deviate into Error, and into Error of long and fatal Consequence. But there are *some Men*, such as I shall not mention upon this Occasion, (because I reserve Them for another and a better) who never deviate into the Road of good Sense ; who, crossed by no Difficulties, pressed by no Exigencies,



gencies, meeting scarce Opposition enough to excite their Industry, and guiding a tame well-tutored Flock, that follow their *Bell-weather* obstinately, but never tread on his Heels; there are *Men*, I say, whose special Privilege it is to proceed with all these Advantages, deliberately and superciliously, from Blunder to Blunder, from Year to Year, in one perpetual Maze of confused, incoherent, inconsistent, unmeaning Schemes of Business.

But having nothing to do with the *Men of this Character* at present, I return to Those of the *former Class*; to the *Men*, who led the *Whig-Party*, at its first Appearance, in the Time of King *Charles the Second*. The Foundation, upon which they built all their Hopes of Success, was This; that They should frighten and force the *King* into a Compliance with Them; but They did not enough consider that the Methods They took were equally proper to frighten and force a great Part of the Nation from Them, by Reason of the particular Circumstances of that Time. They did not enough consider that when they began to put their Designs in Execution, scarce twenty Years had passed from the *Restoration*, and that the highest Principles, in Favour of the *Church* and the *Monarchy*, had prevailed almost universally, during one half of that Time, and very generally, during the other half; that They had the accidental Passions of the People for them, but the settled Habits of Thinking against Them; that they were going off from a *broad* to a *narrow Bottom*; from the *Nation* to a *Part of the Nation*; and This at a Time, when They wanted a more than ordinary Concurrence of the *whole Body*. They did not enough consider that They were changing the very Nature of their *Party*, and giving an Opportunity to the *Court*, which

which was then become, in the strict Sense of the Word, a *Faction*, to grow up into a *Party* again, and *such a Party*, as would divide, at least, the People with Them, upon *Principles*, plausible in those Days, and sufficient to raise a Spirit, capable to disappoint all their Endeavours.

The same Resentments and Prejudices, the same Jealousies and Fears, which burst out with Violence, upon many Occasions, a few Years before, lay still in the Hearts of Men; latent and quiet, indeed, and wearing out by Degrees; but yet easy to be revived, and to be blown up anew. If We compare the Conduct of the *long Parliament*, in 1674 and 1675; with the Attempts, which had been lately made, during the Administration of the *Cabal*; with the Secret of the *second Dutch War*, and many other Designs and Practices of the *Court*, which were then come lately and very authentically to Light; with the State of *Scotland*, which was then subdued under a *real Tyranny*; and with That of *Ireland*, where, to say no more, the *Act of Settlement* was but ill-observed; if We make this Comparison, it will not yet appear that the Proceedings of the *House of Commons* were immoderate, though they were warm; nor factious, though they were vigorous; nor that any Danger could be then reasonably apprehended from them, except to the Enemies of the Constitution in Church and State; and yet even the old Resentments, Prejudices, Jealousies and Fears began to revive; and an Apprehension of falling back under the Influence of *Presbyterian* and *Republican Principles* began to shew itself in the House of Lords, and in the Nation. It is true that This had no immediate Consequence; because the *Popish Plot* broke out soon afterwards like a mighty Flame, in which these little Fires, that began to

burn anew, were lost. This great Event made the *Church* and the *Dissenters* continue to run into one, as They had begun to do before ; and the sole Division of *Parties* was That of the *Court* and the *Country*, as long as *this Parliament* lasted. But still it was evident with how delicate an Hand every Thing, that related to our *former Disputes*, required to be touched. It was evident that the least Alarm given to the *Church*, or to Those, who value Themselves on the Principles of *Loyalty* then in Fashion, would be sufficient to open those Wounds, which were just skinned over, and to raise *two new Parties* out of the Ashes of the *old*.

*These Parties* were not raised, whilst the *long Parliament* sate ; because a general Opinion prevailed, and well enough founded on their precedent Conduct, that however angry the *King* might be with the *Parliament*, or the *Parliament* with the *King*, a few popular Steps made on *one Side*, and a little Money granted on the *other*, would soften Matters between Them, and dispose Them to forget all former Quarrels. As hot therefore as the *Parliament* grew, and as much as some People might think that they exceeded their Bounds ; yet still it was difficult to persuade even these People that a *Parliament*, like This, would push Things to the last Extremity ; destroy the *Constitution* They had settled and supported with so much Zeal ; or draw the Sword against a Prince, to whom They had borne so much Affection. But in the *Parliament*, which followed, the Case was not the same ; and I will state as shortly as I can, upon Authorities, which no Man likely to contradict me must refuse, what made the Difference. These Authorities shall be that of *Burnet*, and That of *Rapin* ; whom I quote, on this Occasion, for the same Reason as I would

would quote my Lord *Clarendon* against King *Charles* the First, or *Ludlow* for Him.

In the Year 1676, before We have Grounds sufficient to affirm that the Design of (a) *excluding the Duke of York* was formed, but not before We have Reason to suspect that it might be in the Thoughts of several. Those, who stood foremost in the Opposition to the *Court*, were very industrious to procure a Dissolution of the *long Parliament*; so industrious, that They (b) negotiated the Affair with the *Duke*, who had concurred in a Vote for an Address to dissolve it; and they undertook (c) *that a new Parliament should be more inclineable to grant the Papists a Toleration; than They would ever find This would prove.* The *Papists* were in Earnest for this Measure; since *Coleman* drew a Declaration for justifying it, and since their Design in it was to divide the (d) *King and his People.* It is fair to conclude that the *Protestants*, who had been in it at the Time I mention, upon *Party-Views*, were at least as much so, when their Views rose higher. *This Parliament* had pushed a strict and thorough Examination into the *Popish Plot*; with great Sincerity and Zeal. Nay, the Project of the *Exclusion* had been started, though not prosecuted, in the last Session. May We not take it for granted however that They, who were now resolved to carry the *Exclusion* in a Manner, in which they soon attempted to carry it, and who foresaw by Consequence the Difficulties, that would be opposed to them, and the strong Measures they should be obliged to pursue, in order to overcome these Difficulties; I say, might not they think *this Parliament* much less proper than any other to engage

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and

- (a) *Burnet's History of his own Times, Vol. I. p. 391.*  
 (b) *Ibidem.* (c) *Ibid.* (d) *Ibid.*



and persist in such Measures ? They thought thus, without Doubt ; and so far they judged better than the *King*, who came into the *Dissolution*, upon very different Motives. But as to the Consequence of engaging a *new Parliament* in such strong Measures, the Event shewed that the *King* judged better than they, in the Progress of this Affair.

The *Dissenters*, who had been long persecuted by the *Parliament*, and bantered and abused by the *Court*, were encouraged by the Conjuncture to lift up their Heads. They took Advantage of the Horror and Indignation, which the Discovery of the *Papish Plot*, and the Use made of this Discovery had raised all over the Kingdom. They could not be more zealous in this Cause than the Members of the *established Church* had shewn themselves to be ; but they cried, perhaps, louder for it. In short, whatever their Management was, or however they were abetted, certain it is, that they were very active, and very successful too, in the Elections of the *Parliament*, which followed the *long Parliament*, according to *Rapin*, who asserts, that many of the Members chosen into this House of Commons, were *Presbyterians*. He might have said as much, upon just as good Grounds, of the *two Parliaments*, which followed this, and I shall speak of them indiscriminately. The Leaders, who mustered all their Forces, in order to push the *Bill of Exclusion*, looked on this Turn in the *Elections* as an Advantage to them ; and it might not have been a Disadvantage, if they and the *Dissenters* had improved it with more Moderation. But they were far from doing so, as *Rapin* himself seems to own a little unwillingly, when He says, that *Complaisance for the Presbyterians was carried, perhaps, too far in the Bill for the Comprehension of Protestant Dissenters.*

*senters.* Bishop Burnet speaks more plainly. He owns that many began to declare openly in Favour of the Non-Conformists ; that upon this the Non-Conformists behaved themselves very indecently ; that They fell severely on the Body of the Clergy ; and that They made the Bishops and Clergy apprehend that a Rebellion, and with it the pulling the Church to pieces, was designed. Several other Passages of the same Strength, and to the same Purpose, might be collected from this Historian ; and He, who reads them, will not be surprized, I think, to find that such Proceedings as these, both in Parliament and out of it, gave an Alarm to the Clergy, and set them to make Parallels between the late and the present Times ; and to infuse the Fears and the Passions, which agitated them, into the Nation. The Bishop accuses them, indeed, of doing this with much Indecency. But they, who are frightened out of their Wits, will be apt to be indecent ; and Indecency begets Indecency.

At the same Time, that these Jealousies of a Design to destroy the Church prevailed, others prevailed likewise of a Design to alter the Government of the State ; of a Design not only against the Successor, but against the Possessor of the Crown. Many well-meaning Men, says Bishop Burnet upon one Occasion, began to dislike these Practices, and to apprehend that a Change of Government was designed.

—The King came to think Himself, says the same Author upon another Occasion, levelled at chiefly, though for Decency's Sake his Brother was only named. Rapin goes farther ; for, speaking of the same Time, he uses this remarkable Expression ; that Things seemed to be taking the same Course as in the Year 1640 ; and there was Reason to think that the opposing Party had no better Intentions towards the King now, than the Enemies of King Charles the First had towards Him. But whatever some particular Men,

who knew themselves irreconcilable with the *King*, as well as the *Duke*, or some others, who had still about them a Tang of religious Enthusiasm and Republican Whimsies might intend; I am far from thinking that the *Party*, who promoted the *Exclusion*, meant to destroy, on the contrary it is plain that they meant to preserve, by that very Measure, the *Constitution in Church and State*. The Reason why I quote these Passages, and refer to others of the same Kind, is not to shew what was really designed, but what was apprehended; for as the Distinction of *Whig* and *Tory* subsisted long after the real Differences were extinguished, so were *these* Parties at first divided, not so much by *Overtacts* committed, as by the *Apprehensions*, which each of them entertained of the Intentions of the other. When the Resolution was once taken of rejecting all Limitations, on the Belief artfully, and, I think, knavishly propagated, that the *King* would yield, if the Parliament persisted; the necessary Consequences of the *King's* adhering inflexibly to his *Brother*, were those which followed; those *Fulmina Parliamentaria*, harsh Votes, angry Proceedings, Addresses, that were in Truth Remonstrances, Projects of Associations, Pretensions to a Power of *dispensing with the Execution of Laws*, (that very *Prerogative* they had so justly refused to the *Crown*) and many others, which I omit. All these would have been Blasts of Wind, *bruta Fulmina*, no more, if the *King* had yielded; and that they were pushed in this Confidence by the Bulk of the *Party*, who pushed them, cannot be doubted; since it cannot be doubted that the Bulk of the *Party* depended on the *King's* yielding almost, perhaps, even to the last. Some few might be willing, nay desirous, that He should not yield, and

and hope to bring Things into a State of Confusion ; which none but Madmen, or Those, whom their Crimes, or their Fortunes render desperate, can ever wish to see. But it would be hard, indeed, if Parties were to be characterized, not by their common View, or the general Tenour of their Conduct, but by the private Views imputed to some amongst them, or by the particular Sallies, into which Mistake, Surprize, or Passion, hath sometimes betrayed the best-intentioned, and even the best-conducted Bodies of Men. *Whig* and *Tory* were now formed into Parties ; but I think they were not now, nor at any other Time, what they believed one another, nor what they have been represented by their Enemies, nay by their Friends. The *Whigs* were not *Roundheads*, tho' the Measures They pursued, being stronger than the Temper of the Nation would then bear, gave Occasion to the Suspicions I have mentioned. The *Tories* were not *Cavaliers*, though they took the Alarm so sudden and so warm for the *Church* and the *King*, at least while the Heat of their Contest with the *opposite* Party lasted, higher than they had been ever carried before. The *Whigs* were not *Dissenters*, nor *Republicans*, though they favoured the *former*, and though some inconsiderable Remains of the *latter* might find Shelter in their Party. The *Tories* had no Disposition to become *Slaves*, or *Papists*, though they abetted the Exercise of an exorbitant Power by the *Crown*, and tho' they supported the Pretensions of a *Popish Succession* to it. — Thus I think about the Parties, which arose in the Reign of King *Charles* the Second ; and as I deliver my Thoughts with Frankness, I hope they will be received with Candour. Some farther and stronger Reasons for receiving



them so, may, perhaps, appear in a subsequent Letter.

*I am, S I R, Yours, &c.*

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## LETTER VI.

S I R,

**I**F King *Charles* the Second could have been prevailed upon to sacrifice the chimerical divine Right of his *Brother* to the real Interest, and Right too, of his *People*; that happy Event would have made him ample Amends in future Ease and Quiet, and the Nation in future Security, for all precedent Disorders, Dangers, and Fears of Danger. But instead of this, he was every Day confirmed in the Resolution of not giving up, directly and in Terms, that Right to his *Brother*, which he thought reflected Strength on his own. The very Measures, taken to force him to submit, enabled him to resist. The *opposite Spirit* spent itself in Blood and Violence. The *Spirit for him* rose visibly in the Nation; and He saw very soon the Time approach, when He might venture to appeal to his *People* against his *Parliament*. This Time was come, when Men were once convinced that a *Country-Party* prevailed no longer, but that *Faction* had taken its Place. Many Appearances, which I have not Room to enumerate, served to propagate this Opinion; particularly the Behaviour, and almost avowed Pretensions of the Duke of *Monmouth*; which were carried on even in Defiance of the solemn Declaration made by the King, *that He had never married the Duke's Mother*.

Some of the worthiest and warmest Men, who were engaged for the *Exclusion*, complained themselves,

selves, even from the first, of the private Interests and factious Intrigues, which prevailed amongst Them. ‘ I must confess, (says a very *considerable Men*, who laid down his Life for this Cause afterwards, and whose original Letter is still extant) ‘ I must confess, I do not know three Men of a ‘ Miad ; and that a Spirit of Giddiness reigns amongst us, far beyond any I have ever observed ‘ in my Life ; ’ and yet He had lived and acted in as factious a Time as this Nation ever saw. He proceeds ; ‘ Some look who is fittest to succeed. ‘ — They are for the most Part divided between ‘ the Prince of *Orange*, and the Duke of *Monmouth*. ‘ The first hath plainly the most plausible Title. ‘ — I need not tell you the Reasons against *Monmouth*. The strongest for Him are, that whoever ‘ is opposed to *York* will have a good Party ; and ‘ all *Scotland*, which is every Day like to be in ‘ Arms, doth certainly favour Him, and may probably be of as much Importance in the Troubles, ‘ that are now likely to fall upon us, as They were ‘ in the Beginning of the last. Others are only ‘ upon Negatives, &c. ’

I could easily multiply Proofs of this Kind ; but I think I need not take any Pains to shew that there was *such a Faction* formed at this Time ; nor to refute *Welwood*, who asserts, that the Duke of *Monmouth* was not ambitious to the Degree of aspiring to the Crown, till after his Landing in the West. I will only remark, that the Efforts of this Faction amongst those, who drove on the *Bill of Exclusion*, furnished another Motive to the Division and Animosities of Parties. The *Tories*, who had divided from the others, on Jealousies and Designs to change the Constitution in Church and State, began now to apprehend that the opposite Party might succeed in another View, and set up a King of their own Nomination.

mination. A Notion then entertained by many, that the worse Title a Man had, the better King He was likely to make, did not persuade them. They had suffered under the Tyranny of a *Party*; many of them had been themselves the Abettors of a *Party-Administration*; and they feared with Reason a *Party-King*. Thus personal Interests were mingled on both Sides with publick Considerations; and the Duke of York gained a great Number of Adherents, not by Affection to Him, but by an Aversion to *Monmouth*; which increased among the *Tories*, in Proportion as the Duke's Popularity increased among the *Whigs*; not by any favourable Disposition in the *Tories* to *Papery* and arbitrary Power; but by a Dread, as I have observed already, of returning in the least Degree under the Influence of those Principles, and the Power of those Men; whose Yoke had galled the Necks of many that were still alive and active on the Stage of publick Affairs. 'Men grew jealous of the Design, (says Bishop Burnet, speaking of *Monmouth's* Popularity) 'and fancied there was a new civil War to be raised. Upon This, they joined with the *Duke's Party*; 'meaning the Duke of York's.

I say nothing of the Apprehensions entertained on one Side, and the Expectations entertained on the other from Scotland; because though there was, even in the Beginning of these Struggles, a Concert between Those, who were oppressed by the Court there, and Those, who opposed it here, which grew afterwards into a closer Correspondence, and became riper for Action; yet the seditious Spirit, that gave Occasion to these Apprehensions and Expectations, was roused and exasperated by the Inhumanity of the Duke of *Lauderdale*; who, though a *Presbyterian* Himself, was the Butcher of that Party; pushed the warmest of them into

into unjustifiable Excesses ; revived their silly Zeal for the *Covenant* ; and wrought up their Enthusiasm even to *Affassination* and *Rebellion*. Let me only observe that This was plainly the Fault of the *Court*, and could not therefore be imputed to the *Whigs*, whatever Use some of *that Party* might propose to make of such a Disposition. The Violence of the *Conventiclors* was sounded high, in order to palliate the Severities exercised in the Government of *that Kingdom*. But the reasonable Men of *all Parties* thought then, as They think now, and always will think, that it is the Duty of *those* who govern, to discern the *Spirit of the People* ; to consider even their *Passions* ; to have a Regard to their *Weaknesses* ; and to shew Indulgence to their *Prejudices* ; and that *Ministers*, who punish what they might prevent, are more culpable than *they* who offend.

As the *two Parties* were formed, so was their Division maintained by mutual Jealousies and Fears ; which are often sufficient to nourish Themselves, when They have once taken Root in the Mind ; and which were, at this Time, watered and cultivated with all the factious Industry possible. The most improbable Reports, the most idle Surmises carried about in Whispers, were sufficient (as I might easily shew in various Instances) to raise a panick Terror in *one Party*, or the *other*. In *both*, there were but too many Persons on the Watch, to improve and to propagate these Terrors, and by a frequent Repetition of such Impressions to raise the Alarm and Hatred of *Parties* to the highest Pitch. He, who went about to allay this extravagant Ferment, was called a *Trimmer* ; and He, who was in Truth a common Friend, was sure of being treated like a common Enemy. Some who voted for the *Bill of Exclusion*, were  
very



very far from being *heartily* for it ; but I have seen good Reasons to believe, and such there are even in our publick Relations, that some of Those who voted *against* it, and declared for *Limitations*, concurred in the *End*, though they differed in the *Means*, with Those, who promoted the *Bill*. And yet *such Men* were constantly marked out as *Favourers of Popery* and *Enemies to their Country*. Thus in the *other Party*, Men who had no other View but that of securing their *Religion* and *Liberty*, and who meant nothing more than to force the *Court* into such Compliances, as They judged necessary to establish this Security, were stigmatized with the opprobrious Names of *Fanatick* and *Republican*. Thus it happened in those Days ; and thus it happens in ours ; when any Man, who declares against a *certain Person*, against whom the Voice of the Nation hath already declared, or complains of *Things*, which are so notorious, that no Man in the Nation can deny them, is sure to be followed by the Cry of *Jacobitism*, or *Republicanism*. But there is a great Difference, God be praised, between the *two Classes*. The *present Cry*, being void of *Pretence*, is therefore without *Effect*. It is heard in *few Places*, and believed only in *one* ——— But to return ;

When the Nation was divided in this Manner, the Heat of the *Parties* increased as their Contest lasted, according to the usual Course of Things. New Engagements were daily taken ; new Provocations and Offences were daily given. Publick Disputes begot private Pique ; and private Pique supported publick Disputes with greater Rancour and Obstinacy. The *opposite Principles*, advanced by the *two Parties*, were carried higher and higher, as They grew more inflamed ; and the *Measures* They pursued, in order to get the better each of his

his *Adversary*, without overmuch Regard to any other Consequence, became stronger and stronger, and perhaps equally dangerous. The Meeting of the Parliament at *Oxford* had a Kind of hostile Appearance; and as soon as *Parliaments were laid aside*, which happened on the sudden and indecent Dissolution of This, the Appearance grew worse. No Security having been obtained, by *Parliamentary Methods*, against the Dangers of a *Popish Succession*, it is probable that They, who looked on these Dangers as nearest and greatest, began to cast about how They might secure Themselves and their Country against them, by *Methods of another Kind*; such as extreme Necessity, and nothing but extreme Necessity can authorize. *Such Methods* were happily pursued and attended with glorious Success, a few Years afterwards, when *this Succession* had taken Place; and, by taking Place, had justify'd all, that had been said against it, or foreboded of it; when the Nation was ripe for *Resistance*, and the Prince of *Orange* ready and able from a Multitude of fortunate, concurring Circumstances, to support so great an Enterprize. But the Attempts, which were wise at *one Time*, would have been desperate at the *other*; and the Measures which produced a *Revolution*, in the Reign of King *James*, would have produced in the Reign of King *Charles* a *civil War*, of uncertain Event at best; I say of uncertain Event at best; because it seems to me that whoever revolves in his Thoughts the State of *England* and *Scotland*, as well as the Situation of our *Neighbours on the Continent*, at that Time, must be of Opinion that if the Quarrel about the *Exclusion* had broke out into a War, the *best Cause* would have been the *worst supported*. The King, more united than ever with his *Brother*,  
would.

would have prevailed. What was projected in 1670, and perhaps more than was then intended, would have been effected; and the *Religion* and *Liberty* of *Great Britain* would have been destroyed by Consequence. We cannot say, and it would be Presumption to pretend to guess, how far the Heads of *Party* had gone, in *Scotland*, or in *England*, into Measures for imploing *Force*. Perhaps, little more had passed, in which *they*, who became the *principal Sacrifices*, were any Way concerned, than rash Discourse about dangerous, but rude indigested Schemes, started by Men of wild Imaginations, or desperate Fortunes, and rather hearkened to than assented to; nay, possibly, despised and neglected by Them. But the *Court*, who wanted a *Plot* to confirm and increase their *Party*, and to turn the popular Tide in their Favour, took the first Opportunity of having one; which was soon furnished to them by the imprudent, but honest Zeal of *some*, and by the Villainy, as well as Madness of *others*; and they prosecuted it so severely, with the Help of \* *forward Sheriffs*, *willing Juries*, *bold Witnesses* and *mercenary Judges*, that it answered all their Ends. The Design of assassinating the *King* and the *Duke* was certainly confined to a few desperate Villains; but † *too many had heard it from Them, who were both so foolish and so wicked, as not to discover Them*; and This reflected great Prejudice, though I doubt not in many Cases very unjustly, against all Those who had acted upon better Principles, but yet were involved in these Prosecutions.

As this *Event* disarmed, dispirited and broke one *Party*; so it strengthened animated and united the other. The *Tories*, who looked on the Dangers They

\* *Burnet*

† *Idem.*

They apprehended from the *Whigs* to be greater and nearer than Those, which They had apprehended, as well as the *Whigs*, before this new Division of *Parties*, from a *Popish Succession*, were now confirmed in their Prejudices. Under this Persuasion, They run headlong into all the Measures, which were taken for *enlarging the KING's Authority*, and *securing the Crown to the Duke of York*. The Principles of *divine hereditary Right*, *Passive Obedience* and *Non-Resistance*, were revived and propagated with greater Zeal than ever. Not only the wild Whymfies of *Enthusiasts*, of *Schoolmen* and *Philosophers*, but the plainest Dictates of *Reason* were solemnly condemned, in Favour of them, by *learned and reverend Bodies of Men*, who little thought that in five Years Time, that is in 1688, They should act conformably to some of the very *Propositions*, which at that Time They declared *false, seditious and impious*.

In short, the *Guelphs* and *Gibellines* were not more animated against each other, at any Time, than the *Tories* and *Whigs* at this; and in such a national Temper, considerable Steps were made, as they well might be, towards the Destruction of our Constitution. One of Those, which *Rapin* enumerates, and insists upon very gravely, can scarce be mentioned without smiling. - 'The King, He says, in order to make his *People* feel the Slavery He had newly imposed on Them, affected to review his *TROOPS*; and these Troops amounted, by the Return of the Garrison of *Tangier*, to 4000 Men, effective, and well armed.' The *Whigs*, indeed, in those Days, were so averse to *STANDING ARMIES*, that They thought even those Troops commonly called *Guards*, unlawful; and Bishop *Burnet* argues, in his *Reflections* on my Lord *Russel's* Tryal, that 'a Design to seize  
on.



‘ on them amounted to no more than a Design to ‘ seize on a Part of the King’s Army.’ But it is possible that the *Tories*, who had shewed their Dislike of *standing Armies* sufficiently in the long *Parliament*, might think it however no unreasonable Thing, when Designs of *Insurrections*, and even of *Affassinations* had come so lately to Light, that a Number of *regular Troops*, sufficient to defend the *Person of the King*, but not sufficient to oppress the *Liberties of the People*, and five Times less than We have since seen kept up, in the Midst of the most secure Tranquility, should be winked at, till *these Distempers* were entirely over.

Another Step, which the *same Author* mentions, was indeed of the greatest Consequence, and laid the Ax to the Root of all our Liberties at once, by giving the CROWN *such an Influence over the Elections of Members to serve in Parliament* as could not fail to destroy that *Independency*, by which alone the Freedom of our Government hath been, and can be supported. I mean the Proceedings by *Quo Warranto*, and the other Methods taken to force, or persuade, the Corporations to surrender their *old Charters*, and accept *new ones*, under such Limitations and Conditions, as the *King* thought fit to innovate. *These Proceedings* were violent, the *Judgments* upon them arbitrary, and the *other Methods* employed scandalous. But still it was the *End*, it was the *Consequence*, that alarmed and terrified all Those, who had not sold themselves to the *Court*, or who had not lost in their Zeal for *Party*, all Regard to their *Country*, much more than the *Means* that were employed upon this Occasion. If instead of garbling Corporations by *Prerogative*, the *Court* could have purchased their Elections by *Money*, We may reasonably believe that the *surer and more silent Way* would have

have been taken. But would the Alarm have been less among all the *Friends of Liberty*? Certainly not. They would have seen that the *End* was the same, and have disliked *these Means* the more, for being less liable to Observation and Glamour. A *Prince*, asserting an *illegal and dangerous Prerogative*, and applauded for doing so, and seconded in the Attempt by a *numerous Party* in the Nation, carried, no Doubt, a very terrible Aspect. But still there was Room to hope, the violent Character of the Duke of *York* considered, (and that Hope was actually entertained by many) that the *Party*, who abetted these Usurpations of the *Prerogative*, might be soon frightened back again from a *Court* to a *Country Interest*; in which Case there was Room to hope likewise, the milder Character and better Understanding of the *King* considered, that the *Evil* might be in some Degree redressed, and the *Consequences* of it prevented. It was reasonable for the *Friends of Liberty* to expect that Men, who were injured would complain and seek Relief, on the first favourable Opportunity. But if They had been *corrupted*, and the Practice of *selling Elections* had been once established, I imagine that the *Friends of Liberty* would have thought the Case more desperate—It is certainly an easier Task, and there is somewhat less provoking, as well as less dangerous in it, to struggle even with a *great Prince*, who stands on *Prerogative*, than with a *weak, but profligate Minister*, if he hath the Means of *Corruption* in his Power, and if the *Luxury* and *Prostitution* of the Age have enabled Him to bring it into *Fashion*. Nothing surely could provoke Men, who had the *Spirit of Liberty* in their Souls, more than to figure to themselves *one of these saucy Creatures of Fortune*, whom she

he raises in the Extravagance of her Caprice, dispatching his Emissaries, ecclesiastical and secular, like so many evil Dæmons, to the North and to the South, to buy the Votes of the People with the Money of the People, and to chuse a *Representative Body*, not of the *People*, but of the *Enemy of the People*, of *Himself*.

This was not the Case at the Time We are speaking of. It was *Prerogative*, not *Money*, which had like to have destroyed our *Liberties* then. Government was not then carried on by *Undertakers*, to whom *so much Power* was farmed out for Returns of *so much Money*, and *so much Money* intrusted for Returns of *so much Power*. But tho' the Case was not so desperate; yet was it bad enough in all Conscience; and among all the Excesses, into which the *Tories* ran, in Favour of the *Crown*, and in Hopes of fixing Dominion in their *own Party*, their Zeal to support the Methods of *garbling Corporations* was, in my Opinion, That which threatened *publick Liberty* the most. It hath been reproached to them by many; but if among *those* who reproached them, there should be *some* who have shared since that Time in the more dangerous Practice of *corrupting Corporations*; *such Men* must have Fronts of Brass, and deserve all the Indignation, which is due to Iniquity, aggravated by Impudence. The *others* abetted, in Favour of a *Prerogative*, supposed *real* by many in those Days, and under the Pretence at least of *Law*, a Power, which gave the *Crown* too much Influence in the *Elections of Members of the House of Commons*; but *these Men*, if there are any such, have been concerned in a Practice, for the Sake of their own vile Interest, which spreads like a Gangreen over the whole Body of a Nation, and to every Branch of Government; and which hath

never

never failed in any one Instance, where it hath been suffered, to become the Bane of *Liberty*.

We have now carried the *two Parties* through that Period of Time, when the Conduct of *both* was most liable to the Objections made to them by *their Adversaries*.——The *Tories* acted on the *most abject Principles of Submission to the King*, and, on *those of hereditary Right*, were zealous for the Succession of a *Prince*, whose Bigotry rendered him unfit to rule a *Protestant* and a *free People*.——The *Whigs* maintained the *Power of Parliament to limit the Succession to the Crown*, and avowed the *Principles of Resistance*; in which they had *Law, Example and Reason* for them. But then the Fury of *Faction* was for doing that *without Parliament*, which could only be legally done *by it*; and, in order to This, the *Principles of Resistance* were extended too far; and the hottest Men of the *Party* taking the Lead, they acted in an *extravagant Spirit of Licence*, rather than a *sober Spirit of Liberty*; and the *Madness of a Few*, little inferior to That of *Cromwell's Enthusiasts*, dishonoured the whole Cause for a Time.——My Intention was not to have left them here; but to have carried these Observations on so far as to justify, notwithstanding these Appearances, what is said at the Conclusion of my *last Letter*, concerning the true Characters of *both Parties*. But either the Abundance of Matter hath deceived Me, or I have wanted Skill and Time to abridge it; so that I must defer this Part of my Task, and crave your Indulgence, as well as that of your Readers, for my Prolixity.

I am, S I R, &c.

L E T.



## LETTER VII.

S I R,

I Advanced, in the *first* of these Essays, something to this Effect; that every *clumsy, busy, bungling Child of Fortune*, on whom she bestows the Means and the Opportunity of *corrupting*, may govern by this infamous Expedient; and, having gratified his Ambition and Avarice, may have a Chance to secure himself from Punishment, by destroying the *Liberties of his Country*. It was advanced likewise, in the *same Paper*, that every Character is not equally fit to govern a People, by *dividing* them; because some Cunning, some Experience, nay, some Skill to form, and some Address to conduct a *System of Fraud*, are necessary in this Case. I persuade my self that no Man, who read that Paper, was at a Loss to find an Instance to confirm the Truth of the *first of these Propositions*; and we have now before us another, which may serve to confirm the Truth of the *second*.

Though I do not think the Designs of King Charles the Second either deeply laid, or deeply fixed in his own Mind; yet in general they were founded on *bad Principles*, and directed to *bad Ends*. He desired indeed to be easy, and to make his People so; but then he desired both these on such Conditions, as were inconsistent with good Government, during the whole Course of his Reign, and with the Security of Religion and Liberty, during the latter Part of it. We have seen how the intemperate Conduct of many, and the flagitious Designs of some among the *Whigs*, weakened their *own Party*, and gave new Strength  
and

and new Provocations to the *other*. But we have not yet considered some other Advantages, without which *these Divisions* could neither have been fomented, nor supported as they were. Now these Advantages arose chiefly from the Character and Conduct of the *King* himself. If King *Charles* had found the Nation plunged in *Corruption*; the People chusing their Representatives for *Money*, without any other Regard; and these Representatives of the People, as well as the Nobility, reduced by Luxury to beg the unhallowed Alms of a *Court*; or to receive, like miserable Hirelings, the Wages of Iniquity from a *Minister*; if He had found the Nation, I say, in this Condition, (which extravagant Supposition one cannot make without Horror) He might have dishonoured her abroad, and impoverished and oppressed her at home, though he had been the weakest Prince on Earth, and his Ministers the most odious, and contemptible Men, that ever presumed to be ambitious. Our Fathers might have fallen into Circumstances, which compose the very Quintessence of political Misery. They might have *sold their Birthright for Porridge*, that was their own. They might have been bubbled by the foolish, bullied by the fearful, and insulted by those whom they despised. They would have deserved to be *Slaves*, and they might have been treated as such. When a *free People* crouch, like Camels, to be loaded, the next at Hand, no Matter who, mounts them, and they soon feel the Whip and the Spur of their *Tyrant*; for a *Tyrant*, whether Prince or Minister, resembles the *Devil* in many Respects; particularly in this. He is often both the *Tempter* and *Tormentor*. He makes the *Criminal*, and he punishes the *Crime*.

But this was not the State of the *English* Nation, at the Time we speak of. We were not yet *corrupted*, nor even quite ripe for *Corruption*. *Parties* there were ; and the Contests of *these Parties* gave Occasion to the Rise and Growth of *Factions* ; some of which ran into the most seditious Practices against the Government, and others into the vilest Submission to it. But still a *Spirit of Liberty* remained in many, uncorrupted and unextinguished, and such as worked our national Deliverance in the Days of Distress, that soon followed. We were *Freemen* then, in the proper Sense, and full Extent of the Words ; because not only the *Laws*, which asserted our common Rights, were maintained and improved, but *private Independency*, which can alone support *publick Liberty*, under such a Government as ours, was itself supported by some of that *ancient Oeconomy* and *Simplicity of Manners*, that were growing, but not grown, out of Fashion. *Such a People*, as we then were, could neither be *bought*, nor *driven*, and I think King *Charles* could not have *divided* and *led* them, if he had wanted any of the Qualities he possessed, or had held another Conduct than he held. Far from being proud, haughty, or brutal, \* *he had not a Grain of Pride, or Vanity, in his whole Composition* ; but was the most affable, best-bred Man alive. He treated his Subjects like *Noblemen*, like *Gentlemen*, like *Freemen*, not like *Vassals*, or *Boors*. Whatever Notion he had of his *hereditary Right*, he owned his Obligation for the Crown he wore to his People, as much as He would have been bound to do, in Reason, in Justice, in Honour, and in Prudence, if he had stood at the greatest Distance from it, in the Course of lineal Succession, and had been called to it from the low State in which he

\* Sir William Temple.

he was before, by the free Gift and Choice of the Nation. His Professions were plausible, and his whole Behaviour engaging ; so that he won upon the Hearts, even whilst he lost the good Opinion of his Subjects, and often ballanced their Judgment of Things, by their personal Inclination. These Qualities and this Part of his Conduct went a great Way to give him Credit with his People, and an Hold on their Affections. But this was not all. He observed their Temper, and He complied with it. He yielded to them in Points, from which he had determined, and declared too, that he would never depart. To know when to yield, in *Government*, is at least as necessary, as to know when to lose in *Trade* ; and he who cannot do the *first*, is so little likely to govern a *Kingdom well*, that it is more than probable he would govern a *Shop ill*. King *Charles* gave up to the Murmurs of his People, not *one* or *two such Ministers* as may be found almost behind every Desk ; those aukward Pageants of Courts, those wooden Images, which Princes gild and then worship ; but several *great* and *able Men* ; nay, *whole Cabals of such*, who had Merit with *Him*, though they had none with the *Nation*. He started often out of the true Interest of his People ; but the Voice of his People almost as often reclaimed him. He made the *first Dutch War* ; but he made the *Triple Alliance* too. He engaged with *France* in the War of 1672 ; but he made a separate Peace with Holland. True it is, indeed, that neither the Representations of his *Parliament*, nor the Desires of his People, could prevail on him to go farther, and to enter in earnest into the War against *France*. But the Confidence between *Him* and his *Parliament* was so broken at that Time, that they would not trust *Him*, nor *He* them. At



this I am not surprized, and for that very Reason, I confess, I have always been so at the strong and repeated Instances made to force Him into *that War*; since it cannot surely be better Policy to drive a Prince into a War, which He has no Inclination to make, than it would be to be drawn by Him into a War, if He had no Ability to conduct it. In *Home-Affairs*, besides his frequent Concessions, whenever the Nation took Umbrage at his Proceedings, He passed the *Test* and the *Habeas Corpus Bills*, and many others for the publick Benefit; and I scarce remember any *popular Act*, which stopped at the Throne in his Time, except that about the *Militia*, which he apprehended to be a dangerous Encroachment on his *Prerogative*, and another in Favour of the *Dissenters*, which was contrived, meanly enough, to be stolen off the Table in the *House of Lords*.

What has been touched here, and in former Papers, will be sufficient to shew, in some Measure, how King *Charles* was enabled to *divide a Nation* so united and so heated as this Nation was, on the Discovery of the *Papish Plot*; to oppose so avowedly and so resolutely the *Exclusion of his Brother*; the Prospect of whose succeeding to the Crown was become still more dreadful, even by that small Part of *Coleman's* Correspondence, which had come to Light; and yet to attach so numerous a Party to *Himself*, nay to his *Brother*; to lay aside *Parliaments* for several Years, and not only to stand his Ground, but to gain Ground in the Nation, at the same Time. But there is still something more to be added. He had not only prepared for the Storm, but he acquired new Strength in the Midst of it; That is, in the Proceedings on the *Papish Plot*, and the *Bill of Exclusion*. He would gladly have kept the *former* out of Parliament; but when

it was once there, he put on the Appearances of great Zeal for the Prosecution of it. These Appearances helped him to screen his *Brother*; as the ill Success of the *Exclusion-Bill in the House of Lords*, where it was rejected by *Sixty-three* against *Thirty*, helped to screen himself from the Violence of the *House of Commons*. But that, which gave him the principal Advantage, in the present Contests, was another Management. As soon as the first preparatory Steps were made to the *Bill of Exclusion* in 1678, he declared himself, in a Speech to his Parliament, ready to pass any Bills to make his People safe in the Reign of his Successor, so they tended not to impeach the Right of Succession, nor the Descent of the Crown in the true Line. He persisted in his Declaration to the last; and if he had done nothing else, I imagine that he would have gained no great Popularity. When a free People lye under any Grievance, or apprehend any Danger, and try to obtain their Prince's Consent to deliver them from one, or prevent the other; a flat Refusal, on his Part, reduces them to the melancholy Alternative of continuing to submit to one, and to stand exposed to the other, or of freeing themselves from both, without his Consent; which can hardly be done by Means very consistent with his and their common Interest. King Charles was too wise to push the Nation to such an Extremity. He refused what his Parliament pressed on him, in the Manner and on the Principle they pressed it: but then his Refusal was followed by Expedients; which varied the Manner, and yet might have been managed so as to produce the Effect; and which seemed to save, rather than actually saved, the Principle. Numbers concurred, at that Time, in avowing the Principle; and the Tests had made many Persons think Religion safe; as the King's Offers made them

think it no Fault of his, if it was not made safer. The *Council* had prepared *some Expedients*; and the *Limitations*, and other *Provisions* against a *Popish Successor*, proposed directly from the Throne by the *Chancellor* in 1679, went a great Way towards binding the Hands of *such a Successor*, and lodging the Power, taken from *Him*, in the *Parliament*. But the Scheme of *Expedients*, debated in the *Oxford Parliament*, was a real Exclusion from every Thing, but the *Title of King*. The *first Article* banish'd the *Duke of York*, during his Life, to the Distance of 500 Miles from *England, Scotland, and Ireland*; and the *Tenth*, to mention no more, excluded him *ipso facto*, if he came into any of these Kingdoms; directed that he should suffer, in this Case, as by the *former Bill*, and that the Sovereignty should vest forthwith in the *Regent*; that is, in the *Princess of Orange*. Surely this was not to vote the *Lyon in the Lobby into the House*. It would have been to vote him *out of the House, and Lobby both*, and only suffer him to be called *Lyon* still. I am not ignorant of the Refinements, urged by *Sir William Jones* and others against *this Scheme*; but I know that Men run into Errors from both Extremes; from that of seeing too much, as well as that of seeing too little; and that the most subtle Refiners are apt to miss the true Point of political Wisdom, which consists in distinguishing justly between what is absolutely best in Speculation, and what is the best of Things practicable in particular Conjunctions. The *Scheme*, no Doubt, was built on manifest Absurdity, and was liable to many Inconveniencies, Difficulties and Dangers; but still it was the utmost, that could be hoped for at that Moment; and the single Consideration, one would think, should have been This; whether, united under such an Act of Parliament, they would not have opposed the Succession

son of the Duke of York, with less Inconveniency, less Difficulty and Danger, than disunited, and with the Laws against them. The Truth is, that as there were Men at this Time, desirous that the King should be on desperate Terms with his *Parliament*, because *they* were to Themselves; in like Manner, there were others, who desired, for a Reason of the same Nature, that the *Parliament* should be on desperate Terms with the King. These were *factious Interests*, and they prevailed against the *national Interest*; which required that the King should be separated at any Rate from his Brother, instead of being united to him by a Fear made common to *both*. But the Dye was thrown; and the Leaders of the *Whig Party* were resolved \* to let all lye in Confusion, rather than hearken to any Thing, besides the Exclusion. Obstinacy provoked Obstinacy. The King grew obstinate, and severe too, against his natural Easiness and former Clemency of Temper. The *Tory-Party* grew as obstinate, and as furious on their Side, according to a natural Tendency in the Disposition of all *Parties*; and thus the Nation was delivered over, on the Death of King † Charles, à la Sottise de son Frere; to the Folly and Madness of his Brother.

It was this Folly and Madness however, that cured the Folly and Madness of Party. As the common Danger approached, the Impression of Terror, which it made, increased. *Whig* and *Tory* then felt them alike, and were brought by them, as drunken Men sometimes are, to their Senses. The Events of King James's Reign, and the Steps, by which the Revolution was brought about, are so recent, and so well known, that I shall not descend into

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\* Burnet's History.

† An Expression used by King Charles on many Occasions.



any particular Mention of them. A few general Remarks on the Behaviour of *this Prince*, and on the Behaviour of *Parties*, in his Reign, and at the *Revolution*, will be sufficient to wind up the History of *Whig* and *Tory*, and to prove what I have so often asserted, that *both Sides* purged themselves on this great Occasion, of the Imputations laid to their Charge by their *Adversaries*; that the proper and real Distinction of the *two Parties* expired at this *Æra*, and that, although their Ghosts have continued to haunt and divide us so many Years afterwards, yet there neither is, nor can be any Division of *Parties* at this Time, reconcileable with common Sense, and common Honesty, among Those, who are come on the Stage of the World, under the *present Constitution*; except Those of *Churchmen*, and *Dissenters*; Those of *Court* and *Country*.

The Behaviour and Conduct of King *James* the Second would be sufficient, if there was no other Instance, (and there are Thousands) to shew that as strong Prejudices, however got, are the Parents, so a weak Understanding is the Nurse of *Bigotry*, and Injustice, and Violence and Cruelty its Offspring. *This Prince* was above *Fifty*, when he came to the Throne. He had great Experience of all Kinds; particularly of the Temper of *this Nation*, and of the Impossibility to attempt introducing *Papery*, without hazarding his Crown. But his *Experience* profited him not. His *Bigotry* drew false Conclusions from it. He flattered himself that he should be able to play *Parties* against one another, better than his *Brother* had done; (which, by the Way, was not the least of his little Talents;) and to compleat his Designs by an *Authority*, which was but too well established. He passed, I think, for a sincere Man. Perhaps, he was so, and he spoke always with great Emphasis of the *Word of a King*;

King; and yet never was the meanest Word so scandalously broken as his. In the Debate in 1678, about the *Test*, when He got a Proviso put in for excepting Himself, it has been advanced in Print, and not denied that I know of, that speaking with \* *great Earnestness, and with Tears in his Eyes, He solemnly protested that whatever his Religion might be, it should only be a private Thing between God and his own Soul; and that no Effect of it should ever appear in the Government.* At his Accession to the Throne, in Council first, and after that in full Parliament, in the Face of the Nation, he made the strongest Declaration in Favour of the Constitution in Church and State, and took the most solemn Engagements to defend and support it. But *Bigotry* burst through all these Cobwebs; for such they are to Men, transported by a *religious Delirium*, who acquire a Strength, that those, who are well, have not, and conscientiously break all the Obligations of Morality. These admirable Dispositions in the King were encouraged by the State, in which his Brother left and He found the Nation, and by the Complaisance of the *Parliament*, which He called soon after his Accession. They were confirmed, and He was determined to pull off the Mask entirely, by the ill Success of the Duke of *Monmouth* and the Earl of *Argyle*. Bishop *Burnet* speaks of *this Parliament* very indecently, and I think very untruly. *They were neither Men of Parts nor Estates*, according to Him. The Truth is, that the Circumstances, under which we were brought, by the factious Proceedings of *both Parties*, in the late Reign, for and against the Court, were such as might perplex the best Parts, and puzzle the Heads even of the wisest Men. A *professed, zealous Papist*, in full and quiet Possession of the Throne, and, in-

\* *Burnet's History.*

stead of any Provision made, or any Measures taken against him, the Notion and the Exercise of the *Prerogative* established at an extravagant Height, were such Circumstances, as laid the Nation almost at the Mercy of the *King*. They therefore, who were the most determined not to part with either their *Religion*, or their *Liberty*, and yet had more to lose in the Fray than Dr. *Burnet*, might be willing to look round them; to wait Opportunities; and not undertake rashly what can seldom be undertaken twice. It is impossible to believe that their Confidence in the *King's Word* was such as They affected. But like drowning Men, who saw nothing else to catch at, They caught at a Straw. The Duke of *Monmouth's* Expedition into *England*, and the Earl of *Argyle's* into *Scotland*, were so far from affording the Nation any Opportunity of mending their Condition, that the Declaration of the *former* might draw some of the *Dissenters* to his Standard, as it did; but was calculated to drive the *Tory-Party*, most of the *Whigs*, and in short the *Bulk of the People* from Him. The Declaration of the *latter* was founded in the *solemn League and Covenant*; and gave so much Reason to apprehend that a Revival of the *same Principles*, and a Renewal of the *same Tyranny* was intended, that we cannot wonder it had no better an Effect; though we lament the Fate of a *worthy and gallant Man*, whose Crime was refusing a *Test*, that should never have been imposed on *Protestants* and *Freemen*, and who had been driven into these extreme Resolutions by a Series of *unjust* and *tyrannical Usage*.

Thus were *these Invasions*, in the very Beginning of his Reign, favourable in some Respects to the Designs of King *James*. They fortified, in the Minds of Men, the Jealousies and Fears, which had

had a few Years before formed the *Tory-Party*; and disposed Them by Consequence, at least, to keep Measures, and not break with the *King*. They gave him the Pretence, which He seized very readily, of raising and keeping up a *standing Army*. But, in the Event, they forwarded our Deliverance from all the Dangers, to which we were exposed, under his Government, by precipitating his Attempts against our *Religion* and *Liberty*. The same Day, that the News of the Invasion in *Scotland* was communicated to the *Parliament* here, the *Commons* voted that great Revenue, which they gave him, and gave him for Life. After *these Invasions* were over, They voted a Supply, which was intended for the Charge of maintaining the *additional Forces*. They offered to pass a Law for indemnifying his *Papish Officers* from the Penalty They had incurred; and to capacitate *such others* as he should name in a List to be given to the *House*. In short, They suffered Themselves to be drawn to the Brink of the Precipice; but there They stopped. They would never give him the whole Supply of 1,200,000 Pounds, which he asked, nor sanctify, by the Authority of *Parliament*, the Practice of keeping up a *standing Army* in *Time of Peace*; but rejected the Words moved for that Purpose. They would neither repeal the *Test* and *penal Laws*; nor submit to his *dispensing*, or *suspending*; which was in Effect a *repealing Power*; That is, They would not cast Themselves headlong down the Precipice; and because They would not, He quarrelled with Them; lost the 700,000 Pounds They had voted, rather than suffer Them to sit any longer; and never met Them more.

Things hastened now to a Decision. The *King's* Designs were openly avowed, and desperately pushed. The Church of *England* opposed them,



with the utmost Vigour. The *Dissenters* were cajoled by the *Court*; and They, who had been ready to take Arms against King *Charles*, because He was unwilling to exclude his *Brother*, and who had taken Arms against *this Prince*, since he was on the Throne, became Abettors of his Usurpation. It were easy to prove This, even by Bishop *Burnet's* Account, as much as That is softened; and if the Excuses, which have been made for their Silence against *Popery* in this critical Moment, or for their approving and encouraging the Exercise of a *dispensing Power*, are to be received, one may undertake to excuse, on the same Principles of Reasoning, all those Instances of Misconduct in the *Church-Party*, which I have presumed to censure so freely. But the Truth is, these Excuses are frivolous. I could quote some, that are even burlesque. Let us reverence Truth therefore, and condemn the *Dissenters* as frankly, on this Occasion, as we have condemned the Members of the *Church of England* on others.

The *Revolution* soon followed. Many of the most distinguished *Tories*, some of Those, who carried highest the Doctrines of *Passive Obedience* and *Non-Resistance*, were engaged in it; and the whole Nation was ripe for it. The *Whigs* were zealous in the same Cause; but their Zeal not such as, I think, it had been some Years before, a *Zeal without Knowledge*; I mean, that it was better tempered, and more prudently conducted. Though the *King* was not the better for his Experience, *Parties* were. Both saw their Errors. The *Tories* stopped short in the Pursuit of a *bad Principle*. The *Whigs* reformed the Abuse of a *good one*. Both had sacrificed their *Country* to their *Party*. Both sacrificed, on this Occasion, their *Party* to their *Country*. When the *Tories* and the *Whigs* were thus coalited,

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the latter stood no longer in need of any adventitious Help. If They did not refuse the Assistance of Those, who had weakened their Cause more, by the Jealousies and Fears, to which They gave both Occasion and Pretence, than They had strengthened it by their Number; yet they suffered Them to have no Influence in their Councils, no Direction of their Conduct. The Cause of *Liberty* was no longer made the Cause of a *Party*, by being set on such a Bottom, and pushed in such a Manner, as *one Party* alone approved. The *Revolution* was plainly designed to restore and secure our Governmeat, Ecclesiastical and Civil, on true Foundations; and whatever might happen to the *King*, there was no Room to suspect any Change of the *Constitution*. There were Some, indeed, concerned in this great and glorious Undertaking, who had obstinately preserved, or lightly taken up the *Republican* and other *Whimsies*, that reigned in the Days of Usurpation and Confusion. If They could have prevailed, (and it was no Fault of theirs They did not) the *Coalition of Parties* had been broken; and, instead of a *Revolution*, we might have had a *civil War*; perhaps, not even that sad Chance for our *Religion* and *Liberty*. But *this Leaven* was so near worn out, that it could neither corrupt, nor seem any longer to corrupt the Mass of the *Whig-Party*. The *Party* never had been *Presbyterians*, nor *Republicans*, any more than They had been *Quakers*; any more than the *Tory-Party* had been *Papists*, when, notwithstanding their Aversion to *Popery*, They were undeniably under the accidental Influence of *Popish Councils*. But even the Appearances were now rectified. The *Revolution* was a Fire, which purged off the Dross of both *Parties*; and the Dross being purged off, They appear-

appeared to be the same Metal, and answered the same Standard.

I shall deliver my Thoughts, on some other Occasion, concerning the Disputes, that arose about the *Settlements of the Crown*, after the *Revolution*: and shew, if I do not very much deceive myself, that no Argument can be drawn from thence against any Thing I have advanced.

I am, S-I R, Yours, &c.

## LETTER VIII.

S I R,

THE slavish Principles of *Passive Obedience* and *Non-Resistance*, which had sculked perhaps in some old Homily before King *James* the First, but were talked, written and preached into Vogue in that inglorious Reign, and in Those of his three Successors, were renounced at the *Revolution* by the *last of the several Parties*, who declared for them. Not only the *Laity*, but the *Clergy* embraced and co-operated in the Deliverance, which the Prince of *Orange* brought Them. Some of our *Prelates* joined to invite Him over. Their Brethren refused to sign an Abhorrence of this Invitation. The University of *Oxford* offered Him their Plate, and associated for Him against their King. In one Word, the Conduct of the *Tories*, at this Crisis, was such as might have inclined a Man to think They had never held *Resistance* unlawful, but had only differed with the *Whigs* about the Degree of Oppression, or of Danger, which it was necessary to wait, in order to sanctify *Resistance*. Now, it may appear at first a little strange that *these Principles*,

*principles*, which had always gone Hand-in-Hand with Those of the *divine hereditary, indefeazable Right of Kings*, that were just as well founded in Reason, in support of which the Example of the primitive *Christians* might be pompously cited, and to countenance which some Texts of the Bible might be piously strained, should not keep their Hold, and maintain their Influence, as well as the *others*.

This Attachment to *hereditary Right* will appear the more strange, if We consider what Regard was shewn, at this Time, to the Difficulties They, who had pawned Themselves, as it were, for the *Principles*, would be under, when They came to concur in establishing a *Settlement* repugnant to it. That great and solemn Resolution, about the *Abdication of King James*, and the *Vacancy of the Throne*, might have been expressed in Terms much stronger and plainer than it was. I have heard there were Persons who had a Mind it should be so; and who, more attached to the Honour, That is the Humour of *Party*, than to the *national Interest*, in this great Event, would have turned this Resolution, as well as the Declaration of the Prince of *Orange*, to a more express Approbation of the *Whig*, and a more express Condemnation of the *Tory* Tenets and Conduct. But a wiser and honest Consideration prevailed. Instead of erecting the *new Government* on the narrow Foundations of *Party-Systems*, the Foundations of it were laid as wide, and made as comprehensible, as They could be. No Man, I believe, at this Time, thinks that the Vote asserted too little; and surely there was no Colour of Reason on the Side of Those, who cavilled against it, at that Time, for asserting too much.

The Disputes about the Words *abdicate*, or *desert*, and about the *Vacancy of the Throne*, were in Truth



Truth fitter for a *School* than a *House of Parliament*, and might have been expected in some Assembly of *Pedants*, where young Students exercised Themselves in Disputation, but not in such an august Assembly as that of the *Lords and Commons*, met in solemn Conference upon the most important Occasion.. The Truth is that They, who formed the Opposition, were reduced to maintain strange Paradoxes; stranger in my Opinion, than most of Those, which cast so much Ridicule on the *Stoicks* of old. Thus, for Instance, They were forced to admit that an *oppressed People* might seek their Remedy in *Resistance*; for They had sought it there Themselves, and yet They opposed making use of the *only Remedy*, which could effectually secure Them against Returns of the *same Oppression*, when *Resistance* had put it in their Power, as *Oppression* had given them a Right to use this *Remedy*. Surely This must appear a Paradox, and a very absurd one too, if We consider that *Resistance*, in all such Cases, is the *Mean*, and *future Security* the *End*; and that the *former* is impertinent, nay wicked in the highest Degree, if it be not employed to obtain the *latter*. Thus again, the *same Men* declared Themselves willing to secure the Nation against the Return of King *James* to that Throne, which He had *abdicated*; or, according to Them, *deserted*; nay, some of Them were ready, if We may credit the Anecdotes of that Time, to proceed to such extream Resolutions, as would have been more effectual, than justifiable in the Eyes of Mankind; and yet they could not prevail on their scrupulous Consciences to declare *the Throne vacant*. They had concurred in the Vote, that it was *inconsistent with the Laws, Liberties and Religion of England to have a Papist rule over the Kingdom*. King *James* had followed the

the pious Example of *Sigismund*, who, not content to lose the Crown of *Sweden* Himself for his Religion, had carried his *Son* away, that he might be bred a *Papist*, and lose it too ; and yet They maintained, though They did not expressly name Him, that if the Throne was then, or should be at any Time vacant of the *Father*, it must be reputed instantaneously full of the *Son*, upon the Foundation of this silly Axiom, that the *King never dies*. According to this Law, and these Politicks, King *James* and his Successors, to the twentieth Generation, might have continued abroad, a Race of Royal Exiles, preserving their *indefeazable Right* to govern, but debarred from the *Exercise* of it ; whilst the Nation continued, during all this Time, from Century to Century, under the Dominion of *Regents*, with *regal Authority*, but without any *regal Right* ; an excellent Expedient sure to keep the Monarchy in an *hereditary Succession* ! But there remained none better, on the Principles of *these Men*, since the Prince of *Orange* had committed the fatal Oversight of neglecting to *conquer* the Nation. His Sword would have cut the Gordian Knot of *hereditary Right*, and They could have submitted with safe Consciences to a *Conqueror*. But to *give* the Crown to a *Prince*, though They had put the *whole Administration* into his Hands ; which, by the Way, was *High Treason*, unless the Throne was, what They denied it to be, actually *vacant* ; to *give* the Crown, I say, to a *Prince*, who would not *take* it, when it was in his Power to *take* it, without their *Consent* ; to settle a new Government by *Agreement* and *Compact*, when the glorious Opportunity of establishing it by *Force* and *Conquest* had been unhappily lost ; These were Propositions, to which they could not consent. King *James* had violated the  
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fundamental Laws, which he had promised over and over and sworn to maintain. He had shewn by his *first Escape*, when nothing was more imposed on Him than to wait the Resolution of a *free Parliament*, that he would renounce his Crown rather than submit to secure effectually the Observation of these Laws. He had made a *second Escape*, which was voluntarily as well as the *first*, and made on the same Principle; against the Intreaties of his Friends, and the Instigations of the *same Council* as had directed his former Conduct, and on a Letter from the *Queen*, claiming his Promise to do so. Notwithstanding all these Reasons, They, who maintained the *hereditary Right of our Kings*, reduced themselves, and would have reduced their Country, to the absurd Necessity of altering the *Constitution*, under Pretence of preserving it. No *King*, except a *Stuart*, was to reign over Us. But We might establish a *Doge*, a *Lord Archon*, a *Regent*; and thus these were warm Assertors of *Monarchy*, refusing to be *Slaves*, contending to be *Republicans*. Many more Paradoxes of equal Extravagance might be cited, which were advanced directly, or which resulted plainly from the Arguments employed on one Side of the Question in those Disputes. But the Instances I have cited; may suffice for our present Purpose; and may serve to shew that although Difficulties hard to solve in Speculation, or to remove in Practice, will arise in the Pursuit of the most rational Principles; yet such Absurdities as these can never arise, except from the most irrational, and always must arise from such.

If the Persons who maintained this *divine, hereditary, indefeazable Right of Kings*, had thought fit to drop these Principles, when they laid aside Those of *Passive-Obedience* and *Non-Resistance*,  
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and no tolerable Reason can be given why They did not, their Conduct would have been consistent and uniform on this great Occasion; and this Consistency and Uniformity would have been productive of great Good, by taking away at once even the Appearances of all political Division in the Bulk of the Nation. But whilst they laboured to reconcile their *present Conduct* to their *antient System*, They were true to *neither*. They had gone much farther than *this* would allow, and then *they* refused to go as far as the *other* required, in order to be safe, and therefore in order to be justified. They lost every Kind of Merit; the chimerical Merit of adhering to a Set of *filly Principles*; the real Merit of sacrificing their Prejudices to the compleat Deliverance of their Country from the recent Danger of *Popery* and *arbitrary Power*. Nay, they did worse; for mischievous Consequences of their Conduct were not hurtful to them alone, and at that Time alone, but to the Publick, and even down to these Times. They furnished Pretence to *Factions*, who kept up a Division under the *old Names*, when the Differences were really extinguished by the Conduct of *both Parties*; because the Conduct of *both Parties* was no longer conformable to the *Principles* imputed to them. The *Tories* had no longer any Pretence of fearing the Designs of the *Whigs*; since the *Whigs* had sufficiently purged themselves from all Suspicion of *Republican Views*, by their Zeal to continue *monarchical Government*, and of Latitudinarian Schemes in Point of *Religion*, by their ready Concurrence in preserving our *Ecclesiastical Establishment*, and by their insisting on nothing farther, in Favour of the *Dissenters*, than that Indulgence, which the *Church* was most willing to grant. The *Whigs* had as little Pretence:

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of fearing the *Tories*; since the *Tories* had purged themselves in the most signal Manner, from all Suspicion of favouring *Popery*, or *arbitrary Power*, by the vigorous Resistance they made to *both*. They had engaged, they had taken the Lead in the *Revolution*, and they were fully determined against the Return of King *James*. The real Essences of *Whig* and *Tory* were thus destroyed; but the nominal were preserved, and have done since that Time a good Part of the Mischief, which the real did before. The Opposition made to the *Settlement of the Crown* brought this about. An over-curious Enquiry into the Motives of this Opposition would be a Task too invidious for me to undertake. Something however may be said upon it. We may say in general, without Offence, that *private Ambition* mingled itself early in the great and national Concerns of the *Revolution*; and that it did so more, as the Prospect of a *new Settlement*, and of the Elevation of the Prince of *Orange* approached. Expectations were raised; Disappointments were given, or foreseen; and a Variety of Motives of the same Kind began to influence very strongly the Conduct of the principal Actors. *Some* endeavoured to lay the Foundations of their future Fortune by Demonstrations of a personal Attachment to the *Prince*; which were carried on, I doubt, a little too independently of the Regard due to their Country, in some Cases; particularly, if I mistake not, in that of the *Declaration of Rights*, of which We may pronounce, and Experience will justify us, that it was too loose, too imperfect, and nothing less than proportionable to the Importance of the Occasion, and the favourable Circumstances of the Conjunction. *Others* there were, who imagined that the shortest and surest Way for them to take,

in Pursuit of the same View, was to make themselves considerable by *Opposition*, to form a *Party*, and maintain a Struggle for *personal Power*, under the Pretence and Umbrage of *Principle*. This was, without Doubt, the Motive of some particular, leading Men, and could not be, at least at first, the Motive of Numbers. But there was *another Motive*, which easily became that of Numbers, because it arose out of a Fund common to all Men, the *Perversity of human Nature*, according to an Observation made in one of these Letters. Whilst the Event of the Prince of Orange's Expedition was undecided, Men remained under the full Influence of their *Fears*, which had determined them to act against their *Prejudices*. But when the *Revolution* was secure, and these *Fears* were calmed, these *Prejudices* resumed, in some Degree, their former Power, and the more for being revived and encouraged by Men of Reputation and Authority, who argued for some, and might as reasonably have argued for all the Errors, in Contradiction to which most of them had acted, nay and were ready to act. With such Views, and by such Means, were many brought, at this Time, to entangle Themselves in a Maze of inextricable Absurdities. Had they owned candidly and fairly that their *Principles*, as well as those of the *Whigs*, were carried too high in the former Disputes of *Parties*, and that *these Principles* could not be true, since They found themselves actually in a Situation, wherein it was not possible to act agreeably to them without manifest Absurdity, the Distinction, as well as the Difference, of *Whig* and *Tory* had been at an End. But contrary Measures produced a contrary Effect. They kept up the Appearances, and they could keep up no more, of a *Whig* and a *Tory Party*, and with these  
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Appearances a great Part of the old Animosity. The *two Names* were sounded about the Nation ; and Men, who saw the same Ensigns flying, were not wise enough to perceive, or not honest enough to own, that the same Cause was no longer concerned, but listed themselves on either Side, as their Prejudices at first, and their Inclinations, or other Motives, which arose in the Progress of their Contests, directed them afterwards ; *Whigs* very often under the *Tory* Standard, *Tories* very often under the *Whig* Standard.

This general Representation, which I have made of the State of *Parties* at the *Revolution*, is, I am verily persuaded, exactly just ; and it might be supported by many particular Proofs, that I chuse rather to suggest, than to mention. But if any Doubt remains, let us analyse the several *Parties* of that Time a little more, reduce them to their *first* and *real Principles*, and then pronounce whether We find the *Whig*, or the *Tory Party* subsisting among them.

In the first Place, there was a *Party*, that concurred in making the *new Settlement* ; a *Party*, that prevailed in *Parliament*, and was by much the Majority of the Nation out of it. Were the *Whigs* this Majority ? Was this Party a *Whig-Party* ? No Man will presume to affirm so notorious an Untruth. The *Whigs* were far from being this Majority, and King *James* must have died on the Throne, if the *Tories* had not concurred to place the Prince of *Orange* there, in his Stead. Was this Party a *Tory Party* then ? Certainly no. The *Whigs* had been zealous for the same Cause, and had contributed to make it successful by their Temper, as well as their Zeal ; by waiting the Time of the *Tories*, or rather the Maturity of the Conjunction, and by moderating their Principles and their Conduct,

duct, in Favour of that *Coalition*, without which the *Revolution* could have succeeded no more than the *Exclusion* did. We find then here neither a *Whig* nor a *Tory Party*; for in *Coalitions* of this Kind, where *two Parties* are melted, as it were, into one, *neither* of them can be said, with Truth and Propriety, to exist.

There was *another Party* directly opposite to *this*; a certain Number of Men, on whom the original Taint, transmitted down from King *James* the First, remained still in the full Strength of its Malignity. These Men adhered to *those Principles*, in the natural Sense and full Extent of them, which the *Tories* had professed. But yet, the *Tories* having renounced *these Principles*, or distinguished themselves out of any Obligation to observe them, this inconsiderable Faction could not be deemed the *Tory Party*, but received the Name of *Jacobite* with more Propriety.

*Two other Parties* there were at this Time, formed on one common Principle, but widely different however, by the different Consequences they drew from it. The Principle I mean is that contained in the Distinction of a King *de Jure*, and a King *de Faëto*. The famous Statute of *Henry* the Sixth authorized this Distinction. The Statute was designed principally, no Doubt, for the Advantage of the *Subjects*, that They might be safe, which ever Side prevailed in an Age, when the epidemical Folly of fighting for *different Pretenders* had spilt Oceans of Blood on the Scaffold, as well as in the Field; and yet the Statute was designed for the Service of *Kings de Faëto* too, and particularly of *Henry* the Seventh. The Author of *hereditary Right* asserted would have us believe otherwise; and yet surely nothing can be more evident than This, that if King *Henry* the Seventh's Right had been as unquestion-



questionable as He supposes, and I presume to deny that it was, yet He would have been declared a King *de Facto* only, if the Intrigues of the Dutchess of *Burgundy*, and the Faction of *York* had succeeded; and consequently this Provision for the Safety of his Adherents, in that possible Contingency, gave Strength to Him, as it would have given Strength to any other Prince, whilst it attached his Adherents to Him by the apparent Security it provided; for *this Author* contends that it did not establish a real Security, and advises us to suspend our Judgment on the Validity of *this Statute*, till We see what the *Opinion of Parliament*, or the *Judges*, may be, whenever a King *de Jure* shall dispossess a King *de Facto*. He refers us *ad Calendas Græcas*.

But there are two Observations to be made to our present Purpose on *this Statute*, which seem to me natural and plain. *First*, it confounds in Effect the very Distinction it seems to make; since it secures alike, and, by securing alike, authorizes alike those, who adhere to the *King de Jure*, and those, who adhere to the *King de Facto*, provided they adhere to the *King in Possession*. *Secondly*, it was contrived to hinder People, according to my Lord *Bacon's* Sense of it, from busying themselves in prying into the King's Title, and that Subjects might not trouble themselves with Enquiries into the Justness of the King's Title, or Quarrel. Now, upon the Foundation of this Distinction, and this Statute, thus understood, They, who demurred on the Settlement of the Crown, at the Revolution, might plausibly, though I think very unreasonably, resolve neither to vote, nor act themselves against those Maxims and Principles, which they had entertained and professed, as Maxims of Law, and Principles of the Constitution, and yet resolve to submit

mit sincerely, and adhere *faithfully* to a *new Establishment*, when it was once made. But the *other* of the two *Parties* I mentioned drew from the same Principle, of distinguishing between a King *de Facto* and a King *de Jure*, a very different Conclusion. They acknowledged *one King*, and held their Allegiance still due to *another*. They bound themselves by Oath to preserve a *Settlement*, which they pretended themselves in Conscience obliged to subvert. This was to justify *Perfidy*, to sanctify *Perjury*, to remove the sacred Boundaries of *Right* and *Wrong*, and, as far as in them lay, to teach Mankind to call *Good Evil*, and *Evil Good*.

Such were the *three Divisions*, into which Men broke at the *Revolution*, in opposing the *Settlement* then made ; whilst the great Body of the Nation concurred in it ; and *Whig* and *Tory* formed in Reality but *one Party*. The *first* of these *Divisions* continued, and became a *Faction in the State* ; but made no *Proselytes*, and is worn out by Time. The Principle of the *second* was wrong ; but it could not be reputed dangerous, whilst it lasted, and it seems to have been built on so narrow and slippery a Foundation, that it did not continue long in Force. I may be more bold in asserting this, since if We look back to the *Æra* of the *Revolution*, and to the Times, which followed, we shall find among those, who voted for a *Regent*, not a *King*, on the Abdication of King *James*, some illustrious Persons, who served King *William* faithfully, who adhered inviolably to our *new Establishment*, and who have been distinguished Friends of the *Succession*, that hath now taken Place. That there have been Persons, who deserved to be ranked under the *third Head*, is too notorious to be denied ; but I persuade myself, that *this Division* hath consisted of a flux Body. On one Hand, it is scarce possible

sible to believe that any Number of Men should be so hardened, as to avow to themselves, and to one another, the acting and persisting to act on a *Principle* so repugnant to every Notion and Sentiment, that harbour in the Breasts of social Creatures. On the other, We know how the Sallies and Transports of *Party*, on some Occasions, can hurry even reasonable Men to act on the most unjustifiable Principles, or both one and the other on no Principle at all, according as the Object, which the prevailing Passion presents to Them, directs. This hath been the Case of many, since the *Revolution*, and there are some of all Sides, I believe, still alive, sure I am that there were some a few Years ago, who know that no Side is absolutely unexceptionable in this Respect.

S I R, Yours, &c.

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## L E T T E R IX.

S I R,

**B**UT whatever the State of *Parties* was at the *Revolution*, and for some Time afterwards, the *Settlement* made at that Time having continued, that State of *Parties* hath changed gradually, tho' slowly, and hath received at Length, according to the necessary Course of Things, a total Alteration. This Alteration would have been sooner wrought, if the Attempt I have mentioned, to defend *Principles* no longer defensible, had not furnished the Occasion and Pretence to keep up the Appearances of *Tory*, and a *Whig-Party*. Some of Those, who had been called *Tories*, furnished this Pretence. They, who had been called *Whigs*, seized and improved

proved it. The Advantages to *one Side*, the Disadvantages to the *other*, the Mischiefs to the whole, which have ensued, I need not deduce. It shall suffice to observe, that these Appearances were the more easy to be kept up, because several Men, who had stood conspicuous in Opposition to one another before the *Revolution*, continued an Opposition, though not the same, afterwards. Fresh Provocations were daily given, and fresh Pretences for Division daily taken. These Contests were present; They recalled Those, that had past in the Time of King *Charles* the Second; and *both Sides* forgot that Union, which their common Danger and their common Interest had formed at the *Revolution*. Old Reproaches were renewed, new ones invented, against the Party called *Whigs*, when They were as complaisant to a *Court* as ever the *Tories* had been; against the Party called *Tories*, when They were as jealous of *publick Liberty*, and as frugal of *publick Money*, as ever the *Whigs* had been. Danger to the *Church*, on *one Side*, and Danger to the *State*, on the *other*, were apprehended from Men, who meant no Harm to *either*; for though *Dissenters* mingled Themselves on *one Side*, and *Jacobites* on the *other*, and notwithstanding the Leanings of *Parties* in Favour of Those, by whom They were abetted; yet it is a certain Truth, that the Struggle was in the main for *Power*, not *Principle*; and that there was no formal Design laid, on *one Side*, to destroy the *Church*, nor, on the *other*, the *State*. The Cavils, which may be made, and the Facts, which may be cited, some of older, and some of fresher Date, against what hath been here said, do not escape me. Men of Knowledge, and of cool and candid Thought, will answer one, and account for the other, without my Help; and I cannot resolve, for the Sake



of the Passionate, nor even of the Ignorant, to descend upon this Subject into a greater Detail.

I pass to That, which is closer to my present Purpose, and of more immediate Use ; and I say, that as the natural Dispositions of Men are altered and formed into different moral Characters by Education, so the Spirit of Constitution of Government, which is confirmed, improved and strengthened by the Course of Events, and especially by Those of fruitless Opposition, in a long Tract of Time, will have a proportionable Influence on the Reasoning, the Sentiments, and the Conduct of Those, who are subject to it. A different Spirit and contrary Prejudices may prevail for a Time. But the Spirit and Principles of the Constitution will prevail at last. If one be unnatural, and the other absurd, (and That is the Case in many Governments) a vigorous Exercise of Power, signal Rewards, signal Punishments, and a Variety of other secondary Means, which in such Constitutions are never wanting, will however maintain, as long as they are employed, both the Spirit and the Principles. But if the Spirit and Principles of a Constitution be agreeable to Nature, and the Ends of Government, which is the Case of the present Constitution of the *British Government*, They want no such Means to make them prevail. They not only flourish without them, but they would fade and dye away with them. As *Liberty* is nourished and supported by such a Spirit and such Principles, so They are propagated by Liberty. Truth and Reason are often able to get the better of Authority in particular Minds ; but Truth and Reason with Authority on their Side will carry Numbers, bear down Prejudices, and become the very Genius of a People. The Progress They make is always sure, but sometimes not observable

servable by every Eye. Contrary Prejudices may seem to maintain Themselves in Vigour, and these Prejudices may be kept up long by Passion and by Artifice. But when Truth and Reason continue to act without Restraint, a little sooner, or a little later, and often when this Turn is least expected, the Prejudices vanish at once, and Truth and Reason triumph without any Rival.

The Constitution of *England* had been seen in two very different Lights, for almost a Century before the *Revolution*; so that there is no Room to be surprized at the great Opposition, that appeared (when the *Whig* and *Tory Parties* arose a very few Years before that *Æra*;) between *Principles*, which, as opposite as they were, each Side pretended to establish on the Nature of *one and the same Constitution*. How This happened, hath been often hinted, and I have not here Room to explain any farther. Let us be satisfied that it is no longer the Case. Our *Constitution* is no longer a Mystery; the Power of the *Crown*, is now exactly limited; the Chimæra of *Prerogative* removed; and the *Rights of the Subject* are no longer problematical, though some Things necessary to the more effectual Security of them may be still wanting. Under *this Constitution*, the greatest Part of the Men now alive were born. They lie under no Pretence of Obligation to any *other*, and to the Support of This They are bound by all the Ties of Society, and all the Motives of Interest.

Let us prove what We advance; and that We may do so *ad Homines*, let us borrow our Argument from the great Champion of *hereditary Right*. Having mentioned in his Introduction what He endeavours pompously, but vainly, to establish in his Book, in Favour of *hereditary Right*, a *Prescription of nine Centuries, a continual Claim of five hundred*

*hundred and fifty Years, He attempts to convince us by a novel Law, and a modern Constitution. This modern Constitution is the Act of Recognition, in the 1st of King James the First. The Declarations there made, in Favour of hereditary Right, are no Doubt as strong as Words can frame, and the Words are such as would tempt one to think, by the Fustian They compose, that his Majesty Himself had penned them. From hence it is concluded that since the Vows and Acts of Fathers—bind their Posterity—This Act, till the Society hath revoked it lawfully, lays the same Obligation on every Member of the Socie'y, as if he had personally consented to it.—If this Act then was lawfully revoked, or repealed, another novel Law, contrary to it, might be made equally binding; but neither this Act, nor the Act of the 12th of Charles the Second, affirming the Crown to appertain by just and undoubted Right to the King, his Heirs and lawful Successors, having been expressly repealed, We still lie under the same Obligations, and every Settlement contrary to them, and by Consequence, the Settlement made at the Revolution, is unlawful. Now I ask, was not the Will of Henry the Eighth, which excluded the whole Scottish Line, made in Pursuance, and by the Authority of an Act passed in the 25th Year of his Reign? Hath not this Author justified the Validity of this Will, much to his own Satisfaction, and, I believe, to That of his Readers? Was this Will lawfully revoked? Was this Statute expressly repealed? I ask farther, whether hereditary Right, and the Obligations of Subjects to it, could be made immutable and eternal, as this Author asserts that they were by the Act of Recognition, without a manifest Contradiction to the Act of Queen Elizabeth, which declares the Power of Parliament to limit and bind the Succession*

cession to the Crown? Was this Act *expressly repealed*? That King *James* the First succeeded *lawfully against Law*, our Author is fond to maintain, and the Proposition is not unlike That of some *Popish Casuists*, who assert that his Holiness *Jure potest contra Jus decernere*; can decree rightfully against Right; but if these Questions are fairly answered, it will result from such Answers, and from the Arguments I have quoted, that this *novel Law*, this *modern Constitution*, is a mere Illusion; that it never bound any *Member of the Society*; and that the Parliament had as much Right to make the *Settlement* in 1688, notwithstanding the *Act of Recognition*, as the Parliament had to make *this Act* in 1603, notwithstanding the *two Acts* I have mentioned, and the *Will of Henry* the Eighth, made by Virtue of the *first* of them. This wayward and forlorn *hereditary Right* must therefore fall to the Ground, or be supported by the supposed *Prescription of nine Centuries*, and *Claim of five and a half*, which no intelligent Man, who reads this Book, will be persuaded that the *Author* hath proved a Jot better, than the uninterrupted Succession of *Popes*, from *St. Peter* down to his present Holiness, is proved by the learned Antiquaries of *Italy*. If *this Act of Recognition* be urged, as it sometimes is, to shew the declared Sense of the *three Estates of the Kingdom*, which Declaration was obtained, it seems, in an Hurry, since the *Act* was read three Times in one House the same Day; the declared Sense of the *three Estates*, not pronounced in an Hurry, but after the most solemn Debates and Conferences, may be urged with much greater Weight, in favour of our *present Settlement*. If this *Act of Recognition*, notwithstanding what hath been objected, be urged as a *Law*, which had the Assent of a *King*, in Opposition to the



Proceedings of the *Convention*, by which King *William* and Queen *Mary* were raised to the Throne; the Answer is obvious and conclusive. The Circumstances of the *two Cases* are very different; but when they come to be weighed in a fair Balance, Those, which attended the Settlement of the Crown on the *Revolution*, will be found at least as conformable to Reason, to Law, and to Practice, as Those, which attended the Establishment of the *Stuart Family*. Queen *Elizabeth* designed King *James* the First to be her Successor; the Nation concurred to make him so; neither She nor They paid any Regard to the *Law*, which stood in his Way. Their Reasons for acting in this Manner are easy to be discovered in the History of that Time; and on the same Authority We may certainly conclude, that They would not have acted in this Manner, if King *James* had been, like his Mother, a *professed Papist*. Thus He got into the Throne; and when he was there, He got, like other Kings, *such a Title*, as He chose to stand upon, *agnized or recognized* by his Parliament. The Settlement at the *Revolution* was made a *Convention of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal*, and a *full and free Representative of the whole Body of the People*. When King *William* and Queen *Mary* were once settled on the Throne, *this Settlement* was continued and confirmed by an Assemblage of *all the legislative Powers*. He, who will dispute the Validity of these Proceedings, must shew therefore *first* of all, what hath never yet been shewn, (no, not by the *Author* I have so often quoted) the Invalidity of the Proceedings of *those Parliaments*, which raised *Edward* the Third and *Henry* the Fourth to the Throne; which were called as irregularly, though by Writs in the Names of *Edward* the Second and *Richard* the Second, as it can be pretended

tended that the *Convocation* was. He must shew the Invalidity of the Proceedings even of *that Assembly*, by which *Charles* the Second was called home, till their Proceedings became valid by a subsequent Confirmation. He must shew farther, how any of the Laws of the Princes of the House of *Lancaster* came to be *constantly received* and *executed*, a little better than the Author of *hereditary Right* asserted hath done, by assuring us on his Word that it was by the 'Sufferance of *Edward* the Fourth and his Successors, and the Approbation of the People.' He must account for the Continuance in Force of the Laws of *Richard* the Third, and of *Henry* the Seventh, a little better than the *same Author* does, by the Deficiency of *Henry* the Seventh's Title, (which, upon another Occasion, he magnifies; though upon This He affirms it to have been *no better* than That of *Richard* the Third) and by the great Respect of *Henry* the Eighth for his Father. When This hath been once shewn, it will be Time to think of a Reply. In the mean while, We will observe that besides the Passion and Party-Spirit, which possess almost all Those, who write on this Subject, there is a Distinction which should be constantly made in Cases of this Nature, and which They never make, or never make exactly enough, They compare the Proceedings, without comparing the Situation. *Necessity* and *Self-Preservation* are great Laws of Nature, and may well dispense with the strict Observation of the common Forms of any particular Constitution. Either the *Convention* must have fallen into the Absurdities I have already mentioned; or have called back King *James*, which would have been a still greater Absurdity; or have done what They did. What They did, was done as near as possible to the

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Spirit

Spirit of our *Constitution*, the Forms of our *Laws*, and the Examples of *former Times*. They had the *Merit*; their Posterity had the *Benefit*; nay He, who would say that They had the *Guilt*, not the *Merit*, must still allow that their Posterity hath the *Benefit*, without sharing the *Guilt*; and, upon the whole Matter, I will venture to assert that He, who scruples, or pretends to scruple, at this Time, the Validity of our *present Constitution*, is no wiser, or else no honefter, than He would be, who should scruple, or pretend to scruple, the Validity of *magna Charta*. I have often wished that some profound Antiquary, of much Leisure, would write an elaborate Treatise to assert *Royal Prerogative* against the *great Charter*, as well as *hereditary Right* against the *Revolution*. I am persuaded that He would succeed alike in *both*. Why, indeed, should a *Charter*, extorted by Force, and therefore vicious in its Principle, stand on a better Foot, or have more Regard paid to it, than a *Settlement* made in Opposition to a *divine*, and therefore *indefeazable Right*? I say, *and therefore indefeazable*; because if it be not proved to be something more than *human*, it will hardly be proved *indefeazable*. But I quit this Subject; upon which, perhaps, you may think I have spent my Time as ill, as I should have done, if I had preached against the *Koran* at *Paul's*. It is Time to speak of the *Motives of Interest*, by which we are bound, as well as by the Ties of Duty, to support the *present Constitution*.

Upon this Head, a few Words will be sufficient; since I presume that no Prejudices can be strong enough to create much Diversity of Opinion, in a Case so very clear, and capable of being stated so shortly. Whether the *Revolution* altered our *old Constitution* for the better, or renewed it, and brought it

it back to the *first Principles*, and nearer to the *primitive Institution*, shall not be disputed here. I think the *latter*, and every Man must think that *one* or the *other* was necessary, who considers, in the first Place, how the Majesty and Authority of the *Prince* began to swell above any Pitch, proportionable to the Rank of *chief Magistrate*, or *supreme Head*, in a *free State*; by how many Arts the *Prerogative of the Crown* had been stretched, and how many *Precedents*, little favourable to *Liberty*, had been set, even before the Accession of the *Scottish Line*; and who considers, in the next Place, the direct Tendency, confirmed by Experience, of *those Principles of Government*, so frequently mentioned, which composed an avowed System of *Tyranny* and established *Slavery* as a political, a moral, and a religious Obligation; which King *James* the First was too successful in establishing; but neither *he*, nor his *Descendents* were able to pursue. What these Considerations made necessary, was done at the *Revolution*; at least, so far as to put it into our Power to do the Rest. A Spirit of *Liberty*, transmitted down from our *Saxon Ancestors*, and the unknown Ages of our Government, preserved itself through one almost continual Struggle, against the Usurpations of our *Princes*, and the Vices of our *People*; and They, whom neither the *Plantagenets*, nor the *Tudors* could enslave, were incapable of suffering their Rights and Privileges to be ravished from them by the *Stuarts*. They bore with the *last King of this unhappy Race*, till it was shameful, as it must have been fatal, to bear any longer; and whilst they asserted their *Liberties*, they refuted and anticipated, by their Temper and their Patience, all the Objections, which foreign and domestick Abettors of *Tyranny* are apt to make against the Conduct  
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of our Nation towards their *Kings*. Let us justify this Conduct, by persisting in it, and continue to ourselves the peculiar Honour of maintaining the Freedom of our *Gothick Institution of Government*, when so many other Nations, who enjoyed the same, have lost theirs.

If a *divine, indefeazable, hereditary Right* to govern a Community be once acknowledged, a *Right independent of the Community*, and which vests in every successive Prince immediately on the Death of his Predecessor, and previously to any Engagement taken on his Part towards the *People*; if the *People* once acknowledge themselves bound to such Princes by the Ties of *Passive Obedience* and *Non-Resistance*, by an *Allegiance unconditional*, and not reciprocal to *Protection*; if a Kind of *oral Law*, or *mysterious Cabbala*, which Pharisees of the *black Gown* and the *long Robe* are always at Hand to report and interpret, as a *Prince* desires, be once added, like a supplemental Code, to the *known Laws of the Land*; then, I say, such Princes have the *Power*, if not the *Right*, given them, of commencing *Tyrants*; and Princes, who have the *Power*, are prone to think that they have the *Right*. Such was the State of *King and People* before the *Revolution*. By the *Revolution*, and *Settlement* since made, this State hath received considerable Alterations. A *King of Britain* is now, strictly and properly, what *Kings* should always be, a Member, but the Supreme Member, or the Head of a political Body. Part of one individual, specifick Whole, in every Respect; distinct from it, or independent of it in none; He can move no longer in another Orbit from his *People*, and, like some superior Planet, attract, repel, influence, and direct their Motions by his own. He and They are Parts of the same System, intimately joined

joined and co-operating together, acting and acted upon, limiting and limited, controuling and controuled by one another; and when He ceases to stand in this Relation to Them; He ceases to stand in any. The *Settlements*, by Virtue of which He governs, are plainly *original Contracts*. His *Institution* is plainly *conditional*; and He may *forfeit* his Right to *Allegiance*, as undeniably and effectually, as the Subject may *forfeit* his Right to *Protection*. There are no longer any hidden Reserves of Authority, to be let out on Occasion, and to overflow the Rights and Privileges of the People. The *Laws of the Land* are known, and they are the sole Springs, from whence the *Prince* can derive his Pretensions, and the *People* theirs. It would be to no Purpose to illustrate any farther a Matter, which begins to be so well understood; or to descend into a more particular Enumeration of the Advantages, that do, or may result, from our *present Settlement*. No man who doth not prefer *Slavery* to *Liberty*, or a more precarious Security to a better, will declare for such a Government, as our national Divisions, and a long Course, seldom interrupted, of improvident Complaisance to the *Crown*, had enabled King *James* the Second to establish against such a Government as was intended by the *subsequent Settlement*; and if there be any such Man, I declare that I neither write to Him, nor for Him.

I may assume therefore, without fearing to be accused of begging the Question, that the *Constitution*, under which We now live, is preferable to That, which prevailed at any Time before the *Revolution*. We are arrived after many Struggles, after a Deliverance almost miraculous, and such an one as no Nation hath Reason to expect twice, and after having made some honest Improvements  
on

on the Advantages of our *new Constitution*, very near to that full Security, under which Men, who are *free* and solicitous to continue so, may sit down, not without Watchfulness, (for That is never to be suffered to relax under such a Government as ours) but without Anxiety. The Sum therefore of all these Discourses, and of all our Exhortations to one another, is, and ought to be, that We should not stop short in so important a Work. It was begun at the *Revolution*; but He who thinks it was perfected then, or hath been perfected since, will find Himself very much mistaken. The Foundations were laid then. We proceeded for some Time after that, like the *Jews* in rebuilding their Temple; We carried on the holy Work with one Hand, and held our Swords in the other to defend it. That Distraction, that Danger is over, and we betray the Cause of *Liberty* without any Colour of Excuse, if We do not compleat the glorious Building, which will last to Ages yet more remote, if it be once finished, and will moulder away and fall into Ruins, if it remain longer in this imperfect State.

Now, that We may see the better how to proceed in the Cause of *Liberty*, to compleat the Freedom, and to secure the Duration of our *present Constitution*; it will be of Use, I think, to consider what Obstacles lie, or may hereafter lie, in our Way, and of what Nature that Opposition is, or may hereafter be; which We may expect to meet. In order to this, let us once more analyse our political Divisions; Those, which may possibly exist now, or hereafter, as We did those which were formed at the *Revolution*.

*One possible Division* then is That of Men angry with the *Government*, and yet resolved to maintain the *Constitution*. This may be the Case at any Time;

Time ; under the present, wise, virtuous, and triumphant Administration, and therefore to be sure at any other.

A *second possible Division* is That of Men averse to the *Government*, because they are so to the *Constitution*, which, I think, can never be the Case of many ; or averse to the *Constitution*, because they are so to the *Government*, which, I think, may be the Case of more. *Both* of these tend to the same Point. *One* would subvert the *Government*, that they might change the *Constitution*. The *other* would sacrifice the *Constitution*, that they might subvert the *Government*.

A *third possible Division*, and I seek no more, is that of Men attached to the *Government* ; or, to speak more properly, to the Persons of *those*, who govern ; or, to speak more properly still, to the Power, Profit, or Protection they acquire by the Favour of *these Persons* ; but Enemies to the *Constitution*.

Now, as to the *first* and *second of these possible Divisions*, if there be any such among us, I do not apprehend that We are at present, or can be hereafter, in much Danger ; or that the Cause of *Liberty* can meet with much Opposition from them ; though the *second* have certainly Views, more likely to bring Slavery upon us, than to promote *Liberty* ; and though Prudence requires that We should be on our Guard against *both*. The *first*, indeed, might hope to unite even the Bulk of the Nation to them, in a weak and oppressive Reign. If Grievances should grow intolerable under some Prince as yet unborn ; if Redress should become absolutely desperate ; if *Liberty* it self should be in imminent Peril ; the Nature of our *Constitution* would justify the Resistance, that We ought to believe well enough of Posterity to persuade our selves



selves would be made in such an Exigency. But without such an Exigency, particular Men would flatter themselves extremely, if they hoped to make the Nation angry, because they were so. Private Motives can never influence Numbers. When a Nation revolts, the Injury is national. This Case therefore is remote, improbable, nay impossible, under the Lenity, Justice and heroical Spirit of the *present Government*; and if I mentioned such an *imaginary Party*, it was only done that I might omit none, which can be supposed. The Projects of the *second Division*, stated in the same hypothetical Manner, are surely too extravagant, and their Designs too wicked, to be dangerous. Disputes may arise hereafter, in some distant Time, about *Ministers*, perhaps about *Kings*; but I persuade myself, that *this Constitution* will be, as it ought to be always, distinguished from, and prefer'd to *both*, by the *British Nation*. Reasons must arise in Process of Time, from the very Nature of Man, to oppose *Ministers* and *Kings* too; but none can arise, in the Nature of Things, to oppose *such a Constitution* as ours. *Better Ministers, better Kings*, may be hereafter often wanted, and sometimes found; but a *better constituted Government* never can. Should there be therefore still any such Men, as We here suppose, among us, they cannot expect, if they are in their Senses, a national Concurrence; and surely a little Reflection will serve to shew them, that the same Reasons, which make them weaker now than they were some Years ago, must make them weaker some Years hence than they are now.

As to the *third Division*, if any such there be, it is in That our greatest and almost our whole Danger centers. The *others* cannot overthrow, but *these* may undermine our *Liberty*. Capable of being

ing admitted into Power, in all Courts, and more likely than other Men to be so in every Court, except the present, (whose approved Penetration and spotless Innocence give a certain Exclusion to them) They may prevent any farther Securities from being procured to *Liberty*, till Those already established are dissolved, or perverted. Since then our principal Danger must in all Times arise from Those, who belong to *this Division*, it is necessary to shew, before We conclude these Discourses, by what Means *such Men* may carry on their pernicious Designs with Effect, and by what Means They may be defeated. These Considerations will lead us to fix that Point, wherein Men of all Denominations ought to unite, and do unite, and to state the solemn Distinction of *Parties*, which can be made with Truth, at this Time, amongst us.

*I am, SIR, Yours, &c.*

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## LETTER X.

*SIR,*

IT may be asked, perhaps, how Men, who are Friends to a *Government*, can be Enemies at the same Time to the *Constitution*, upon which *that Government* is founded. But the Answer will be easy, if We consider these two Things; *first*, the true Distinction, so often confounded in Writing, and almost always in Conversation, between *Constitution* and *Government*. By *Constitution* We mean, whenever We speak with Propriety and Exactness, that Assemblage of Laws, Institutions and Customs, derived from certain fixed Principles of Reason, directed to certain fixed Objects of publick Good,  
that

that compose the general System, according to which the Community hath agreed to be governed. By *Government* We mean, whenever We speak in the same Manner, that particular Tenor of Conduct, which a chief Magistrate, and inferior Magistrates, under his Direction and Influence, hold in the Administration of publick Affairs. We call This a *good Government*, when the Execution of the Laws, the Observation of the Institutions and Customs, in short, the whole Administration of publick Affairs is wisely pursued, and with a strict Conformity to the Principle and Objects of the *Constitution*. We call it a *bad Government*, when it is administered on other Principles, and directed to other Objects, either wickedly or weakly, either, by obtaining *new Laws*, which want this Conformity, or by perverting *old ones*, which had it; and when This is done *without Law*, or in *open Violation of the Laws*, We term it a *tyrannical Government*. In a Word, and to bring this home to our own Case, *Constitution* is the Rule, by which our Princes ought to govern, at all Times; *Government* is That, by which they actually do govern, at any particular Time. *One* may remain immutable; the *other* may, and as human Nature is constituted, must vary. *One* is the Criterion, by which We are to try the *other*; for surely We have a Right to do so, since if We are to live in Subjection to the Government of our *Kings*, our *Kings* are to govern in Subjection to the *Constitution*; and the Conformity, or Non-Conformity of their Government to it, prescribes the Measure of our Submission to Them, according to the Principles of the *Revolution*, and of our *present Settlement*; in both of which, though some remote Regard was had to *Blood*, yet the Preservation of the *Constitution* manifestly determined the Community to the Choice then made

of

of *Persons*, who should govern. Another Thing to be considered is This. When Persons are spoken of as *Friends to the Government*, and *Enemies to the Constitution*, the Term *Friendship* is a little prostituted, in Compliance with common Usage. Such Men are really incapable of Friendship; for real Friendship can never exist among Those, who have banished Virtue and Truth. They have no Affection to any but Themselves; no Regard to any Interest, except their own. Their sole Attachments are such as I mentioned in the last Letter, Attachments to *Power* and *Profit*, and when they have contracted a Load of Infamy and Guilt, in the Pursuit of *these*, an Attachment to *that Protection*, which is sufficient to procure Them Appearances of Consideration, and real Impunity. They may bear the Semblance of Affection to their Prince, and of Zeal for his Government; but They, who are false to the Cause of their Country, will not be true to any other; and the very *same Minister*, who exalts his Master's Throne on the Ruins of the *Constitution*, that He may govern without Controul, or retire without Danger, would do the Reverse of This, if any Turn of Affairs enabled Him to compound, in that Manner, the better for Himself.

Under a Prince therefore tolerably honest, or tolerably wise, *such Men as these* will have no great Sway; at least, They will not hold it long. Such a Prince will know, that to unite Himself to *them*, is to disunite Himself from his *People*, and that He makes a stupid Bargain, if He prefers Trick to Policy, Expedient to System, and a Cabal to the Nation. Reason and Experience will teach Him, that a Prince, who does so, must govern weakly, ignominiously and precariously; whilst He, who engages all the Hearts, and employs all the Heads and Hands of his People, governs with Strength,  
with.



with Splendour, and with Safety, and is sure of rising to a Degree of absolute Power, by maintaining *Liberty*, which the most successful Tyrant could never reach, by imposing Slavery. But how few Men (and Princes by their Leaves are Men) have been found in Times past, or can be hoped for in Times to come, capable of governing by such Arts as these? Some cannot propose the Ends, nor some employ the Means; for some are wicked, and some are weak. This general Division runs through the whole Race of Mankind; of the Multitudes designed to obey, and of the Few designed to govern. It was this Depravity of Multitudes, as well as their mutual Wants, which obliged Men first to enter into Societies; to depart from their natural Liberty; and to subject themselves to Government. It was this Depravity of the Few, (which is often the greater, because born no better than other Men, They are educated worse) which obliged Men first to subject *Government* to *Constitution*, that They might preserve social, when They gave up natural Liberty, and not be oppressed by arbitrary Will. *Kings* may have preceded *Lawgivers*, for aught I know, or have possibly been the *first Lawgivers*, and *Government by Will* have been established before *Government by Constitution*. *Theseus* might reign at *Athens*, and *Eurytion* at *Sparta*, long before *Solon* gave Laws to the *one*, and *Lycurgus* to the *other* of these Cities. *Kings* had governed *Rome*, We know, and *Consuls* had succeeded *Kings*, long before the *Decemviri* compiled a Body of Law; and the *Saxons* had their Monarchs before *Edgar*, though the *Saxon Laws* went under his Name. These and a thousand other Instances of the same Kind will never serve to prove, what my Lord *Bacon* would prove by them, \* that Monarchies

\* *Argum. in the Case of Postnati.*

archies do not subsist, like other Governments, by a precedent Law, or Compact; *that the original Submission to them was natural, like the Obedience of a Child to his Parent; and that Allegiance to hereditary Monarchs is the Work of the Law of Nature.* But That, which these Examples prove very plainly is, that however Men might submit voluntarily in the primitive Simplicity of early Ages, or be subjected by Conquest, to a Government without a Constitution, yet They were never long in discovering that † *to live by one Man's Will became the Cause of all Mens Misery*, and therefore They soon rejected the Yoke, or made it sit easy on their Necks. They instituted *Commonwealths*, or they limited *Monarchies*; and here began that Struggle between the *Spirit of Liberty* and the *Spirit of Dominion*, which always hath subsisted, and, that We may not flatter ourselves nor others, must always subsist, except in those Instances, of which the most antient Histories furnish so few, the Reigns of a *Titus*, or a *Trajan*; for it might look like Flattery to quote the present most auspicious Reign.

To govern a Society of Freemen by a *Constitution*, founded on the eternal Rules of right Reason, and directed to promote the Happiness of the Whole, and of every Individual, is the noblest Prerogative, which can belong to Humanity; and if Man may be said, without Prophaneness, to imitate God in any Case, This is the Case. But sure I am, He imitates the Devil, who is so far from promoting the Happiness of others, that he makes his own Happiness to consist in the Misery of others; who governs by no Rule but That of his Passions, whatever Appearances He is forced sometimes

† Hookers's *Eccles. Pol.* L. I. Sect. 10.

times to put on ; who endeavours to corrupt the Innocent, and to enslave the Free ; whose Business is to seduce, or betray ; whose Pleasure is to damn ; and whose Triumph is to torment. Odious and execrable as this Character is, it is the Character of every Prince, who makes use of his Power to subvert, or even to weaken *that Constitution*, which ought to be the Rule of his *Government*. When such a Prince fills a Throne with superior Parts, *Liberty* is in the utmost Peril ; nor does the Danger diminish in Proportion, if he happens to want them. Such Men as We are now to speak of (*Friends to the Government and Enemies to the Constitution*) will be always at Hand to supply his Defects ; for as They are the willing Instruments of a wicked Prince, They are the ready Prompters of a weak one. They may sink into the Mass of the People, and disappear in a good and a wise Reign, or work Themselves into Power under false Colours. *Sed Genus immortale manet.* Their Race will continue as long as Ambition and Avarice prevail in the World, and there will be bad Citizens as long as there are bad Men. The good ought therefore to be always on their Guard against Them, and whatever Disguise They assume, whatever Veils They cast over their Conduct, They will never be able to deceive Those long, who observe constantly the Difference between *Constitution* and *Government*, and who have Virtue enough to prefer the Cause of the *former*, how unprofitable soever it may be at all Times, and how unpopular soever at some.——But I ramble too long in Generals. It is high Time I should come to those particular Measures, by which the Men I have described are most likely to carry on their Designs against our *Constitution* ; after which

which I shall say something of the Methods, by which alone their Designs may be prevented, or will be defeated, if a *national Union* oppose itself by such Methods as These, in Time, to them.

Now, that I may do This the better, and make what I have to say the more sensibly felt, give me Leave to suppose, (though I speak of a remote Time, and such an one as We ought to hope will never come) that our national Circumstances will be just the same as They are now, and our *Constitution* as far distant as it now is from that Point of Perfection, to which the *Revolution* ought to have brought it, might have brought it, and hath given the Nation a Right to expect that it should be brought. The Completion of that glorious Deliverance is still imperfect, after five and forty Years, notwithstanding the Hopes then given, the Engagements then taken, and the Opportunities, that have since arisen. How This hath happened, by what Arts this Justice to the *Constitution* hath been hitherto evaded, sometimes in Favour of one Government, and sometimes in Favour of another, might easily be shewn, and proved too, beyond Contradiction. But I had rather exhort, than reproach; and especially at a Time, when a strong Tendency appears among Men of all Denominations to such a *national Union*, as will effectually obtain the complete Settlement of our *Constitution*, which hath been so long delayed, if it be honestly, prudently and vigorously improved.

It is certain then, that if ever such Men as call Themselves *Friends to the Government*, but are *real Enemies of the Constitution*, prevail, They will make it a capital Point of their wicked Policy to keep up a *standing Army*. False Appearances of Reason for it will never be wanting, as long as there are *Prebenders* to the Crown; though nothing can be more  
absurd



absurd than to employ, in Defence of *Liberty*, an Instrument so often employed to destroy it; though nothing can be more absurd than to maintain that *any Government* ought to make use of the same Expedient to support itself, as *another Government*, on the Ruins of which *this Government* stands, was subverted for using; though nothing can be proved more manifestly by Experience than these two Propositions; that *Britain* is enabled, by her Situation, to support her *Government*, when the Bulk of her People are for it, without employing any Means inconsistent with her *Constitution*; and that the Bulk of the People are not only always for the *Government*, when the *Government* supports the *Constitution*, but are even hard and slow to be detached from it, when the *Government* attacks or undermines the *Constitution*, and when they are by Consequence both justified in resisting, and even obliged in Conscience to resist the *Government*.

I have heard it argued lately that *Pretenders* abroad are a Security at home, and that a *Government*, exposed to their Attacks, will never venture to attack the *Constitution*. I have been told too that these Notions were entertained by Some, who drew many political Consequences from them at the *Revolution*. But if any of those Persons are still alive, I persuade myself, that They have altered this Opinion, since such a Situation will furnish, at all Times, Pretences of Danger; since Pretences of Danger to a *Government*, whether real or imaginary, will be always urged with Plausibility, and generally with Success, for obtaining *new Powers*, or for straining *old ones*; and since, whilst Those who mean well to the *Government*, are imposed upon by Those, who mean ill to the *Constitution*, all true Concern in the *latter* is lost in a mistaken Zeal for the *former*, and the most important is ventured

to save the least important, when neither one nor the other would have been exposed, if false Alarms had not been rashly and too implicitly taken, or if true Alarms had not given unnecessary Strength to the *Government*, at the Expence of weakening the *Constitution*.

Notwithstanding what hath been said, I do not imagine that an *Army* would be employed by *these Men*, directly and at first, against the Nation, and national Liberty. I am far from thinking that any Men can arise, in future Times, capable of attempting, in this Manner, what some Men in our Age, who call Themselves *Friends to the Government*, have been so weak and so impudent as to avow in Print, and publish to the Nation. To destroy *British Liberty* with an *Army of Britons* is not a Measure so sure of Success, as some People may believe. To corrupt the *Parliament* is a slower, but might prove a more effectual Method, and two or three hundred Mercenaries in the two Houses, if They could be listed there, would be more fatal to the *Constitution*, than ten Times as many Thousands in Red and Blue out of them. *Parliaments* are the true Guardians of *Liberty*. For This principally They were instituted; and This is the principal Article of that great and noble Trust, which the collective Body of the People of *Britons* reposes in the Representative. But then no Slavery can be so effectually brought and fixed upon us, as *Parliamentary Slavery*. By the *Corruption of Parliament*, and the absolute Influence of a *King*, or his *Minister*, on the *two Houses*, we return into that State, so deliver or secure us from which *Parliaments* were instituted, and are really governed by the arbitrary Will of *one Man*. Our whole *Constitution* is at once dissolved. Many Securities to *Liberty* are provided; but the Integrity, which depends on

the *Freedom* and the *Independency of Parliament*, is the Keystone, that keeps the whole together. If This be shaken, our *Constitution* totters. If it be quite removed, our *Constitution* falls into Ruin. That noble Fabrick, the Pride of *Britain*, the Envy of her Neighbours, raised by the Labour of so many Centuries, repaired at the Expence of so many Millions, and cemented by such a Profusion of Blood ; that noble Fabrick, I say, which was able to resist the united Efforts of so many Races of Giants, may be demolished by a Race of Pygmies. The Integrity of *Parliament* is a Kind of *Palladium*, a tutelary Goddess, who protects our State. When she is once removed, We may become the Prey of any Enemies. No *Agamemnon*, no *Achilles* will be wanted to take our City. *Thersites* Himself will be sufficient for such a Conquest. But I need not dwell any longer on this Subject. There is no Man, who thinks at all, and can fail to see the fatal Consequences, which will necessarily flow from this one Source, whenever it shall be opened. If the Reason of the Thing does not strike him enough, Experience must. The single Reign of *Henry* the Eighth will serve to shew, that no Tyranny can be more severe than That, which is exercised by a Concert with *Parliament* ; that *arbitrary Will* may be made the sole Rule of Government, even whilst the Names and Forms of *free Constitution* are preserved ; that for a *Prince*, or his *Minister*, to become our *Tyrant*, there is no Need to abolish *Parliaments* ; there is no Need that He, who is Master of *one Part of the Legislature*, should endeavour to abolish the *other two*, when He can use, upon every Occasion, the united Strength of the *whole* ; there is no Need He should be a Tyrant in the Gross, when He can be so in Detail ; nor in Name, when He can be so in Effect ; the

for *Parliaments* to establish *Tyranny*, there is no Need therefore to repeal *Magna Charta*, or any other of the great Supports of our *Liberty*. It is enough, if They put Themselves corruptly and servilely under the Influence of such a *Prince*, or such a *Minister*. — On the whole, I conclude, that, in the possible Case here supposed, the first and principal Object will be to destroy the *Constitution*, under Pretence of preserving the *Government*, by *corrupting our Parliaments*. I am the better founded in concluding that This may happen in some future Age, by what We may observe in our own. There is surely but too much Reason to expect that the *Enemies of our Constitution* may attempt hereafter to govern by *Corruption*, when We hear and see the Friends and Advocates of our *present most incorrupt Minister* harangue and scribble, in Favour of *Corruption*; when it is pleaded for and recommended, as a necessary Expedient of Government, by some Men of all Ranks and Orders; not only by *professed Hirelings*, who write that They may eat; but by Men, who have talked and written Themselves already out of their native Obscurity and Penury, by affecting Zeal in the Cause of *Liberty*; not only by such as These, but by Men, whose Birth, Education and Fortune aggravate their Crime and Folly; by Men, whom Honour at least should restrain from favouring so dishonourable a Cause; and by Men, whose peculiar Obligations to preach up *Morality* should restrain Them, at least, from being the Preachers of an *Immorality*, above all others, abominable in its Nature, and pernicious in its Effects.

*These Men* are ready, I know, to tell us that the Influence They plead for is necessary to strengthen the Hands of Those, who govern; that *Corruption* serves to oil the Wheels of Government, and to



render the Administration more smooth and easy ; and that it can never be of dangerous Consequence, under the present Father of our Country.——Abfurd and wicked Triflers ! ‘ According to Them, ‘ our excellent Constitution ( as one of your Correspondents hath observed extremely well ) ‘ is no better than a Jumble of incompatible ‘ Powers, which would separate and fall to Pieces ‘ of Themselves, unless restrained and upheld by ‘ fuch honourable Methods as thofe of *Bribery* and ‘ *Corruption*.’ They would prove, *that the Form of our Government is defective to a Degree of Ridiculousnefs.* But the Ridicule, as well as the Iniquity, is their own. A good Government can want no Power, under the *present Constitution*. A bad one may, and it is fit it fhould. *Popularity* is the Expedient of *one*, and will effectually fupport it. Nothing but *Corruption* can fupport the *other*. If there was a real Deficiency of *Power in the Crown*, it ought to be fupplied, no Doubt. The old Whimfies of *Prerogative* fhould not be revived ; but *Limitations* ought to be taken off, or *new Powers* to be given. The *Friends of Liberty* acknowledge, that a Ballance of the Powers, divided among the *three Parts of the Legislature*, is effential to our *Constitution*, and neceffary to fupport it. The *Friends of Liberty* therefore would concur, at leaft to a certain Point, with the *Friends of the Miniftry* ; for the former are Friends to Order, and Enemies to Licence. For Decency’s fake therefore let the Debate be put on this Ifsue. Let it be fuch a Debate as *Freemen* may avow, without blufhing. To argue from this fupposed Deficiency of *Power in the Crown*, in Favour of a Scheme of Government, repugnant to all Laws divine and human, is fuch an Instance of abandoned, villainous Proftitution, as the moft corrupt Ages never faw, and as will place this

the present Age, with infamous Pre-eminence, at the Head of them ; unless the Nation do itself Justice, and fix the Brand on *Those*, who ought alone to bear it.——Thus much for the Iniquity of the Practice pleaded for. As to the Danger of it, let us agree, that a Prince of such Magnanimity and Justice as our present Monarch, can never be tempted by any sordid Motives to forget the recent Obligation, which He and his Family have to the *British* Nation, by whom They were made Kings ; nor to aim at greater Power and Wealth, than are consistent with the Safety of the *Constitution* They are intrusted to preserve, and obliged to secure. Allowing This to be our present Case, (and concerning our present Case, there are not two Opinions, I dare say, in the whole Nation ) yet still the Symptoms I have mentioned shew that the Poison, with which these pretended *Friends of Government*, and real *Enemies of the Constitution*, corrupt the Morals of Mankind, hath made some Progress ; and if this Progress be not immediately checked by proper Antidotes, and the Power of poisoning taken from *these Empiricks*, the Disease will grow incurable. The last dismal Effect of it may not, or if you please, cannot happen in this Reign ; but it may, nay it must happen in some other, unless We prevent it effectually and soon ; and what Season more proper to prevent it in, and to complete the Security of our *Liberties*, than the Reign of a Prince, for whom the Nation hath done so much, and from whom by Consequence the Nation hath a Right to expect so much ? King *William* delivered us from Popery and Slavery. There was Wisdom in his Councils, and Fortitude in his Conduct. He steered through many real Difficulties at home, and He fought our Battels abroad ; and yet those Points of Security, which had been neglected,

or not sufficiently provided for, in the Honey-moon of his Accession, were continually pressed upon Him, during the whole Course of his Reign. The Men, who pressed them, were called *Jacobites*, *Tories*, *Republicans*, and *Incendiaries* too, not from the Throne indeed, but by the Clamour of Those, who shewed great Indifference at least for the *Constitution*, whilst They affected great Zeal for the *Government*. They succeeded however in Part, and We enjoy the Benefit of their Success. If They did not succeed in the whole ; if the Settlement necessary to secure our *Liberty*, and therefore intended at the *Revolution*, be not yet compleat ; let us be persuaded, and let us act on that Persuasion, that the Honour of compleating it was reserved to crown the Glories of the present Reign. To finish the great Work, which King *William* began, of establishing the Liberties of *Britain* on firm and durable Foundations, must be reputed an Honour surely ; and to whom can this Honour belong more justly than to a Prince, who emulates in so remarkable a Manner all the other heroic Virtues of his renowned Predecessor ?

I am, SIR, Your's, &c.

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## LETTER XI.

SIR,

IF it was possible for any Man, who hath the least Knowledge of our Constitution, to doubt in good Earnest whether the Preservation of *publick Freedom* depends on the Preservation of *Parliamentary Freedom*, his Doubts might be removed and his Opinion decided, one would imagine, by this  
single,

single, obvious Remark ; that all the Designs of our Princes against *Liberty*, since *Parliaments* began to be established on the Model still subsisting, have been directed constantly to one of these two *Points* ; either to obtain *such Parliaments as they could govern* ; or else to stand all the Difficulties, and to run all the Hazards of *governing without Parliaments*. The Means principally employed, to the *first of these Purposes*, have been undue Influences on the *Elections* of Members of the House of Commons, and on *these Members*, when chosen. When such Influences could be employed successfully, They have answered all the Ends of *arbitrary Will* ; and when they could not be so employed, *arbitrary Will* hath been forced to submit to the *Constitution*. This hath been the Case, not only since, but before that great Change in the Ballance of *Property*, which began in the Reigns of *Henry the Seventh*, and *Henry the Eighth*, and carried a great Part of that Weight into the Scale of the *Commons*, which had lain before in the Scale of the *Peers* and *Clergy*.

If we look back as far as the Close of the Fourteenth Century, ( an *Æra* pretty near to that, when *Parliaments* received their present Form ) We shall find *both these Means* employed by one of the worst of our Kings, *Richard the Second*. That he might obtain his *Will*, which was rash, He directed Mandates to his *Sheriffs*, ( Officers of the *Crown*, and appointed by the *Crown* ; for such they were then, and such they still are ) to return certain Persons nominated by himself ; and thus He acquired an undue Influence over the *Elections*. In the next Place, He obliged the Persons thus returned sometimes by *Threats and Terror*, and sometimes by *Gifts*, to consent to those Things, which were prejudicial to the *Realm* ; and thus he acquired an undue Influence over the



*House of Commons*; so that, upon the whole; the arbitrary Will of a *rash, headstrong Prince*, and the Suggestions of his *wicked Ministers*, guided the Proceedings of *Parliament*, and became the *Law of the Land*. I might pursue Observations of the same Kind through several succeeding Reigns; but to avoid lengthening these Letters, which are grown perhaps too long already, let us descend at once to the Reign of King *Charles the Second*; for in that We shall find Examples of all the Means, which a *Court*, that hath common Sense, and a *Prince*, who will not set his Crown on the Cast of a Dye, can take to undermine the Foundations of *Liberty*, either by governing *Parliaments*, or by governing without them.

Now the first Attempt, of this Kind, which King *Charles* made against the *Constitution*, was This. He improved and managed the Spirit of the *first Parliament* He called, so as to render the *two Houses* obsequious to his Will, almost in every Case; and having got the TRIENNIAL BILL repealed, He kept the *same Parliament* in Being for many Years by *Prorogations*; which crept into Custom long before his Time, but were still a modern Invention, with respect to the primitive Institution of *Parliaments*, and wholly repugnant to the antient Practice. Thus he established a *standing Parliament*; which is, in the Nature of it, as dangerous as a *standing Army*, and may become, in some Conjunctions, much more fatal to *Liberty*. When the Measures of his Administration grew too bad, and the Tendency of them too apparent to be defended and supported, even in *that Parliament*, and even by a *Party-Spirit*, He had Recourse to a second Attempt; That is, to *Corruption*; and *Clifford* first listed a mercenary Band of *Friends to the Government*, against the *Constitution*, — Let us observe,

observe, on this Occasion, and as We pass along, that a *national Party* (such a Party as the Court adopts, in Contradistinction to such a Party as it creates,) will always retain some *national Principles*, some Regard to the *Constitution*. They may be transported, or surprized, during the Heat of Contest especially, into Measures of long and fatal Consequence. They may be carried on, for a certain Time and to a certain Point, by the Lusts of Vengeance and of Power, in order to wreak one upon their Adversaries, and to secure the other to themselves. But a *national Party* will never be the Instrument of completing *national Ruin*. They will become the Adversaries of their Friends, and the Friends of their Adversaries, to prevent it; and the *Minister*, who persists in so villainous a Project, by what Name soever he may affect to distinguish Himself and his Followers, will be found really at the Head of a *Faction*, not of a *Party*. But the Difference between *one* and the *other* is so visible, and the Boundaries, where *Party* ceases and *Faction* commences, are so strongly marked, that it is sufficient to point at them.

I return therefore, and observe that when the *Spirit of Party* failed King *Charles*, and the *Corruption* He employed proved ineffectual, He resolved to govern for a Time *without Parliaments*, and to employ that Time, as soon as he had checked the Spirit of *one Party*, by enflaming that of *another*, in garbling *Corporations*. He had found by Experience, that it was impossible to corrupt the Stream in any great Degree, as long as the Fountain continued pure. He applied Himself therefore to spread the Taint of the *Court* in them, and to poison those Springs, from whence the Health and Vigour of the *Constitution* flow. This was the third, the last, and by much the most dangerous

dangerous Expedient, employed by the *Friends of the Government*, in the Reign of King *Charles the Second*, to undermine our *Liberties*. The Effect of it He did not live to see; but we may easily conjecture what it would have been.

The Use I make of what hath been here said is This. The Design of the *Revolution* being not only to save us from the immediate Attempts on our Religion and Liberty, made by King *James*, but to save us from all other Attempts, which had been made, or might be made, of the same Tendency to renew and strengthen our Constitution; \* ' to establish the Peace, Honour, and Happiness of these Nations upon lasting Foundations, — and to procure a Settlement of the Religion, and of the Liberties and Properties of the Subjects, upon so sure a Foundation, that there might be no Danger of the Nation's relapsing into the like Miseries at any Time hereafter; This being, I say, the avowed Design of the *Revolution*, and the Nation having engaged in it on a Confidence that all this would be effectually performed, the Design of the *Revolution* was not accomplished, the Benefit of it was not secured to us, the just Expectations of the Nation could not be answered, unless the *Freedom of Elections*, and the *Frequency, Integrity and Independency of Parliaments* were sufficiently provided for. These are the Essentials of *British Liberty*. Defects in other Parts of the *Constitution* can never be fatal, if these are preserved intire. But Defects in these will soon destroy the *Constitution*, though every other Part of it should be so preserved. However it happened, the Truth and Notoriety of the Fact oblige us to say that these important Conditions, without which *Liberty* can never be secure, were almost

\* See the Prince of Orange's Declaration.

almost wholly neglected at the *Revolution*. The *Claim of Right* declares, indeed, that 'Elections ought to be free; that Freedom of Speech and Debates ought not to be impeached, or questioned out of Parliament, and that Parliaments ought to be held frequently.' But such Declarations, however solemnly made, are nothing better than pompous Trifles, if They stand alone; productive of no Good, and thus far productive of Ill, that they serve to amuse Mankind, in Points of the greatest Importance, and wherein it concerns them the most nearly neither to be deceived, nor so much as amused. These were *Rights*, no Doubt, to which the Nation had an indisputable Claim. But then they ought to have been more than claimed, since they had been so often and so lately invaded. That they were not more than claimed, that they were not effectually asserted and secured, at this Time, gave very great and immediate Dissatisfaction; and They, who were called *Whigs* in those Days, distinguished themselves by the Loudness of their Complaints. Thus, for Instance, They insisted that there could be no *real Settlement*, nay that it was a *jest to talk of a Settlement*, till the *Manner and Time of calling Parliaments*, and their *sitting*, when called, were *fully determined*; and This, in order to prevent the Practice of *keeping ONE and the SAME PARLIAMENT so long on Foot*, till the Majority was corrupted by *Offices, Gifts and Pensions*. They insisted that the Assurances given at the *Revolution* had led them to think that † *the antient legal Course of ANNUALLY CHOSEN PARLIAMENTS would have been immediately restored*; and the particular Circumstances of

\* See *Considerations concerning the State of the Nation*, by Mr. Hambden, published in 1692.

† *An Enquiry, or a Discourse, &c.* published in 1693.



of King *William*, who had received the *Crown* by Gift of the People, and who had renewed the *original Contract* with the People, (which are precisely the Circumstances of the present Royal Family) were urged as particular Reasons for the Nation to expect this Compliance.

The *frequent sitting of Parliament* was indeed provided for, indirectly and in Consequence, by the Exigencies of the *War*, which soon followed the *Revolution*. This War made *annual Supplies* necessary; and, before it was over, the same Necessity of *annual Sessions of Parliament* came to be established, as it continues to this Hour, by the great Alteration made relatively to the *publick Revenue*. The whole *publick Revenue* had been the King's formerly. *Parliamentary Aids* were, in those Days, extraordinary and occasional; and Things came to that Pass at last, that *Parliaments* were more frequently, or more rarely convened, just as *Courts* had more frequent, or more rare Occasions for such Supplies. But King *William* began to be, and all our Princes since Him have continued to be, only Proprietors for Life of that Part of the *publick Revenue*, which is appropriated to their *Civil List*; although they are intrusted still with the Management of the *Whole*, and are even with the Stewards of the *publick Creditors* for that Part, which is the private Property of *these Creditors*. This is the present State, sufficiently known, but necessary to be mentioned particularly on this Occasion; and this must continue to be the State; unless some Prince should arise hereafter, who, being advised by a *desperate Minister*, abetted by a *mercenary Faction*, supported by a *standing Army*, and instigated, like *Richard the Second*, by the *\*Rashness of his own Temper*, may lay rapacious Hands

on

\* *Per immoderatam voluntatem.*

on all the *Funds*, that have been created, and by applying illegally what He may raise legally, convert the whole to his own Use, and so establish *arbitrary Power*, by depriving at one Stroke many of his Subjects of their *Property*, and all of them of their *Liberty*. Till this happens, (and Heaven forbid that it should be ever attempted !) *Sessions of Parliament* must be *annually* held, or the Government itself be distressed. But neither is This such a direct and full Security as the Importance of the Thing requires ; nor does the Security of our *Liberty* consist only in *frequent Sessions of Parliaments* ; but it consists likewise in *frequent new Parliaments*. Nay, it consists so much more in *this* than in the *other*, that the *former* may tend without the *latter*, even more than the *Discontinuance of Parliaments*, to the Loss of *Liberty*. This was foreseen by the Wisdom of our *Constitution*. According to that, although it became in Time (by the Course of Events and insensible Alterations) no longer necessary to call Parliaments *once*, or even *twice in a Year*, which had been the more ancient Practice ; yet still our *Kings* continued under an Incapacity of proceeding long in Government, with any tolerable Ease and Safety to themselves, without the Concurrence and Assistance of *these Assemblies*. According to the *same Constitution*, as *Parliaments* were to be *held*, so they were to be *chosen frequently* ; and the Opinion, that the *Holding and Continuance of Parliaments depended absolutely on the Will of the Prince*, may be justly ranked amongst those Attempts, that were made by some Men to set the *Law*, whilst others endeavoured to set the *Gospel*, on the Side of *arbitrary Power*. This is the plain Intent and Scheme of our *Constitution*, which provides that the *Representatives of the People* should have frequent Opportunities to communicate

state together about *national Grievances*; to complain of them, and to obtain the Redress of them, in an orderly, solemn, legal Manner; and that the *People* should have frequent Opportunities of calling their *Representatives* to Account, as it were, for the Discharge of the Trust committed to them, and of approving, or disapproving their Conduct, by electing, or not electing them anew. Thus our *Constitution* supposes that *Princes* may abuse their Power, and *Parliaments* betray their Trust; and provides, as far as human Wisdom can provide, that neither *one*, nor the *other*, may be able to do so long, without a sufficient Controul. If the *Crown*, indeed, persists in usurping on the *Liberties of the People*, or in any other Kind of *Male-Administration*; and if the *Prince*, who wears it, proves deaf, as our *Princes* have sometimes been, to the Voice of his *Parliament* and his *People*, there remains no Remedy in the System of the *Constitution*. The *Constitution* is broken by the Obstinacy of the *Prince*, and the \* *People* must appeal to 'Heaven in this, as in all other Cases, where they 'have no Judge on Earth.' Thus, if a *Parliament* should persist in abetting *Male-Administration*, or any Way give up *those Liberties*, which they were intrusted to maintain, no Doubt can be made but that the *People* would be in the same Case; since their *Representatives* have no more Right to betray them, than their *Kings* have to usurp upon them; and by Consequence they would acquire the same Right of *appealing to Heaven*, if our *Constitution* had not provided a Remedy against *this Evil*, which could not be provided against the *other*; but our *Constitution* hath provided such a Remedy in the *frequent Succession of new Parliaments*, by which there is not Time sufficient given to form  
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\* *Lock's Essay upon Government*, Chap. xiv.

a Majority of the Representatives of the People into a MINISTERIAL CABAL; or by which, if this should happen, *such a Cabal* must be soon broken. These Reflections and such others, as they naturally suggest, are sufficient to convince any thinking Man, 1<sup>st</sup>, That nothing could make it safe, nor therefore reasonable, to repose in any Set of Men whatsoever, so great a Trust as the *collective Body* delegates on the Representative in this Kingdom, except the *Shortness of the Term*, for which this Trust is delegated. 2<sup>dly</sup>, That every *Prolongation of this Term* is therefore, in its Degree, unsafe for the *People*; that it weakens their *Security*, and endangers *Liberty* by the very Powers given for its Preservation. 3<sup>dly</sup>, That *such Prolongations*, expose the Nation, in the possible Case of having a *corrupt Parliament*, to lose the great Advantage which our *Constitution* hath provided, of curing the Evil, before it grows confirmed and desperate, by the gentle Method of *chusing a new Representative*, and reduce the Nation by Consequence to have no other Alternative than that of *submitting*, or *resisting*; though *Submission* will be as grievous, and *Resistance* much more difficult, when the *Legislature* betrays its Trust, than when the *King* alone abuses his Power.—These Reflections, I say, are sufficient to prove these Propositions; and these Propositions set before us, in a very strong Light, the Necessity of using our utmost Efforts that the true Design of our Constitution may be pursued as closely as possible by the Re-establishment of *annual* or at least of *triennial Parliaments*. But the Importance of the Matter, and the particular Seasonableness of the Conjunction, invite me to offer one Consideration more upon this Head, which, I think, will not strike the less for being obvious and plain. It is This. Should a King obtain, for many Years at once, the Supplies

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and Powers, which used to be granted *annually* to Him; This would be deemed, I presume, even in the present Age, an unjustifiable Measure and an intolerable Grievance, for this plain Reason; because it would alter our Constitution in the fundamental Article, that requires *frequent Assemblies of the whole Legislature*, in order to assist, and controul too, the *executive Power*, which is intrusted with *one Part of it*. Now I ask, is not the Article which requires *frequent Elections of the Representative by the collective Body of the People*, in order to secure the *latter* against the ill Consequences of the possible Weakness, or Corruption of the *former*, as fundamental an Article, and as essential to the Preservation of our *Liberties*, as the *other*? No Man dares say that it is not; at least no Man, who deserves our Attention. The People of *Britain* have as good a Right, and a Right as necessary to be asserted, to keep their *Representatives* true to the Trust reposed in them, and to the Preservation of the *Constitution*, by the Controul of *frequent Elections*, as they have to keep their *Kings* true to the Trust reposed in them, and to the Preservation of the *Constitution*, by the Controul of *frequent Sitzings of Parliament*. How comes it then to pass, that we may observe so great a Difference in the Sentiments of Mankind, about these *two Cases*? Propose the *first*, there is no *servile Friend of Government*, who will not affect all that Horror at the Proposition, which every *Friend of the Constitution* will really feel. Propose the keeping up *septennial*, nay, the making *decennial Parliaments*, the same *Friends of Government* will contend strenuously for *one* and by Consequence for *both*; since there can be no Reason alledged for the *first*, which is not stronger for the *last*, and would not be still stronger for a *longer Term*. These Reasons drawn from two or three commonplace Topicks

of pretended *Conveniency*, and *Expediency*, or of supposed *Tranquillity at home*, and *Strength abroad*, I need not mention. They have been mentioned by others, and sufficiently refuted. But That, which may very justly appear marvellous, is this; that some Men, I think not many, who are *true Friends of the Constitution*, have been staggered in their Opinions, and almost seduced by the false Reasonings of these *Friends of Government*; though nothing can be more easy than to shew from Reason and Experience, that *Convenience*, *Expediency*, and *domestick Tranquillity* may be, and in Fact have been as well, nay better secured, under *triennial*, nay *annual Parliaments*, than under *Parliaments of a longer Continuance*; and as for the *Strength abroad*, (that is, national Credit and Influence) it will depend on the Opinion foreign Nations have of our national Dispositions, and the Unanimity of our Sentiments. It must be chiefly determined therefore by their Knowledge of the real Sense of the Nation. Now that can appear no Way so much as in the natural State of our *Constitution*, by frequent *Elections*; and when it does appear so, it must have another Kind of Effect than the bare Resolutions of a *stale, ministerial Parliament*; especially if it happens, as it may happen in some future Time, that the Sense of the *Nation* should appear to be different from the Sense of *such a Parliament*; and that the Resolutions of *such a Parliament* should be avowedly dictated by Men, odious and hated, contemptible and contemned, both at Home and Abroad.

But in the Supposition that some Inconveniencies may arise by frequent *Elections*; (which is only allowed for Argument's Sake;) are such Inconveniencies, and the trifling Consequences of them, to be set in the Balance against the Danger of weakening

weakening any one Barrier of our *Liberty*? Every Form of Government hath Advantages and Disadvantages peculiar to it. Thus *absolute Monarchies* seem formed for sudden and vigorous Efforts of Power, either in attacking, or in defending; whilst, in *free Constitutions*, the Forms of Government must be necessarily more complicated and slow; so that in *these*, the same Secrecy cannot be always kept, nor the same Dispatch always made, nor the same Steadiness of Measures always pursued. Must all these Forms, instituted to preserve the Checks and Controuls of the several Parts of the *Constitution* on one another, and necessary by Consequence to preserve the *Liberty* of the whole, be abandoned therefore, and a *free Constitution* be destroyed, for the sake of some little *Conveniency*, or *Expediency*, the more, in the Administration of publick Affairs? No certainly. We must keep our *free Constitution*, with the small Defects belonging to it, or We must change it for an *arbitrary Government*, free perhaps from these Defects, but liable to more and to worse. In short, We must make our Option; and surely this Option is not hard to be made, between the real and permanent Blessings of *Liberty*, diffused through a *whole Nation*, and the fantastick and accidental Advantages, which *they*, who govern, not the *Body of the People*, enjoy under *absolute Monarchies*. I will not multiply Instances, though they croud in upon me.

——— *Two Consuls* were chosen *annually* at *Rome*, and the *Proconsular Power* in the Government of Provinces was limited to a *Year*. Several Inconveniencies arose, no Doubt, from the strict Observation of this Institution. Some appear very plain in History; and We may assure ourselves that many Arguments of *Conveniency*, of *Expediency*, of preserving the *Tranquillity* of the City, and  
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of giving *Strength* and *Weight* to the Arms and Counsels of the Commonwealth, were urged to prevail on the People to dispense with these Institutions, in Favour of *Pompey* and of *Cæsar*. What was the Consequence ; the *Pirates* were extirpated, the Price of *Corn* was reduced, *Spain* was held in Subjection, *Gaul* was conquered, the *Germans* were repulsed, *Rome* triumphed, her *Government* flourished ; but her *Constitution* was destroyed, her *Liberty* was lost.----The Law of *Habeas Corpus*, that noble Badge of *Liberty*, which every Subject of *Britain* wears, and by which he is distinguished so eminently, not from the *Slaves* alone, but even from the *Freemen* of other Countries ; the Law of *Habeas Corpus*, I say, may be attended perhaps with some little Inconveniencies, in Time of Sedition and Rebellion.----The slow Methods of giving *Money*, and the *strict Appropriations* of it, when given, may be attended with some Inconveniency likewise, in Times of Danger, and in great Exigencies of the State.----But who will plead for the Repeal of the *Habeas Corpus Act* ; or who would not press for the Revival of it, if it stood suspended for an *indefinite*, or even a *long Term* ?-----Who will say that the Practice of giving *Money without Account*, or passing *Votes of Credit* ; (by which the *Purse of the People* is taken out of the Hands of *those*, whom the *People* trusted, and put into the Hands of *those*, whom they neither did nor would have trusted) who will say that such a Deviation from those *Rules of Parliament*, which ought to be deemed sacred and preserved inviolate, may be established, or should not be opposed by all possible Means, if it was established ?

If all this be as clear as I imagine it is : if the Objections to frequent Elections of *Parliaments* do not lye ; or, supposing them to lye, if the Danger  
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on one *Side* outweighs vastly the supposed Inconvenience of the *other* ; nay, if *Laws* and *Institutions*, not more essential to the Preservation of *Liberty* than this *ancient and fundamental Rule of our Constitution*, be maintained ; and if all Men are forced to agree, (even They, who wish them perhaps abolished) that they ought to be maintained, for the Sake of preserving *Liberty* ; let me ask again, how comes it to pass that We observe so great a Difference between the Sentiments and Reasonings of Mankind about *frequent Sessions of Parliament*, and *frequent Parliaments* ; about the *Case* now before us, and all the *others* that have been mentioned ? The only Manner, in which I can account for such an Inconsistency, is This, The Sight of the *Mind* differs very much from the Sight of the *Body*, and its Operations are frequently the Reverse of the *other*. Objects at a Distance appear to the *former* in their true Magnitude, and diminish as they are brought nearer. The Event, that created much Astonishment, Indignation, or Terror in Prospect, creates less and less, as it approaches, and by the Time it happens, Men have familiarized themselves with it.---If the *Romans* had been told, in the Days of *Augustus*, that an Emperor would succeed, in whose Reign an *Horse* should be made Consul, they would have been extremely surprized. I believe, they were not so much surprized, when the Thing happened ; when the *Horse* was Consul and *Caligula* Emperor.----If it had been foretold to those Patriots at the *Revolution*, who remembered *long Parliaments*, who still felt the Smart of them, who struggled hard for *annual*, and obtained with much Difficulty, at the End of five or six Years, *triennial Parliaments*, that a Time would come, when even the Term of *triennial Parliaments* would be deem'd too short, and a Parliament, chosen for  
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*three Years*, would chuse itself for *four* more, and entail *septennial Parliaments* on the Nation; that This would happen, and the Fruits of their honest Labours be lost, in little more than twenty Years; and that it would be brought about, whilst our Government continued on the Foundations they had then so newly laid; if all This had been foretold at the Time I mention, it would have appeared improbable and monstrous to the Friends of the *Revolution*. Yet it hath happened; and, in less than twenty Years, it is grown or is growing familiar to us. The uniform Zeal and Complaisance of our *Parliaments* for the *Crown* leave little Room to apprehend any Attempt to *govern without them*; or to make them do in *one Session* the Work of *seven*; though this would be extremely convenient, no Doubt, a great Ease to *future Ministers*, and a great saving of Expence and Time to *Country Gentlemen*. But suppose, (for I desire it may be remembered that We reason hypothetically) suppose a *Parliament* should think fit to give, in the *first Session*, all the *Money*, all the *Credit*, and all the *Powers*, necessary for carrying on the Government, during *seven Years*; and then let those Persons, who will be shock'd at this Supposition, and yet declare themselves for *septennial Parliaments*, lay their Hands on their Hearts, and consider whether such an Alteration of the Constitution might not grow familiar to them, and even gain their Approbation. I think, it would do so. I am sure, it might as reasonably as the other. They would find the Ease, in one Case, of *little Attendance*, as much as that of *distant Elections*, in the other. The Arguments of *Conveniency*, *Expediency*, *publick Tranquillity*, and *Strength to the Government*, would be just as well apply'd; and if the *Ministers* should, by Miracle, make no very exorbitant ill Use of such a Situation,

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I doubt whether He, who should plead for *annual Parliaments* then, would be much better heard by the same Persons, than He, who pleads for *frequent Elections of Parliaments*, is now. But let not the *Lovers of Liberty*, the *Friends of our Constitution*, reason in this Manner. Let Them remember that Danger commences, when the Breach is made, not when the Attack is begun; that He, who neglects to stop the Leak, as soon as it is discovered, in Hopes to save his Ship by Pumping, when the Water gushes in with Violence, deserves to be drown'd; and, to lay aside Figures of Speech, that our *Constitution* is not, like the Schemes of *some Politicians*, a Jumble of disjointed, incoherent Whimfies, but a noble and wise System, the essential Parts of which are so proportioned, and so intimately connected, that a Change in one begets a Change in the whole; that the *frequent Elections of Parliament* are as much an essential Part of this System as the *frequent Sitzings of Parliament*; that the Work of the *Revolution* is imperfect therefore, and our future Security precarious, unless our *ancient Constitution* be restored, in this essential Part; and that the Restoration of it, in this Part, in one of those Methods, by which alone the pernicious Designs of *such Men*, as We have mentioned in a former Letter, if any such should be ever admitted into Power, (*Enemies to the Constitution*, under the Mask of *Zeal for the Government*) may be defeated.

I am, SIR, &c.

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## LETTER XII.

SIR,

WE have observed already that the *Constitution of the British Government* supposes our *Kings* may abuse

abuse their Power, and our *Representatives* betray their Trust; and provides against both these Contingencies, as well as human Wisdom can provide. Here let us observe that the same *Constitution* is very far from supposing the *People* will never betray Themselves; and yet this Case is possible, no Doubt. We do not read, I think, of more than \* *one Nation*, who refused *Liberty*, when it was offered to Them; but We read of many, and have almost seen some, who lost it through their own Fault, by the plain and necessary Consequences of their own Conduct, when they were in full Possession of it, and had the Means of securing it effectually in their Power. A wise and brave People will neither be cozen'd; nor bully'd out of their *Liberty*; but a wise and brave People may cease to be such; They may degenerate; They may sink into Sloth and Luxury; They may resign Themselves to a treacherous Conduct; or abet the *Enemies of the Constitution*, under a Notion of supporting the *Friends of the Government*; They may want the Sense to discern their Danger in Time; or the Courage to resist, when it stares Them in the Face. The *Tarquins* were expell'd, and *Rome* resum'd her *Liberty*. *Cæsar* was murdered, and all his Race extinct; but *Rome* remained in Bondage. From whence this Difference? † *Machiavel* shall account for it. In the Days of *Tarquin*, the People of *Rome* were not yet corrupted. In the Days of *Cæsar*, They were most corrupt. A free People may be sometimes betrayed; but no People will betray themselves, and sacrifice their *Liberty*, unless they fall into a State of universal Corruption: and when  
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\* *The Cappadocians, vid. Strabo Lib. 12. — Libertatem repudiaverunt, ut quam sibi dicerent intolerabilem.*

† *Discourses Lib. 1. c. 17.*



They are once fallen into such a State, They will be sure to lose what They deserve no longer to enjoy. To what Purpose therefore should our *Constitution* have supposed a Case, in which no Remedy can avail; a Case, which can never happen, 'till the Spirit, which formed *this Constitution* first, and hath preserved it ever since, shall be totally extinguished; and 'till it becomes an ideal Entity, like the *Utopia*, existing in the Imagination, or Memory, no where else? As all Government began, so all Government must end by the *People*; tyrannical Governments by their Virtue and Courage, and even free Governments by their Vice and Baseness. Our *Constitution*, indeed, makes it impossible to destroy *Liberty* by any sudden Blast of a popular Fury, or by the Treachery of a Few; for though the Many cannot easily hurt, they may easily save themselves. But if the Many will concur with the Few; if They will advisedly and deliberately suffer their *Liberty* to be taken away by Those, on whom They delegate Power to preserve it; This no *Constitution* can prevent. God would not support even his own Theocracy against the concurrent Desire of the Children of *Israel*, but gave them a *King* in his Anger. How then should our human Constitution of Government support itself against so universal a Change, as We here suppose, in the Temper and Character of our People? It cannot be. We may give ourselves a Tyrant in our Folly, if We please. But This can never happen till the whole Nation falls into a State of political Reprobation. Then, and not till then, political Damnation will be our Lot.

Let us descend into a greater Detail, in order to develope these Reflections fully, and to push the Consequences of them home to our selves, and to our present State. They deserve our utmost At-  
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tention, and are so far from being foreign to the Subject of these Essays upon *Parties*, that they will terminate in the very Point, at which We began, and wind up the whole in one important Lesson.

To proceed then; I say, that if the People of this Island should suffer their Liberties to be at any Time ravished, or stolen from Them, They would incur greater Blame, and deserve by Consequence less Pity, than any enslaved and oppressed People ever did. By how much *true Liberty* (That is, Liberty stated and ascertained by *Law*, in equal Opposition to *popular Licence* and *arbitrary Will*) hath been more boldly asserted, more wisely or more successfully improved, and more firmly established in This, than in other Countries; by so much the more heavy would our just Condemnation prove in the Case, that is here supposed. The Virtue of our Ancestors, to whom all these Advantages are owing, would aggravate the Guilt and the Infamy of their degenerate Posterity. There have been Ages of *Gold*, and of *Silver*, of *Brass* and of *Iron*, in our little World, as in the great World, though not in the same Order. In which of these Ages We are at present, let others determine. This, at least, is certain, that in all these Ages *Britain* hath been the Temple, as it were, of *Liberty*. Whilst her sacred Fires have been extinguished in so many Countries, here they have been religiously kept alive. Here she hath her Saints, her Confessors, and a whole Army of Martyrs, and the Gates of Hell have not hitherto prevailed against Her; so that if a fatal Reverse is to happen; if Servility and Servitude are to over-run the whole World, like Injustice, and *Liberty* is to retire from it, like *Astræa*; our Portion of the abandoned Globe will have, at least, the mournful Honour,

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whenever it happens, of shewing her last, her parting Steps.

The antient *Britons* are to us the *Aborigines* of our Island. We discover little of Them through the Gloom of Antiquity, and We see nothing beyond Them. This however We know; They were *Freemen*. *Cæsar*, who visited Them in an hostile Manner, but did not conquer Them, perhaps was \* beaten by Them; *Cæsar*, I say, bestows very liberally the Title of *Kings* upon their Chieftains, and the Compilers of fabulous Traditions deduce a Series of their Monarchs from *Samothès*, a Cotemporary of *Nimrod*. But *Cæsar* affected to swell the Account of his Expedition with pompous Names; and these Writers, like Those whom † *Strabo* mentions, endeavoured to recommend Themselves by publishing Romances to an ignorant Generation, instead of Histories. These supposed Monarchs were the † Heads of little Clans; *Reguli, vel melioris Notæ Nobiles*; and if our Island knew any Authority of the kingly Sort in those Days, it was That of *occasional* and *temporary Monarchs*, elected in great Exigencies, †† *communi Consilio, Suffragiis Multitudinis*, like *Cassivellaunus* in *Britain*, or *Vercingetorix* in *Gaul*; for, in some Cases, Examples taken from either of these People will conclude for both. The *Kings*, who ruled in *Britain*, after the *Romans* abandoned the Island, in the Beginning of the 5th Century, held their Authority from the *People*, and governed under the Controul of *national Assemblies*, as We have great Reason to believe, and none to doubt. In short,

\* *Tertia quæstis ostendit Terga Britannis.*

† *Geog. Lib. 11.*

† *Sol. Anal. Anglo Brit. Lib. 2. cap. 3. Cam.*

†† *Cæs. de Bell. Lib. 5.*

as far as We can look back, a lawless Power, a Government by Will, never prevailed in *Britain*.

The *Saxons* had *Kings*, as well as the *Britons*. The Manner, in which They established Themselves, and the long Wars They waged for and against the *Britons*, led to and maintained *monarchical Rule* amongst Them. But *these Kings* were in their first Institution, no Doubt, such as *Tacitus* describes the *German Kings* and *Princes* to have been; \*\* Chiefs, who persuaded, rather than commanded; and who were heard in the publick Assemblies of the Nation, according to their *Age*, their *Nobility*, their *military Fame*, or their *Eloquence* gave Them Authority. How many doubtful Monarchs, in later and more polite Ages, would have slept in Cottages, and have work'd in Stalls, instead of inhabiting Palaces, and being cushioned up in Thrones, if this Rule of Government had continued in Force? ---- But the *Saxon Kings* grew into Power in Time; and among Them, as among other Nations, Birth, instead of Merit, became, for the Sake of Order and Tranquillity, a Title to the Throne. However, tho' these Princes might command, and were no longer under the Necessity of governing by Persuasion, they were still under that of governing to the Satisfaction of the People. By what other Expedient could they govern Men, who were wise enough to preserve and exercise the Right of electing their *civil Magistrates*, and *military Officers*, and the System of whose Government was upheld and carried on by a Gradation of *popular Assemblies*, from the inferior Courts to the high Court of Parliament; for such, or very near such, was the *Wittena Gemote* in Nature and Effect, whenever the Word *Parliament* came into Use?

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\*\* *De Situ mor. & Pop. Germ. lib. 11.*



The first Prince of the *Norman Race* was an absolute *Conqueror*, in the Opinion of some Men; and I can readily agree that He assumed, in some Cases, the Power of a *Tyrant*. But supposing all This to be true in the utmost Extent, that the *Friends of absolute Monarchy* can desire it should be thought so; This, and This alone, will result from it; *unlimited, or absolute Monarchy*, could never be established in *Britain*; no, not even by *Conquest*. The Rights of the People were soon re-asserted; the Laws of the *Confessor* were restored; and the third Prince of this Race, *Henry the 1st*, covenanted in a solemn Speech to his People for their Assistance against his Brother *Robert* and the *Normans*, by promising that *sacred Charter*, which was in other Reigns so often and so solemnly confirmed, by engaging to maintain his Subjects in \* *their ancient Liberties*, to follow their *Advice*, and to rule Them in Peace with *Prudence* and *Mildness*.

I need not descend into more Particulars to shew the Perpetuity of free Government in *Britain*. Few Men, even in this Age, are so shamefully unacquainted with the History of their Country, as to be ignorant of the principal Events and signal Revolutions, which have happened since the *Norman Æra*. One continued Design against *Liberty* hath been carried on by various Methods, almost in every Reign. In many, the Struggles have been violent and bloody. But *Liberty* still hath triumphed over Force, over Treachery, over Corruption, and even under Oppression. The Altars of *Tyranny* have been demolished as soon as raised ;  
nay,

\* *In Antiquis vestris Libertatibus. Vestris inclinando Consiliis. Consultius & mitius, more mansueti Principis.*  
*Yid. Mat. Par.*

may, even whilst they were raising ; and the Priests of that Idol have been hewed to Pieces ; so that I will affirm, without the least Apprehension of being disproved, that our *Constitution* is brought nearer than any *other Constitution* ever was to the most perfect Idea of a *free System of Government*.—One Observation only I will make, before I leave this Head, and it is This. The Titles of those Kings, which were precarious, from Circumstances of Times, and Notions that prevailed, notwithstanding the general Acquiescence of the Nation to them, afforded so many Opportunities to our Ancestors of better securing, or improving *Liberty*. They were not such Bubbles as to alter, without mending the Government : much less to make Revolutions, and suffer by them. They were not such Bubbles as to raise Princes to the Throne, who had no Pretence to sit in it but their Choice, purely to have the Honour of bettering the Condition of those Princes, without bettering their own in Proportion.—If what I have been saying appears a little too digressive from the main Scope of this Essay, I shall hope for Indulgence from this Consideration, that the natural Effects of such Reflections, as I have made and suggested, must be to raise in our Minds the honest Ambition of emulating the Virtue and Courage of our Forefathers, in the Cause of *Liberty* ; and to inspire a reasonable Fear, heightened by Shame, of losing what They preserved and delivered down to us, through so many Mixtures of different People, of *Britons* with *Saxons*, of both with *Danes*, of all three with *Normans*, through so many Difficulties, so many Dangers, so many Revolutions, in the Course of so many Centuries.

There is another Reason to be given why the People of this Island would be more inexcusable than

than any other, if They lost their *Liberty* ; and the opening and enforcing of this Reason will bring us fully into our Subject.

I suppose just now that our *Liberty* might be ravished or stolen from us ; but I think, that Expression must be retracted ; since it will appear, upon due Consideration, that our *Liberty* cannot be taken away by the Force, or Fraud alone of Those, who govern ; it cannot be taken away, unless the People are Themselves Accomplices ; and They, who are Accomplices, cannot be said to suffer by one, or the other. Some Nations have received the Yoke of Servitude with little or no Struggle ; but if ever it is imposed upon us, We must not only hold out our Necks to receive it ; We must help to put it on. Now, to be passive in such a Case is shameful ; but to be active is supreme and unexampled Infamy. In order to become Slaves, We of this Nation must be beforehand, what other People have been rendered by a long Course of Servitude ; We must become the most corrupt, the most profligate, the most senseless, the most servile Nation of Wretches, that ever disgraced Humanity ; for a Force sufficient to ravish *Liberty* from us, such as a great *standing Army* is in Time of Peace, cannot be continued, unless We continue it ; nor can the Means, necessary to steal *Liberty* from us, be long enough employed with Effect, unless We give a Sanction to their Iniquity, and call Good Evil, and Evil Good.

It may be said, that even the *Friends of Liberty* have sometimes different Notions about it, and about the Means of maintaining, or promoting it ; and therefore that even the *British Nation* may possibly, some Time or other, approve and concur in Measures destructive of their *Liberty*, without any Intention to give it up, and much more with-

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out changing from the Character, which They have hitherto borne among the Societies of Mankind, to that infamous Character I have just now supposed. If this were true, it would only furnish more Reasons to be always on our Guard, to be jealous of every extraordinary Demand, and to reject constantly every Proposition, though never so specious, that had a Tendency to weaken the Barriers of *Liberty*, or to raise a Strength superior to theirs. But I confess I do not think We can be led blindfold so far as the Brink of the Precipice. I know, that all Words, which are Signs of complex Ideas, furnish Matter of Mistake and Cavil. We dispute about *Justice*, for Instance, and fancy that We have different Opinions about the same Thing; whilst, by some little Difference in the Composition of our Ideas, it happens that We have only different Opinions about different Things, and should be of the same Opinion about the same Thing. But This, I presume, cannot happen in the Case before us. All the Disputes about *Liberty* in this Country, and at this Time, must be Disputes for and against the self-same, fixed and invulnerable Set of Ideas, whatever the Disputants on *one Side of the Question* may pretend, in order to conceal what it is not yet very safe to avow. No Disputes can possibly arise from different Conceptions of any Thing so clearly stated, and so precisely determined, as the fundamental Principles are, on which our whole *Liberty* rests.

If *Liberty* be that delicious and wholesome Fruit, on which the *British* Nation hath fed for so many Ages, and to which We owe our Riches, our Strength, and all the Advantages We boast of; the *British Constitution* is the Tree, that bears this Fruit, and will continue to bear it, as long as We are careful to fence it in, and trench it round.



against the Beasts of the Field, and the Insects of the Earth. To speak without Figure, our *Constitution* is a System of Government suited to the Genius of our Nation, and even to our Situation. The Experience of many hundred Years hath shewn that by observing *this Constitution* inviolate, or by drawing it back to the Principles, on which it was originally founded, whenever it shall be made to swerve from them, We may secure to ourselves, and to our latest Posterity, the Possession of that *Liberty*, which We have long enjoyed. What would We more? What *other Liberty* than This do We seek? And if We seek no other, is not This marked out in such Characters as He, that runs, may read? As our *Constitution* therefore ought to be, what it seldom is, the *Rule of Government*; so let us make the Conformity, or Repugnancy of Things to *this Constitution* the Rule, by which We accept them as favourable, or reject them as dangerous to *Liberty*. They, who talk of *Liberty* in *Britain* on any other Principles than Those of the *British Constitution*, talk impertinently at best, and much Charity is requisite to believe no worse of Them. But They, who distinguish between *practicable* and *impracticable Liberty*, in order to insinuate what They mean, (or they mean nothing) that the *Liberty* established by the true Scheme of our *Constitution* is of the *impracticable Kind*; and They, who endeavour, both in Speculation and Practice, to elude and pervert the Forms, and to ridicule and explode the Spirit of *this Constitution*; these Men are Enemies, open and avowed Enemies, to it, and by Consequence to *British Liberty*, which cannot be supported on any other Bottom.— Some Men there are, the Pests of Society I think Them, who pretend a great Regard to *Religion* in general, but who take every Opportunity of de-  
claiming

claiming publicly against that *System of Religion*, or at least against that *Church-Establishment*, which is received in *Britain*. Just so the Men, of whom I have been speaking, affect a great Regard to *Liberty* in general, but They dislike so much the *System of Liberty* established in *Britain*, that they are incessant in their Endeavours to puzzle the plainest Thing in the World, and to refine and distinguish away the Life and Strength of our *Constitution*, in Favour of the little, present, momentary Turns, which They are retained to serve. What now could be the Consequence, if all the Endeavours should succeed? I am persuaded that the great *Philosophers*, *Divines*, *Lawyers*, and *Politicians*, who exert them, have not yet prepared and agreed upon the Plans of a new *Religion*, and of new *Constitutions in Church and State*. We should find ourselves therefore without any Form of *Religion*, or *civil Government*. The first Set of these *Missionaries* would take off all the Restraints of *Religion* from the *Governed*, and the latter Set would remove, or render ineffectual, all the Limitations and Controuls, which *Liberty* hath prescribed to *Those that govern*, and disjoint the whole Frame of our *Constitution*. Entire Dissolution of Manners, Confusion, Anarchy, or perhaps absolute Monarchy, would follow; for it is possible, nay probable, that in such a State as This, and amidst such a Rout of lawless Savages, Men would chuse this Government, absurd as it is, rather than have no Government at all.

But here again it may be said, that as *Liberty* is a Word of uncertain Signification, so is *Constitution*; that Men have taught the most opposite Doctrines, and pretended at least to build them on the Principles of the *Constitution*; that the Rule therefore of determining our Notions of *Liberty*, by the Principles of our *Constitution*, is no Rule, and We

are by Consequence just where We were before, But the Answer is ready. It is true that there were formerly Men, who persisted long in the Attempt to talk and write that Chimera, called *Prerogative*, into Vogue; to contend that it was something *real*; a Right inherent in the *Crown*; founded in the *Constitution of our Government*; and equally necessary to support the just Authority of the *Prince*, and to protect the *Subject*. How We had like to have lost our *Liberty* by the Prevalence of such *Doctrines*, by the Consequences drawn from them, and the Practices built upon them, hath been touched in the Deduction of the State of *Parties*. But happily this Kind of Progression from a free to a slavish Constitution of Government was stopped at the *Revolution*, and the Notions themselves are so exploded in the Course of Six and Forty Years, that they are entertained at this Hour by no Set of Men, whose Numbers, or Importance, give Them any Pretence to be reckoned amongst our *national Parties*.——It is as true, that there are now Men, who pursue the very same Design by different Methods. The *former* attacked, *These* undermine our *Liberty*. The *former* were *Beasts of the Field*, hinted at above; *These* are the *Insects of the Earth*; and like other Insects, though sprung from Dirt, and the vilest of the animal Kind, they can nibble and gnaw, and poison; and, if they are suffered to multiply and work on, They can lay the most fruitful Country waste. *Corruption* and *Dependency* are their favourite Topicks. They plead for the *first* as a laudable Expedient of Government; and for the *last*, I mean *corrupt, private Dependency*, as an essential Part of our *Constitution*. When they have perplexed, as much as they are able, our Ideas of *Dependency* and *Independency*, They reason, if I may give their Sophisms

so good a Name, as if the *Independency of each Part of the Legislature*, of the King particularly, arose from the *Dependency of the other Parts on that Part*. Now, This is both false and absurd. — It is false, because the *constitutional Independency of each Part of the Legislature* arises from hence ; that distinct Rights, Powers and Privileges are assigned to it by the *Constitution*. But then this *Independency of one Part* can be so little said to arise from the *Dependency of another*, that it consists properly and truly in the free, unbiassed, uninfluenced, and independent Exercise of these Rights, Powers and Privileges, by *each Part*, in as ample an Extent as the *Constitution* allows ; or, in other Words, as far as that Point, where the *Constitution* stops this free Exercise, and submits the Proceedings of *one Part*, not to the private Influence, but to the publick Controul of the *other Parts*. Before this Point, the *Independency of each Part* is meant by the *Constitution* to be *absolute*. From this Point, the *constitutional Dependency of each Part on the others* commences. To talk of *natural Independency* belonging to the *kingly Office*, to an *House of Peers*, or an *House of Commons*, (the Institutions of *Art*, not of *Nature*) is impertinent. — It is absurd, because it absolutely destroys the very Thing it is advanced to establish ; for if *A's Independency* arises from the *Dependency of B*, and *B's Independency* from the *Dependency of A*, then are *A* and *B* both dependent, and there is no such thing as *constitutional Independency* at all. The *Crown* is the Source of *Honours*, and hath the Disposal of *publick Employments*. This no Man disputes ; nor would any Man, I believe, go about to alter. But will it follow, that the \* *constitutional Independency of the King* would be lost, because

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\* *Vide London Jour. Sept. 28. 1734.*



cause the *House of Commons* give the Supplies, if He had not the Power of giving Part of this Money, in *Places* and *Pensions*, back again to the Members of *that House*? It would be easy for me to turn this whole profound Reasoning into many, even ridiculous Lights ; but the Subject creates other Sentiments than those of Mirth, though the *Logick* employed about it, deserves a ludicrous, not a serious Treatment.—I ask Pardon for having said so much upon so slight an Occasion, and I proceed.

Notwithstanding all these Endeavours to puzzle our *Constitution*, formerly in Favour of that *Prerogative*, by the Weight of which it must have been crushed, and actually at this Time in Favour of *that Corruption* and *corrupt Dependency*, by which it would be soon demolished ; the main Principles of the *British Constitution* are simple, and obvious, and fixed, as well as any Truths can be fixed, in the Minds of Men, by the most determinate Ideas. The State of our *Constitution* then affords an easy and unerring Rule, by which to judge of the State of our *Liberty*. The Improvement, or Decay of *one* denotes the Improvement, or Decay of the *other* ; and the Strength, or Weakness of *one*, the Safety, or Danger of the *other*. We cannot lose our *Liberty*, unless We lose our *Constitution*, nor lose our *Constitution*, unless We are Accomplices to the Violations of it ; for *this Constitution* is better fitted than any, antient or modern, ever was, not only to preserve *Liberty*, but to provide for its own Duration, and to become immortal, if any thing human could be so.

I am, SIR, Yours, &c.

L E T-

## LETTER XIII.

S I R,

MUCH hath been said occasionally, in the Course of these Letters, concerning the Beauty and Excellency of the *British Constitution*. I shall make however no Excuse for returning to the same Subject upon an Occasion, which introduces it so naturally, and indeed so necessarily. Nothing can be more opposite to the professed Design of these Writings; nothing of more real, and more present Use. Let me speak plainly. We have been all of us, those of every Side, and of every Denomination, accustomed too long to value ourselves foolishly, or knavishly, on our Zeal for *this*, or *that Party*, or for *this*, or *that Government*; and to make a Merit of straining the *Constitution* different Ways, in order to serve the different Purposes of each. It is high Time we should all learn, if that be still possible, to value ourselves in the first Place on our Zeal for the *Constitution*; to make *all Governments*, and much more *all Parties*, bow to *That*, and to suffer *That* to bow to none. But how shall this *Constitution* be known, unless We make it the Subject of careful Enquiry, and of frequent and sober Reflection? Or unknown, how shall it become, what it ought to be, the Object of our Admiration, our Love and our Zeal? Many of those, who reap the greatest Advantages from it, pass it by unregarded, with equal Folly and Ingratitude. Many take a transient, inattentive View of it. Many again consider it in Part only, or behold it in a narrow, pedantick Light. Instead of this, We should view it often. We should pierce through the Form to the Soul of it.

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We should contemplate the noble Object in all its Parts, and in the Whole, and render it as familiar to our intellectual Sight, as the most common sensible Objects are to our corporeal Sight. \* *Quam illa ardentis Amores excitaret sui, si videretur?* Well may it be allowed me to apply to so glorious an Effort of human Wisdom what *Tully* says after *Plato*, in the *Phædrus*, if I mistake not, of Wisdom herself.

‘ All publick Regiment, saith *Mr. Hooker*, hath arisen from deliberate Advice, Consultation and Composition between Men.’ The Proposition is undoubtedly and universally true. It is as true in the Kingdom of *Morocco*, as it is in the Kingdom of *Britain*; and the undeniable Consequences which flow from it, are obvious. We are not to wonder however, if Men do not look up to *this Original of Government*, nor trace these Consequences from it, in most Countries. In the Institution of Governments, too great Powers have been usually given, and too great Confidence reposed, either at first, or in Process of Time. These Powers have subsisted, have been confirmed by more Time, and increased by the very Nature of Power, which is the properest Instrument of its own Propagation. But the *original Composition*, for want of being expressed, or sufficiently implied, or frequently recurred to by the Forms of the Government, hath been forgot, or hath grown so obsolete, that they, whose Interest required that no such Thing should be believed, have thought Themselves at Liberty boldly to deny it; and not only so, but to suppose *some other Original of Government*. Strange Systems of Policy, and stranger of Religion, have been devised to support  
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\* *Cic. de Finib. L. ii.*

and sanctify these Usurpations. *Education* hath been set on the same Side ; and *saucy Authority* hath prevailed against the clearest Light of *Nature*, and the plainest Dictates of *common Sense*. No Man, who hath read and looked abroad into the World, and made a reasonable Use of either, will think this too strange to be true ; since there is no demonstrated Truth (such Truths I mean as are here spoken of) which may not be rendered, at least very problematical by long, uniform, positive Contradiction ; nor any demonstrated Lye, which may not be rendered probable to many, and certain to some, by long, positive Affirmation ; according to a just Observation made by Father *Paul* somewhere or other, on Occasion of *Constantine's* supposed Grant, and other Cheats of the Court of *Rome*. But We of this Country have been more happy. Our *original Contract* hath been recurred to often, and as many Cavils as have been made, as many Jestts as have been broke about this Expression, We might safely defy the *Affertors of absolute Monarchy and arbitrary Will*, if there were any worth our Regard, to produce any one Point of Time, since which We know any Thing of our *Constitution*, wherein the whole Scheme of it would not have been one monstrous Absurdity, unless an *original Contract* had been supposed. They must have been blinded therefore by Ignorance, or Passion, or Prejudice, who did not always see that there is such a Thing necessarily, and in the very Nature of our *Constitution* ; and that They might as well doubt whether the Foundations of an ancient, solid Building were suited and proportioned to the Elevation and Form of it, as whether our *Constitution* was established by *Composition* and *Contract*. Sure I am that They must be worse than blind, if any such there are, who do not confess



at this Time, and under the *present Settlement*, that our *Constitution* is in the strictest Sense a *Bargain*, a *conditional Contract* between the *Prince* and the *People*, as it always hath been, and still is, between the *representative* and *collective Bodies* of the *Nation*.

That *this Bargain* may not be broken, on the Part of the *Prince*, with the *People*, (though the *executive Power* be trusted to the *Prince*, to be exercised according to such Rules, and by the Ministry of such Officers, as are prescribed by the Laws and Customs of this Kingdom) the *legislative*, or *supreme Power*, is vested by our *Constitution* in *three Estates*, whereof the *King* is one. Whilst the Members of the *other Two* preserve their *private Independency*, and *those Estates* are consequently under no Dependency except That, which is in the Scheme of our *Constitution*, this Controul on the *first* will always be sufficient; and a *bad King*, let Him be as bold as He may please to be thought, must stand in Awe of an *honest Parliament*.

That *this Bargain* may not be broken, on the Part of the *representative Body*, with the *collective Body* of the *Nation*, it is not only a principal, declared Right of the People of *Britain*, that the *Elections* of Members to sit in *Parliament* shall be free; but it hath been a principal Part of the Care and Attention of *Parliaments*, for more than three hundred Years, to watch over *this Freedom*, and to secure it, by removing *all Influence* of the *Crown*, and *all other corrupt Influence*, from these *Elections*. This Care and this Attention have gone still farther. They have provided, as far as they have been suffered to provide hitherto, by the *constitutional Dependency* of one House on the other, and of both on the *Crown*, that *all such Influence* should be removed from the Members, after they are chosen.

Even

Even here the Providence of our *Constitution* hath not stopped. Lest all other Provisions should be ineffectual to keep the Members of the House of Commons out of this *unconstitutional Dependency*, which some Men presume, with a silly dogmatical Air of Triumph, to suppose necessary to support the *constitutional Independency of the Crown*, the Wisdom of our *Constitution* hath thought fit that the *Representatives of the People*, should not have Time to forget that They are *such*; that They are impowered to act *for the People*, not *against them*. In a Word, our *Constitution* means that the Members of this Body should be kept, as it were, to their good Behaviour, by the frequent Returns of *new Elections*. It does all that a *Constitution* can do, all that can be done by legal Provisions, to secure the Interests of the People, by maintaining the Integrity of their *Trustees*; and lest all this should fail, it gives frequent Opportunities to the *People* to secure their Interests *Themselves*, by mending their Choice of their *Trustees*; so that as a *bad King* must stand in Awe of an *honest Parliament*, a *corrupt House of Commons* must stand in Awe of an *honest People*.

Between these *two Estates*, or Branches of the *legislative Power*, there stands a *third*, the *House of Peers*; which may seem in Theory, perhaps, too much under the Influence of the Crown, to be a proper Controul upon it; because the sole Right of creating *Peers* resides in the *Crown*; whereas the *Crown* hath no Right to intermeddle in the electing *Commoners*. This would be the Case, and an intolerable one indeed, if the *Crown* should exercise this Right often, as it had been exercised sometimes with universal and most just Disapprobation. It is possible too that This may come to be

be the Case, in some future Age, by the Method of electing Peers to sit in Parliament, for *one Part of the same Kingdom*, by the frequent Translations of *Bishops*, and by other Means, if the Wisdom and Virtue of the present Age, and the favourable Opportunity of the present auspicious and indulgent Reign do not prevent it. But in all other Respects the Persons, who are once created *Peers*, and their Posterity, according to the Scheme of the *Constitution*, having a Right to sit and debate and vote in the *House of Peers*, which cannot be taken from them, except by Forfeiture; all Influence of the Kind I have mentioned seems to be again removed, and their Share in the *Government* depending neither on the *King*, nor the *People*, They constitute a *middle Order*, and are properly Mediators between the *other two*, in the Eye of our *Constitution*.

It is by this Mixture of *Monarchical, Aristocratical and Democratical Power*, blended together in one System, and by these *three Estates* ballancing one another, that our *free Constitution of Government* hath been preserved so long inviolate, or hath been brought back, after having suffered Violations, to its original Principles, and been renewed, and improved too, by frequent and salutary *Revolutions*. It is by This, that *weak and wicked Princes* have been opposed, restrained, reformed, punished by *Parliaments*; that the real, and perhaps the doubtful *Exorbitancies of Parliaments* have been reduced by the *Crown*; that the Heat of *one House* hath been moderated, or the Spirit raised by the Proceedings of the *other*. *Parliaments* have had a good Effect on the *People*, by keeping Them quiet; and the *People* on *Parliaments*, by keeping them within Bounds, which they were tempted to transgress. A just Confidence

dence in the safe, regular, Parliamentary Methods of redressing Grievances hath often made the freest, and not the most patient People on Earth, bear the greatest Grievances much longer than People, held under stronger Restraints, and more used to Oppression, who had not the same Confidence, nor the same Expectation, have borne even less. The Cries of the *People*, and the Terror of *approaching Elections*, have defeated the most dangerous Projects for beggaring and enslaving the Nation; and the *Majority without Doors* hath obliged the *Majority within Doors* to truckle to the *Minority*. In a Word, two Things may be said with Truth of our *Constitution*, which I think neither can, nor ever could be said of any other. It secures Society against the Miseries, which are inseparable from *simple Forms of Government*, and is liable as as little as possible to the Inconveniencies, that arise in *mixed Forms*. It cannot become uneasy to the *Prince*, or *People*; unless the *former* be egregiously weak, or wicked; nor be destroyed, unless the *latter* be excessively and universally corrupt. — But these general Assertions require to be a little better explained.

By *simple Forms of Government* I mean such as lodge the whole supreme Power, absolutely and without Controul, either in a *single Person*, or in the *principal Persons of the Community*, or in the *whole Body of the People*. Such Governments are Governments of *arbitrary Will*, and therefore of all imaginable Absurdities the most absurd. They stand in direct Opposition to the sole Motive of Submission to any Government whatsoever; for if Men quit the State, and renounce the Rights of *Nature*, (one of which is, to be sure, that of being governed by their *own Will*) They do this, that they may not remain exposed to the *arbitrary Will*



*Will of other Men*, the Weakest to that of the Strongest, the Few to that of the Many. Now, in submitting to any *simple Form of Government* whatever, They establish what they mean to avoid, and for Fear of being exposed to *arbitrary Will* sometimes, they chuse to be governed by it always. *These Governments* do not only degenerate into *Tyranny*; They are *Tyranny* in their very Institution; and They, who submit to them, are *Slaves*, not *Subjects*, however the supreme Power may be exercised; for *Tyranny* and *Slavery* do not so properly consist in the Stripes that are given and received, as in the Power of giving them at Pleasure, and the Necessity of receiving them, whenever and for whatever they are inflicted. *Absolute Democracy* may appear to some, in abstracted Speculation, a less Deviation from Nature than *Monarchy*, and more agreeable to Reason; because here it is the *Will of the whole Community*, and because Reason does certainly instruct every Man, even from a Consciousness of his own Frailty, the *Impotentia Animi* of the *Latin* Writers, to trust as little Power as possible to any other Man. But still it must be confessed, that if it be unsafe for a People to trust too much Power to a *Prince*, it is unsafe for them likewise to keep too much Power to *themselves*. *Absolute Monarchy* is *Tyranny*; but *absolute Democracy* is *Tyranny* and *Anarchy* both. If *Aristocracy* be placed between these two Extremes, it is placed on a slippery Ridge, and must fall into one or the other, according to the natural Course of human Affairs; if the Few who govern, are united, into *Factions* and *Disorders*, as great as Those of the most *tumultuous Democracy*.

From such Observations, and many of the same Kind and Tendency, it hath been concluded very reasonably that the best Form of Government must

must be one compounded of *these Three*, and in which they are *all* so tempered, that *each* may produce the good Effects, and be restrained by the Counter-workings of the *other Two*, from producing the bad Effects, that are natural to it. Thus much is evident. But then how to fix that just Proportion of each, how to hit that happy Temperament of them all in one System, is a Difficulty that hath perplexed the wisest Politicians, and the most famous Legislators. Let me quote one of the greatest Writers of Antiquity. \* *Tacitus* acknowledges, in the fourth Book of his *Annals*, what is here advanced; but he thinks *such a Constitution of Government* rather a Subject of fine Speculation, than of Practice. He thinks it much more likely that *such a System* should continue to be admired and praised in *Idea*, than established in *Fact*; and if it happens ever to be established, He does not imagine it can be supported long. Not only the real Difficulties, which his Sagacity presented to his Mind, but his Reflections on the Constitution and Fate of the *Roman Commonwealth* might lead *Tacitus* into this Despondency. But what the Refinements of *Roman Policy* could not do, hath been done in this Island, upon Foundations laid by the rough Simplicity of our *northern Ancestors*.

It would be a curious and entertaining Amusement, to reduce the Constitutions of the *Roman Government*, and of *Those*, which were formed on the Ruins of *that Empire*, particularly of *our own*, to

\* *Cunctas Nationes & Urbes Populus, aut Primores, aut singuli regunt. Delecta ex his & constituta Republicæ Forma, laudari facilius quam evenire; vel, si evenit, haud diuturna esse potest.*

to their first Principles; to observe in which they agree, and in which they differ, and the uniform or various Tendencies of each; to mark the latent, as well as apparent Causes of their Rise and Fall; how well or how ill they were contrived for Triumphs abroad, or Peace at home; for vain Grandeur, or real Prosperity; for resisting Corruption, or being ruined by it. Such an Analysis and Enquiry would be, I imagine, not only amusing, but useful. At least, it would be more so than any Rhapsody of general Reflections, huddled together with little Order, or Design; for These leave no systematical Impressions on the Mind; nothing but a Confusion of Ideas, often bright and glittering, seldom instructive. But a Work of this Kind would be too voluminous and too aspiring for these little Essays, and the humble Author of them. He will therefore keep to his Point, and content himself to make some of those Observations alone, which seem proper to illustrate and prove what He hath advanced; that the *British Constitution* is a plain and sufficient Rule of Judgment and Conduct to us in every Thing, that regards our Liberty; for preserving of which, as well as for securing its own Duration, it is better fitted than any other.

There was so great a Mixture of monarchical Power in the *Roman Commonwealth*, that \* *Livy* dates the Original of *Liberty* from the Expulsion of the *Tarquins*, rather because the *consular Dignity* was made annual, than because the *regal Power* had suffered any Diminution in that Change. The

\* *Libertatis Originem inde magis, quia annum Imperium Consulare factum est, quam quod diminutum quicquam in Regia Potestate, numeres. Omnia Jura, omnia insignia primi Consules tenuere. Lib. Cap. 1.*

*dictatorial Power*, the most absolute that can be imagined, was introduced in eight, or at farthest in eleven Years afterwards, and may therefore be reckoned coæval with the Commonwealth; and whatever Diminution either This, or the *consular Power* might suffer, the Axes and the Rods were terrible to the last; especially when they were carried before a *Dictator*,, for whom the *Tribunes of the People* were not a Match, as They were for the *Consuls*. But though there were three Sorts of Power exercised, there were but two Orders, or *Estates*, established in this Commonwealth, the *Patricians* and the *Plebeians*; and the supreme Power was divided accordingly between the *Senate* and the *collektive*, not a *representative*, *Body of the People*. These two Orders, or *Estates*, had frequent Contests, and well They might, since They had very opposite Interests. \* *Agrarian Laws*, for Instance, began to be promulgated within three and twenty Years, and continued to the End of the Commonwealth to produce the same Disorders. How inconsistent, indeed, was that Plan of Government which required so much hard Service of the *People*; and which, leaving them so much Power in the Distribution of Power, left Them so little Property in the Distribution of Property? Such an Inequality of Property, and of the Means of acquiring it, cannot subsist in an equal Commonwealth; and I much apprehend that any near Approaches to a Monopoly of Property would not be long endured even in a Monarchy.——But I return to my first Observation.

Though the Romans made frequent Experience of

\* Tum primum Lex agraria promulgata est; nunquam  
 deinde usque ad hanc Memoriam sine maximis motibus Re-  
 um agitata. Lib. L. 2. C. 41.



of the cruel Mischiefs, and even extreme Danger to *Liberty*, which attended almost every Variance of the *two Estates*, yet did They never fall upon any safe, or effectual Method of preventing these Disputes, or of reconciling them, without Violence. The old Expedients alone subsisted; and surely they were not only violent, but extra-constitutional. When the *Senate* was inflexible, the *People* had immediate Recourse to *Sedition*, When the *People* was refractory, the *Senate* had Recourse to a *Dictator*. The latter had an Approbation, which could not be given to the former, and was a *legal Institution*; notwithstanding which I make no Scruple of saying that it was, at least, as inconsistent with a *free Constitution of Government* as the former. *Sedition* was temporary *Anarchy*. A *Dictator* was a *Tyrant* for six Months, unless He thought fit to abdicate sooner. The *Constitution* was suspended, and endangered by both. It might have been destroyed by the Excesses of one. It was destroyed by the bare Duration of the other. If the *Romans* had annually elected out of their Tribes a certain Number of Men to represent the *People*, instead of depending on their *Tribunes*; (a Sort of bullying Magistracy, and often a very corrupt one) and if this *representative Body* had been one *Estate*, and had acted as such, the *Consuls* might very well have supplied the Place of a *third Estate*, and have been safely trusted, even more independently of the *Senate* than They were, with the executive Power. But the Want of a *third Estate* in the *Roman* System of Government, and of a *representative Body*, to act for the *collective Body*, maintaining one perpetual Ferment, which often increased into a Storm, but never subsided into a Calm. The State of *Rome*, and of the greatest Men in the Commonwealth, would have deserved Pity rather than

than Envy, even in the best Times; if their *defective Constitution* had not made such a State of \* Trouble and Tumult the Price they paid for the Maintenance of their *Liberty*. But This was not the whole Price. Whilst *Rome* advanced triumphantly in conquering the *World*, as her Orators, Poets and Historians have expressed Themselves; that is, a few Nations round the *Mediterranean Sea*, and little more; her Citizens turned against one another those Weapons, which were put into their Hands against the Enemies of *Rome*. Mutual Proscriptions and bloody Massacres followed; each *Party* triumphed in its Turn; They were more animated and better disciplined by their Contests; both grew stronger; the *Commonwealth* alone grew weaker; and *Pompey* and *Cæsar* finished the last tragical Scene, which *Marius* and *Sylla* began. In fine, the *Roman Commonwealth* would have been dissolved much sooner than it was, by the Defects I have mentioned, which many Circumstances concurred to aggravate, if such a Spirit of Wisdom, as well as Courage, and such an Enthusiasm for the Grandeur, the Majesty, and the Duration of their Empire had not possessed this People, as never possessed any other. When this Spirit decayed, when this Enthusiasm cool'd, the *Constitution* could not help, nay work'd against itself. That *Dictatorial Power*, on which the *Senate* had always depended for preserving it, complicated the

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Ruin

\* *Conciones Magistratum pæne pernoctantium in Rostris.*  
 — *Accusationes potentium Reorum, & assignatæ etiam*  
*Domibus Inimicitæ* — *Procerum Factiones, & assidua*  
*Senatus adversum Plebem Certamina.*

Ruin of it, in the Hands of *Cæsar*; and that *Tri-  
bunitial Power*, to which the *People* had always  
trusted the Defence of their *Liberty*, confirmed  
their *Slavery*, in the Hands of *Augustus*.

I am, SIR, &c.

## LETTER XIV.

SIR,

THE Defects, which I have presumed to cen-  
sure, in the *Roman Constitution of Government*,  
were avoided in some of Those, that were esta-  
blished on the breaking of that Empire, by the  
*Northern Nations* and the *Goths*; for I suspect that  
the *Goths* were not properly and strictly a *Northern  
Nation*, any more than the *Huns* and the *Alans*,  
though they have been often confounded, and I  
believe by my self.—Let us cast our Eyes on *Spain*  
and *France*.

We cannot arrive, as far as my scanty Know-  
ledge informs me, at any particular and authen-  
tick Account of the Scheme of that Government,  
which the *Western Goths* establish'd, when, driven  
out of *Gaul* by the *Franks*, they drove the *Vandals*  
and the *Alans* out of *Spain*; nor distinguish very  
accurately between such Institutions as were Parts  
of the original, *Gothick Plan*, and such as were in-  
troduced into the several Kingdoms, that formed  
themselves on the Re-Conquest of the Country by  
the *Spaniards* from the *Arabs* and *Moors*. The Ori-  
ginal of the *Cortes* particularly is quite in the Dark  
as We are assured by a very \* 'industrious En-  
quirer and judicious Writer.' Thus much how

\* *Dr. Geddes in his miscell. Tracts.*

ever We may assert ; that the *Gothick Kings* were at first *elective*, and always *limited*, even after They became *hereditary* ; and that the *Cortes*, whenever it was established, was an Assembly ; that may be more truly compared to a *British Parliament*, than the Assembly of the *Estates of France* could ever pretend to be. *Churchmen* had wriggled Themselves into a Share of temporal Power among the *Goths*, as they did in every Country, where they were admitted to preach the Gospel, though without any Authority from the Gospel ; so that the *Cortes* consisted of *Prelates*, as well as *Dukes*, *Masters of Orders*, *Earls* and *Ricoshomes*, who composed the whole Body of the Nobility ; and of the *Procurators of the Commons* ; That is, of the *Citizens* and *Burgesses*, chosen by the *Cities* and *Boroughs* to represent and act for the *whole Body of the Commons*. To preserve the Independency of this Assembly, *these Procurators* were to be paid by the *Corporations*, for which they served ; the *King* was to give no *Office*, or *Salary* to any of Them ; nay a † ‘ Resumption of Rewards, granted to ‘ Members of the *Cortes*,’ was once at least debated, if not enacted. In short, He was not to name their *President*, nor even to send *Letters unopened to any of them*. No *Money* could be raised on the Subjects, without the Consent of *this Assembly* ; and it was a standing Maxim, or Order, that *Redress of Grievances* should precede the *Grants of Supplies*. Such a Frame of Government as This seems built for Duration ; and, in Fact, if it had not been undermined, it could not have been demolished. The Manner, in which it was both undermined and demolished totally at last, deserves



serves the Attention of every Man in *Britain*. It was undermined by the *Influence of the Court*, too much connived at and too long tolerated, on the *Members of the Cortes*. *Prostitute Wretches* were found in those Days, I doubt not, as well as in ours, to maintain that the *necessary Independency of the Prince* could not be supported, without allowing a *corrupt Dependency of the Cortes on Him*: and They had, in those Days, such Success in *Castile*, as We ought to hope They will never obtain in *Britain*. When *corrupt Majorities* were thus secured, Pretences were not wanting, nor will they ever be so, for making Concessions to the *Crown*, repugnant to the Spirit of the *Constitution*, and even inconsistent with the Forms of it. Such Pretences, however plausible, would not have been admitted by Men zealous to preserve their *Liberty*; because any real Danger, remote as well as immediate, to a *free Constitution* would in their Ballance outweigh all Considerations of real Expediency, and much more all the frivolous Pretences of that Kind. But the \* *Members of the Cortes* were no longer such Men, when *Castile* lost her *Liberties* under *Charles the 5th*. The Custom of bribing the *Representatives of the Commons*, by *Gifts* and *Promises*, and so securing a Majority to the *Court*, had long prevailed, as We have just now said; and after That, it is not to be wondered at if *Excises*, given for eight Years only, became perpetual; if *Money* was granted before *Grievances* were redress'd; and if the *Precedent*, set in the Time of *Henry the 2d*, was followed in all succeeding Reigns. The *Cortes* gave this *Prince* a Supply, for making War on the *Moors*; but the \* Sum being represented by the *Court* to be insufficient for the Service, it was carried

\* Dr. Geddes in his miscell. Tract.

carried that, in Case of a Deficiency, the *King* might raise, without calling a *Cortes*, the Money necessary to make good that Deficiency. This *Vote of Credit* gave an incurable fatal Wound to *that Constitution*. I call it a *Vote of Credit*, though the Powers it gave seem to be less than Those which are given by *some modern Votes of Credit*; for surely there is a Difference, and not a small one, between a Power to raise Money, directly on the People, for a *Service unknown*, and already approved, and provided for in Part, by their *Representatives*, and a Power to borrow Money, on the national Credit, for *Services unknown*, and to lay the Nation under an Obligation of paying, for That, which it is possible their *Representatives* may disapprove.

*This Precedent* having been made, in Favour of *one King*, and in one particular Conjuncture, it became a prevailing Argument, in Favour of *every other King*, and in every other Conjuncture; for though it may be, nay must be, in the vast Variety of Characters, and of Conjectures, prudent and just to grant, in Favour of some *Princes*, and upon some Occasions, what it would be neither prudent, nor just to grant, in Favour of *other Princes*, and upon other Occasions; yet such is the Merit of *every Prince*, who fills a Throne, or rather such is the servile Adulation paid to *Power*, in what Hands soever it be lodged, that general and almost universal Experience shews *this Rule*, which no Man of Sense would break in the Management of his *private Interests*, absolutely reversed in the Management of the most *important, national Interests*. The Inference to be drawn from hence is plainly This; that the Inconveniency, or Danger of refusing to *every Prince*; and in every Conjuncture, such Things as are inconsistent with the *Constitution of a*

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*free Government*, must be always less than the Inconveniency, or Danger of granting them to any *Prince*, and in any Conjunction.

Let me add this farther Observation, which presents itself so naturally after the former. Though it be proper, in all *limited Monarchies*, to watch and guard against all Concessions, or Usurpations, that may destroy the *Ballance of Power*, on which the Preservation of *Liberty* depends ; yet it is certain that *Concessions to the Crown* from the *other*, *constituent Parts of the Legislature* are almost alone to be feared. There is no Danger that the *Crown* should make them to the *others* ; and on this Head the *People* may very safely trust to Those, who wear it, and Those, who serve it. The *Nobility* will not make them to the *Commons*, without great Struggles, which give Time for Interpositions ; nor the *Commons* to the *Nobility*. But *both* may be easily induced to make them to the *Crown*. The Reasons of this Difference are obvious enough ; for, first, a *King* is really nothing more than a *supreme Magistrate*, instituted for the Service of the Community, which requires that the *executive Power* should be vested in a *single Person*. He hath, indeed, a *Crown* on his Head, a *Scepter* in his Hand, and *Velvet Robes* on his Back, and He sits elevated in a *Throne*, whilst others stand on the Ground about Him ; and all This to denote that He is a *King*, and to draw the Attention and Reverence of the *Vulgar*. Just so, another Man wears a *Mitre* on his Head, a *Crosier* in his Hand, and *Lawn Sleeves*, and sits in a *purple Elbow-Chair*, to denote that He is a *Bishop*, and to excite the Devotion of the Multitude, who receive his Benediction very thankfully on their Knees. But still the *King*, as well as the *Bishop*, holds an *Office*, and owes a *Service*. *Officium est imperare, non Regnum*. The *King*, when

when He *commands*, discharges a *Trust*, and performs a *Duty*, as well as the *Subject*, when He *obeys*. Notwithstanding which, *Kings* are apt to see Themselves in another Light, and Experience shews us, that even *They*, who made Them what They are, are apt to take Them for what They are not. From hence it happened in *Spain*, and may happen possibly in other Countries, that the *Kings*, instead of being satisfied with, and thankful for the Dignity, Honour, Power and Wealth, which They possessed in so eminent a Degree above all other Magistrates and Members of the Commonwealth, repined at their being possessed of no more. What They had, was given Them by the *Constitution*; and what They had not, was reserved by the same Authority to the *Nobility*, and to the *Commons*. But They proceeded, and their Sycophants reasoned, as if the sole Power of the Government, and the whole Wealth of the Nation, belonged of Right to *Them*, and the Limitations of the Monarchy, were so many Usurpations on the Monarch. — In the second Place, besides this constant Desire of incroaching, there is another Reason why *Concessions to the Crown* are more to be guarded against than others, in *limited Monarchies*. The Regal Power resides in *one Person*. The other Shares of the supreme Power are assigned to *Bodies of Men*. From hence it follows, that the Interest of the *King*, and the Interest of the *Crown*, cannot well be divided in the Mind of a *Prince*; whereas the Interest of *each Individual* may be distinguished from the Interest of the *Nobility*, or of the *Commons*, and still more from That of the *Nation*, in the Minds of Those, who compose an *House of Peers*, or who are *Representatives of the People*. A *King* cannot be tempted to give up the Interest of the *Crown*, because He cannot give up this *publick Interest*, with-



out giving up his *private Interest*; whereas the *Members of such Assemblies* may promote their *private Interest*, by sacrificing to it That of the *Publick*. Several other Reasons might be insisted upon, to establish the Truth of the Observation We have made, and to shew how fairly They argue, who all along suppose that the *Independency of the Crown* may as easily be lost, and the Balance of Power be destroyed on that Side, by *Concessions from the Prince*, and *Usurpations on Him*, as the *Independency of the Lords, or Commons*, may be lost, and the Balance of Power be destroyed on that Side, by *Concessions to the Prince*, and by his *Usurpations*. Such Reasons, for Instance, might be drawn from the Difference of that *Influence*, which the *Crown* hath on the *other Estates*, and which the *other Estates* have on the *Crown*; as well as from the Difference of the *Pretences*, which may be urged on Behalf of the *Crown*, or of the *Nobility*, or *Commons*, to obtain such *Concessions*; for supposing them all coequal, as Parts of the *Legislature*, yet if it be considered that the *executive Power* is solely in the *Crown*; that the Disposition of *publick Money*, as well as *publick Employments*, is a Part of this *Power*; that this *Power* is the continual Exercise, and may immediately affect, more or less, at one Time or at another, every particular Man, *Peer*, as well as *Commoner*; whereas the *other Powers* are exercised occasionally, are continued or suspended, in great Measure, at the Will of the *Prince*, and are employed chiefly in Matters of general, not particular Concern. In fine, if it be considered farther, that the Powers exercised by *Assemblies of Peers and Commons*, whether these *Assemblies* be regarded as Parts of the *Legislature*, as the great Councils of the Nation, or as the *Judges and Prosecutors of enormous Offenders*, are few and simple, directed to noto-

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rious Purposes, conducted by Rules always known, always the same, and always sufficient to these Purposes; whereas the Branches of *executive Power* are numerous and complicated, the Rules various, and the Purposes often unknown, often contingent; so that it may become difficult to judge either of the Utility of the Purposes, or of the Sufficiency of the Powers. If all these Things be considered, I say, We shall not be at a Loss to determine on which Side the Danger to *Liberty*, in a *limited Monarchy*, lies; and whether *Concessions to the Crown*, in Prejudice of the *Constitution*, are not more likely to be made, than *Concessions from it*.

Happy had it been for the People of *Castile*, if They had seen this Danger in Time, and had remedied, whilst the Remedies were in their Power, those Defects in their *Constitution*, whatever they were, which gave their *Kings* by Degrees such an Influence over the *Cortes*, as overturned at last the whole *Constitution*, and gained to the *German Race*, that began to reign in *Charles the Fifth*, (for his Father *Philip* is scarce to be reckoned) such an absolute Power as the *Gothick Kings* had never been able to obtain. Though *Charles the Fifth* was a very able Prince, yet the Honour, (for such it will be esteemed by some Men) or more truly the Infamy, of enslaving *Castile* must not be ascribed to his superior Capacity, nor to that of his *Ministers*. Had He been the meekest Tool, a Thing of Straw, but something less than a Scarecrow, and unable to protect the Property of his Subjects; He might still have taken their Liberties from Them, in that Conjunction, as He did most effectually. *Corruption* was established; a *Majority of the Cortes* was bribed; the *Nobility* was detached from the common Interest by *Titles, Places, Pensions, and Grants*; and the *Clergy* in general, for Exceptions there were,

took no farther Share in it than their particular Piques, or some indirect and fleeting Considerations, inspired Them to take. The Nation saw itself betrayed, and the *Commons* protested loudly against the Proceedings of their *Representatives*. But This was the very Point, for which the Enemies of the *Castilian Constitution* waited; and as soon as a Pretence for employing Force was given Them, They muffled Themselves up in that thread-bare Cloak of Zeal for the *Government*, and stabbed their *Country* to the Heart. An Ordinance of the *Cortes* had been made, about an hundred Years before, against increasing the *standing Forces of the Kingdom* to more than four thousand Soldiers in Garrisons, and fifteen hundred Ginets. This Ordinance had not been very well observed. The long Wars with the *Moors* made *Armies* often necessary, when there was no actual War. The Danger of being invaded by the *Moors* (for every *Moorish King* was deemed a Pretender to the Throne) might serve to make them so represented; and when this Reason failed intirely, as it did by the Conquest of *Granada*, the last Possession of these People in *Spain*, Pretences for keeping *Armies* on Foot were still to be found. There were still *Moorish Factions*; the *new Christians* were *Moors* in their Hearts; among the *old Christians* there were several, who favoured Them; the *People* were not to be trusted with their own Preservation; *Chievres*, the rapacious Minister of *Charles the Fifth*, and his *Journeymen*, (for so were those *Spaniards* called, according to *Dr. Geddes*, who did not care how much their Country was plundered by Foreigners, provided They shared the Spoils) *Chievres*, I say, and his *Journeymen*, a real Faction, and perhaps not a great one, were the *fast Friends of the Government*. The rest of the Nation were *open*, or *secret Enemies*.

*Enemies.* According to this excellent Logick, the former were to be protected in Blundering, for They were guilty of That too, as well as in Plundering; and the latter were to be oppressed for complaining. The Nation was sacrificed to a Faction, and an excellent Constitution destroyed, in Favour of a profligate Government. This Destruction however would not have been so easily accomplished, nor would *Castilians* alone have enslaved *Castile* to a foreign Race, after asserting their Liberty so often, and so boldly, against Princes of their own Country, if two other Circumstances had not concurred. *Ferdinand* had conquered *Navarre*, and a regular, disciplined Army defended that Conquest against the *French*. This Army, which was at Hand, marched into *Castile*, defeated the *Commons*, and extinguished Liberty in a Country where it had been long declining. The *Nobility* was detached from the *Commons* by Grants of Land, amongst other Considerations, as I said above; and the *Commons* renewed their Contest on this Head, perhaps unjustly, to be sure very unseasonably. The *Commons* however were justified for taking Arms, in the Opinion of the *Nobility*, and even in That of *Adrian*, who governed during the Absence of *Charles*, whose Præceptor He had been; for this honest Man, (too honest to be long endured on the Papal Throne, where he was afterwards placed) affirmed that all the Troubles of *Castile* were caused by the King, and by his covetous and tyrannical Ministers. The Conduct of the *Commons*, upon this great Occasion, was in many Instances rash and violent, as well as ill-advised and weak. But They were tumultuous Assemblies driven into Despair; and the *Nobility*, who might have had great Sway amongst Them, and might have helped to regulate their Fire, and to keep Them sober, helped on the



contrary to make Them mad, either by neglecting Them, or by taking Part against Them, till it was too late ; and then complained of their being mad, with as ill a Grace as the principal Men of *Rome*, who helped to *corrupt* that People, complained of their *Corruption*, and assigned it as a Reason for depriving Them of their *Liberty*.

There cannot be a greater Solecism in Politicks than That of a *Nobility*, under *monarchical Government*, who suffered the *Liberty* of the *Commons* to be taken away. In *Aristocracies*, the *Nobility* get whatever the *Commons* lose ; but in *Monarchies*, the *Crown* alone is the Gainer, and the certain Consequence of their helping to enslave the *Commons*, must be That of being enslaved Themselves at last. How, indeed, should it be otherwise ; since the *Liberty* of the *Commons* cannot be taken away, unless the *Constitution* be first broken ; and since neither the *Peers*, nor any one else, can hold their Privileges, or their Properties, by a better Tenure than That of *arbitrary Will*, when the *Constitution* is once broken ? Was it possible to doubt of this Truth, We might find the Proof of it, without going out of the Country where We are ; I mean *Spain*. Amongst all the surprising Phænomena, which have appeared in the World of late Years, there are none, that have struck Mankind with more Astonishment, than those Instances of Persons raised to the highest Posts of Power, Authority and Command, nay to Empire, who had not, either from their obscure Birth, or their low Talents, or their still lower Habits, the least Occasion even to dream of such Elevation. Among other Countries *Spain* hath had her Share of them : and the *Grandeos*, as They are pompously stiled, the Successors of those Men, who thought to rise on the Ruin of the *Commons of Castile* ; They, who have the vain Honour  
of

of cocking their Hats in the Presence of their Prince, have been seen to stand at awful Distance, or approach with respectful Cringe, in the Presence of a *Parasite* and *Buffoon*.

I know full well that, in such Governments as We speak of here, it is both the Duty and Interest of the *Nobility* to oppose the Excesses of the *Commons*; but I know too that They have another Duty, which They are not to leave undone; another Point of Interest, which they are not to neglect; and therefore I have spoken of this *second Estate* in our Government, as of a *middle Order*, that are properly Mediators between the other two, in the Eye of our *Constitution*. Whilst the *Peers* maintain this Character, They will be able to discharge this Duty; but They would cease to be so, if it was possible They should ever become the *Tools of Faction*, or the *Vassals of a Minister*. In Mediations of this Kind, different from Those that are more commonly called such, *Mediators* mingle in the Contest, are Parties concerned, and can by that alone expect to mediate with Effect, whether They be considered as *Bodies of Men*, or *Individuals*. When the *Commons* are assisted by the *Peers* in their reasonable Endeavours to promote or restore *Frugality*, to secure *Liberty*, and to correct all Sorts of *Mis-Administration*; the *Peers* will have, both collectively and separately, a Credit with the *People*, as well as with the *Representatives of the People*; by which They may contribute to check the latter, whenever an *House of Commons* shall grow unreasonable, factious, or seditious. But if the *Peers of the Realm* neglect, or oppose the *Commons* in their just Attempts, and forfeit by Consequence the Character of Impartiality, and even the Air of Independency, the *Peers* will then add little Strength to the *Crown*,  
whenever

whenever the evil Day comes, and have as little Power to prevent it from coming. There was a Time, our Fathers saw it, when an *House of Commons* destroyed, instead of supporting, the *Constitution*, and introduced *Tyranny*, under Pretence of excluding *Slavery*. I think it might be shewn, from the Anecdotes of that Age, that This could not have happened, if the *Court* had not been so long and so partially abetted by the greatest Part of the *Nobility* and *Clergy*, both in the *House of Lords* and out of it. An universal and timely Concurrence with the Spirit of the *Commons*, which was pious in the true Sense of the Word at first, would have had, I presume, the full Effect that every honest Man proposed in a Parliamentary Reformation of the State; and those fatal Opportunities, that were afterwards given to the *Republican*, *Presbyterian* and *Independent Factions*, would have been avoided. But They, who could have *trimmed*, (for there is a *wise* and *honest*, as well as a *silly* and *corrupt Trimming*) or have mediated with Success, lost the Power of doing either; some by abetting the *Crown* so long, for Fear of the *Commons*, and others by concurring with the *Commons* so far, for Fear of the *Crown*, that the *People* in general had no Confidence in the *former*, and that the *latter* were afraid to trust their *Prince* after all They had done against Him. If any Man had trusted to the plausible Professions of the *Court* at that Time, and the *Court* had subdued the *opposite Party*, We may judge, without any Breach of Charity, that these Men would have found Themselves deceived. Just so, if any Men, who meant the Reformation, not the Destruction of the State, believed in the *canting Reformers of that Age*, such Men were no Doubt egregiously deceived. But I confess myself of Opinion, and surely upon no improbable Grounds,

Grounds, that there were few, or no such Men. The good Intentions of the *Court* were distrusted even by Those, who took Arms for the *King*; and the ill Intentions of many of the Leaders on the *other Side* were suspected, no Doubt, by many, who took Arms for the *Parliament*. But *two* of the *three Estates* being ripe for the rashest Enterprizes, and the *third* being in no Condition to mediate, the Extremes clashed without any Power sufficient to interpose; and when the Sword was drawn, the Sword could alone decide. I conclude therefore, from these two Examples, that as there cannot be a greater Error in Politicks than That of a *Nobility*, who assist a *Prince* to take away the Liberties and Privileges of the *Commons*; (which was the Case in *Castile*) so the surest Way of preventing that terrible Dilemma, wherein Men are obliged to chuse either Submission to *tyrannical Government*, our Concurrence with an *enraged and no longer governable People*, (which hath been the Case in *Castile* and *Britain* both,) is for the *Nobility*, and the principal Men amongst the *Commons*, to engage so early in the Cause of *Liberty*, that the *former* may be always in Condition to mediate with Effect, and the *latter* have always Power to allay the intemperate Heat of their own Body.

I am, SIR, Your's, &c.

## LETTER XV.

SIR,

**B**UT to resume the Comparison of *other Constitutions of Government with our own*, I say that if the *Gothick Constitution* in *Spain*, either by original Defects, or by deviating from, and not being reduced



reduced again in Time to its first Principles, was destroyed through the *Corruption of Parliaments*, and by the Force of an *Army*, one of which betrayed, and the other conquered the *Commons of Castile*; the *Commons of France* seem either not to have had, or to have lost, in the dark Beginnings of that Monarchy, all Share in the *supreme, legislative Power*. The great, original Defect of having but *two Estates* to share the *supreme Power*, is an Objection common to the *Roman*, and to the *French Constitutions*, with this Difference; of the *three simple Forms of Government*, the *Monarchical*, the *Aristocratical*, and the *Democratical*, *Rome* wanted the *first*, and *France* hath always wanted the *last*. *Rome* had a *Nobility* and a *Commonalty*, but no Magistracy fitted by its Institution to answer the Purposes of that supreme Magistrate, who is called *King* even in limited Monarchies. *France* hath always had a *King* and a *Nobility*, and hath felt in their Turns all the Evils of *Monarchical* and *Aristocratical Tyranny*. But the *People* have not had, I presume, since the Government of the *Franks* was fully established on this Side of the *Rhine*, and the Form of their Monarchy settled, any Share in the *supreme Power*, either collectively or representatively, how much soever a contrary Notion may have been countenanced by some Writers, and have been generally entertained, at least in other Countries.

There is no Nation in the World, says *Mezerai*, more *illustrious*, nor any, whose Original is more *obscure* than That of the *French*. They, who would dispute the *first*, could hardly dispute the *last*; and it is no Business of mine to controvert either. As dark as their Original is, We may discover enough to establish what hath been said, and to carry on the Comparison We are making.

The

The *Franks* were a Nation of *Germany*, seated at one Time between the *Elbe*, *Rhine* and *Neckar*, and at another (That is, in the Reign of *Theodosius* the younger) extending Themselves on the *German* Side of the *Rhine*, from *Cologne* down to *Nimighen*, and still lower. What is known therefore of the Governments of the *antient Germans*, either from *Tacitus*, or any other good Authority, may be properly applied to their Government, whilst They continued in *Germany*, and even after They settled in *Gaul*, till such Times as We find, by Relations more modern, that a *different Form of Government* prevailed amongst Them. Now, it seems to me extremely plain that a *different Form of Government* did prevail amongst Them even from the Time of *Clovis*, the Conqueror of *Gaul*. Thus, for Instance, that Passage in *Tacitus*, where He says \*, that ‘ the *antient Germans* took their *Kings* on Account of *Nobility*, and their *Generals* on Account of *Valour*; that the Power of their *Kings* was not absolute and unlimited; and that their *Generals* commanded by the Authority, which their *Example*, rather than their *Power*, gave Them; that Passage, I say, is properly enough applied to the *Franks* before, and perhaps during the Conquest of *Gaul*; but very improperly afterwards, when † *Clovis*, both King and General of that People, had founded the Monarchy, which He transmitted to his Posterity. That the Nation of the *Franks* was divided into several *Tribes*, or *Clans*, and that These were governed by several little *Princes*, cannot be doubted———*Habebat quot Pagos, tot paene Duces.*

\* *Reges ex Nobilitate, Duces ex Virtute sumunt; nec Regibus infinita, nec libera Potestas; Et Duces, Exemplum potius quam Imperio praesunt.* De Mor. Germ.

† *Boulainv. Mem. Hist.*

*Duces.* That a *General* was chosen to command the whole with sovereign Authority, but according to certain Rules made by common Consent, whenever any great Enterprize was undertaken, and that *Clavis* Himself, though He succeeded his Father *Childeric* in commanding over a Part of the *Franks*, was chosen in this Manner, and for this Purpose, is certain. In his first Expedition, he led an Army of *Freebooters*, and was obliged by Compact to divide the Spoil by Lots amongst them. The Story, which so many Authors have told, after *Gregory of Tours*, of a private Soldier, who refused to leave to his Disposition a Vessel of Gold, that had been taken out of a Church at *Rheims*, and broke it before his Face, is a Proof that he was nothing more at first than I have represented Him, the *Head of a Troop of Adventurers*, who chose Him to lead Them, but made their Conditions with Him. The *Franks* therefore might be at this Time, in some Sense, \* *all free, perfectly equal, and independent*; but will it follow from hence that They continued to be so, in any Sense, after *Clavis* had founded their *Monarchy*; had destroyed all their *little Kings*; united in one Body, and under his own Dominion, all their *little States*; and changed the *Form of their Government*, by appointing *Dukes, Earls, Vicars*, and other Magistrates, to govern under Him, according to the Model of Government in the latter *Roman Empire*? Certainly not. However this Change was brought about, and to whatever it was owing, the *Monarchy of the Franks in Gaul* was built on the Ruins of their former Government. This *Boulainvilliers* Himself confesses, when he says (though not very accurately, nor consistently, as I imagine, in calling their former Government a Kind of *Aristocracy*) that

\* *Boulainv. Mem. Hist.*

the Principle of Union, which founded the Monarchy, on the Ruins of a Kind of Aristocracy, was the mistaken Ambition of particular Men. In short, Proofs enough may be collected out of this very Author to shew that the Government of the Franks, even under the first Race of their Kings, was not only different from the German Government, but in some Respects founded on quite opposite Principles. One of these Respects, which is immediately to my Purpose, I shall mention.

The general Assemblies, that were held at first in the Month of March, and afterwards in the Month of May, were national Assemblies, indeed; but not such as the antient Germans held; among whom the \* principal Men consulted and decided about the least, and the whole Body of the People about the greatest Affairs. In these Assemblies of the French, the People had nothing to do, unless We reckon for something the Function of † hollowing, which the Author I have just now quoted assigns Them, and which he says that Custom had rendered necessary. In one Word, the People had not any Share in the supreme Power, either collectively or representatively, in the original Plan of the French Government. Whether They acquired any Share in this Power afterwards, let us enquire next. † Mezerai pretends, and indeed the whole History of France

\* De minoribus Principes, de majoribus omnes. Tacit.

† Ils (that is the French) laissèrent passer aux hauts Magistrats, les Ducs, les Comtes, & les Vicaires, le Droit de la Nation entière; de sort que le Commun n'eut plus d'autres Fonctions dans les Assemblées réelles, que d'y paroître pour les Acclamations, que l'Usage rendoit nécessaires. Boulainv. Mem. Hist.

† L. ii.



*France* vouches for Him, \* that ' no Nation ever  
 ' honoured their *Nobility* so much as the *French* ;  
 ' amongst whom the *Nobility* was not only exempt  
 ' from all Sorts of *Impositions* and *Charges*, but  
 ' commanded absolutely all *inferior Ranks*, who  
 ' were almost in a State of *Servitude*.' How could  
 it be otherwise, when the *Nobility*, and chief *Ma-*  
*gistrates*, and the *Clergy*, composed alone the *na-*  
*tional Councils*, or *Parliaments*, and even exercised  
*distributive Justice* all over the Kingdom ? Their  
 Power increased, as That of the *Kings of the first*  
*Race* diminished: *Charles Martel*, indeed, who  
 trusted to that *Battle-Axe*, which gave Him his  
*Name*, and to *foreign Troops*, laid aside the *national*  
*Assemblies*, neglected the *Nobility*, and misused even  
 the *Clergy*, who damned Him for it. But *Pepin*  
 found it necessary to regain *Both*, and attach Them  
 to his Interest, in order to mount the Throne.  
 By attaching Them, He attached the whole Na-  
 tion to him. *Childeric* was deposed, and he chosen  
 King in a general Assembly held at *Soissons*, which  
*Mezerai* calls most improperly (since the Expres-  
 sion communicates a false Idea to his Reader) the  
*States*, *les Etats*. These *Assemblies*, in his Time, in  
 that of his Son *Charles the Great*, and so on, con-  
 sisted of the *Nobility* and *Clergy* alone ; and once  
 more it is beyond all Dispute certain, that the  
 People had no more Share in these *national Councils*,  
 under the *second*, than under the *first Race of the*  
*Kings of France*.

When the *third Race of these Kings* began in  
*Hugues Capet*, the *Lords* were so powerful in their  
*Estates*

\* *Jamais Nation n'honora tant la Noblesse que celle la ;*  
*car non seulement elle étoit exempte de toute sorte d'Impôts,*  
*& Corvées, mais commandoit à baguette à ses Inferieurs,*  
*sur lesquels elle avoit presque Droit de Servitude.*

*Estates*, and so independent in their Governments, that he was forced to come to a Kind of Composition with Them. They became *Sovereigns*, each in his Territory, but held of the *Crown*, and acknowledged the *King* for the supreme Lord. There was scarce a *Town*, which had not a little *Sovereign*; scarce a *Castle* without some little *Tyrant*. The *Parliaments*, in these Ages, took several Turns; *Ils prirent divers plis*, as \* *Pasquier* expresses Himself; but still They consisted of *Princes*, great *Lords*, *Bishops* and *Abbots*, who decided in them their Disputes with one another, and with the *King*, and maintained by these Means a Sort of national Confederacy, or fœderal Union of many *States*, politically united under one *Head*. Such *Assemblies* as these, under the second and third Race, were the original Institutions, from whence the § *Parliaments of France* have proceeded, as many Alterations as they have received, and as much as they are now changed; so that We may safely affirm the *Parliaments of France* never gave the *People* any Share in the Government of that Kingdom; and whoever entertains a Notion that the *Assemblies of the States* did, or that † *these Assemblies* are of greater Antiquity, or that they are the Foundation of the Liberty of the *People* of that Country, will find Himself, on due Examination, grossly deceived.

These *Assemblies* of the three *Estates*, the *Nobility*, *Clergy*, and *Commons*, were invented first by † *Philip le Bel*. They were intirely unknown before

\* *Recherches de la France.*

§ *Primitive Origine & Institution des Parlemens. Ib.*

† *Ib.*

‡ *L'Assemblée des Etats. — fut une Idée toute nouvelle de Philippe le Bel, & jusqu' alors entièrement inusitée.*

*Boulaniv. Let. sur les anciens Parl. de France.*

fore the Year 1301. The *People* had no Right to any such *Assemblies*; and when they were instituted, they were plainly designed for nothing less than the *Good of the People*. Long after the Establishment of the *Capetian Race*, when *Taxes* grew heavy, and were laid on and levied very arbitrarily, \*\* *Seditions and Rebellions* of an oppressed *People*, who had no other Recourse, followed. To prevent These, not only *Writs*, or *Orders*, were sent to the *Nobility* and *Clergy*, in the several *Sheriffwicks* and *Bailiwicks*, but to the *Commons*, to assemble and take into Consideration how to redress *Grievances*, and support the publick *Expences*; and after such Consideration had amongst Themselves, to depute some Persons of each *Order*, or *Estate*, to confer together in the Place appointed for holding such general *Assemblies*. The *Commons* were added to these *Assemblies*, † says *Pasquier*, 'against the ancient Order or Practice of *France*, for no other Reason than this, that the principal Burthen, or Charge, was to fall upon them.' This was the true Reason. Redress of *Grievances* had no Part in the Schemes of that rapacious and profuse Prince, who was the Author of this Institution; and He, that considers the Manner, in which these *Assemblies* were convened, the Powers They were suffered to exercise, the Subordination, in which the *Commons* particularly were kept, and the habitual, unavoidable Influence, under which They lay, will be easily convinced that such *Assemblies* were fitted to do the Jobs, and sanctify the Iniquity of the Court, and nothing more. , at any Time, They make any

\*\* *Pasqu. Rech.*

† *Le Roturier fut expres ajoute, contre l'ancien Ordre de la France, a cette Assemblée, &c.*

any good Ordinances for the Reformation of the State, † *these Ordinances are, says honest Pasquier, like fine Pieces of Tapestry, hung up to make a Shew to Posterity. They have no other Effect. But the Imposition granted to the King hath its full Effect.* I conclude therefore, and upon sufficient Grounds, that even since the Establishment of these *Assemblies of the Estates*, in the Beginning of the 14th Century, the *People of France* have had no real Share in the *supreme Power of the Government*, either collectively or representatively.

I might illustrate and prove what is here advanced by the Example of every *Assembly of the States of France*, of which We have any good Accounts, from the *first* in 1301, to the *last* that was held, as I remember, in 1614. But such a Deduction would carry us too far. I shall content myself therefore with making two Observations.

*First*, that *these Farces* (for such *these Assemblies* were, and such they were designed to be) owe their Institution not only to one of the *worst Kings*, but to one of the *worst Ministers*, that *France* ever saw; *Enguerand de Marigny*, who was called the *Coadjutor* and the *Governor of the Kingdom*; the most insolent, the most avaricious, and the most prodigal Man of his Age. The great Ability of *this Minister*, on which his whole Merit with a greedy *Master* was raised, consisted in making his Administration a System of *Violence* and *Fraud*, in order to plunder and enslave the *People*. When He durst not employ *one*, He turned Himself to the *other*; and how grossly and impudently He managed even *Fraud*, it may not be improper to take Notice in

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† — Ces sont belles Tapisseries, qui servent seulement de Parade a une Posterite. Cependant l'Impost que l'on accorde au Roy est fort bien mis a Effet.



one Instance ; because we shall see the better, by this Instance, what the Nature and Effect of *these Assemblies* were, of which We speak, and what Use the Court made of them from their first Institution. *Enguerand de Marigny* then, meeting with great Opposition to \* *some Taxes* He had devised, proposed the calling an *Assembly of the States*, and hoped probably that He might gain the *Commons* to favour the Intention He had of extending *these Taxes* to the *Nobility* and *Clergy*. A great Scaffold was erected. The *King*, the *Lords* and the *Clergy* took their Places on it. The *Commons* attended at the Foot of it. The *Minister* made a most vehement Declamation, to stir the Passions of the Audience, and made no Scruple of insinuating in it, what neither *He*, nor his *Master* intended to perform, a Promise of reimbursing, after the Expedition proposed, what the *People* should give to the *King*. The *King* rose from his Throne, and advanced to the Extremity of the Scaffold, that He might second by his Looks the Harangue of his *Treasurer*, and see who Those were, that refused, or consented to the Aid He demanded. The *Deputies of Paris* promised to give a sufficient Supply, or to follow the *King* in their Persons to the War. The *other Deputies* concurred in this general Engagement, and the *Assembly* broke up, without any farther Deliberation, or any Ordinance of the *Estates*. But an Ordinance of the *King* soon followed ; † *general Excise* was imposed by his Authority, as if it had been the Grant of the *Estates* to Him ; and his *Minister* had a Number of Har-

\* *Bonlainv. Let. sur les anciens Parl. de France.*

† — Six Deniers par Livre de toutes les Merchandises Viçtuailles, Boissons, & Denrees, — Vendues dans le Royaume.

pie's ready, whom he let loose to desolate the Kingdom, by levying this *infamous Tax*, for the Consideration of some little Advance made to the *King*. If you ask what were the Consequences of these *Proceedings*, it will be sufficient to mention two. The Tax of a 5th on the *Revenues of the Subject*, which is the Proportion of our *Land Tax of four Shillings in the Pound*, was continued, though the *general Excise* had been imposed; and † *Enguerand de Marigny* was hanged in the succeeding Reign for This, amongst other Crimes, though not by an *Assembly of the Estates*; for the *Estates* had neither the Opportunity, nor the Power, of resenting the greatest Insult, that could be offered them, and the greatest Injury, that could be done to the Nation.

The next *Observation* I have to make is very short; but I think very pertinent, and very important,— This Example shews us clearly how true it is, that no *Instruments of Tyranny* can be found so sure, and effectual as an *Assembly of the Estates of a Realm*, when such an *Assembly* is so constituted as to want the *Power*, (which was from the first the Case of the *three Estates in France*) and the same must happen, when They are so managed as to want the *Will* (which became at last the Case of the *Cortes in Spain*) to secure the Liberty and defend the Property of the *People*, against such Kings as *Philip le Bel*, and such *Coadjutors* as *Marigny*. This Prince and his *Minister* had strained *Prerogative* to the utmost, and had governed by it very tyrannically. Whilst this *Expedient* would do, They try'd no other; but when They apprehended it might fail Them, They added a *Deputation of the Commons* to the *Assembly of the Estates*; that, seeming to

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create

† *Mazerai, Daniel, &c. Sous Louis Hutin.*

create a new *Controul on the Crown*, They might in Reality give greater Scope and freer Exercise to arbitrary Will. The *Friends of Liberty* therefore, who live under *limited Monarchies*, cannot be too careful to preserve their *Constitution* in Vigour, nor too fearful lest their *Representatives* should be so influenced as to neglect their *Privileges*, misapply their *Powers*, and depart from their *Integrity*; since these *Friends of Liberty* see that the *greatest Masters of Tyranny* have judged the *Form*, without the *Spirit of a free Government* more favourable to their *Schemes of Oppression*, than all the Authority, that *absolute Monarchy* can give; and that They made an *Innovation in the Form of their Government* on this very Motive, and for this very Purpose.

I am, SIR, Yours, &c.

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## LETTER XVI.

SIR,

I Have dwelt long, perhaps too long, on the last Head. I was induced to it, not only because the Account I have given, according to the Truth of History, is contrary to the national Prejudices of many People on this Subject, as I hinted before; but principally because the great Point of Strength and Security, on which the *Freedom of our Constitution* rests, will appear in a fuller Light, by being thus contrasted with the *Constitution of the French Government*. Both *their Ancestors* and *ours* came out of *Germany*, and had probably much the same Manners, the same Customs, and the same Forms of Government. But as They proceeded differently

in the Conquests They made, so did They in the Establishments that followed. The Conquest of Britain was a Work of Time, and the *Saxon Monarchy* was long in forming. The Conquest of Gaul was carried on with greater Rapidity, and the *French Monarchy* was sooner formed. From hence some Reasons might be drawn to account, amongst others, for that great Difference between the *Constitutions, of the two Monarchies*, which these *two German Nations* founded, at no great Distance of Time, in Britain and in Gaul. But I shall not indulge myself in guessing at the Reasons, or Accidents, that determined the *Franks* to the Division They made of their People, and to the Form of Government They established. Whatever Reasons, or Accidents, determined Them, This is certain ; that the Distinction of *Lord and Vassal* became the general Distinction of the whole Nation ; that the \* *Commons* amongst Them were little better than *Slaves*, whatever They had been in Germany ; and that they were so inured to Servitude under their *Kings, Prelates and Lords*, that they looked on Themselves at least, not *justly*, but *unjustly*, as Men, who had no Right, no not even a Right by Nature, to any Share in the Government of that Community, whereof They made so vastly the principal Part.

In Britain another Constitution was formed, and another Spirit prevailed. The Saxons had a †

K 2

Nobility

\* *Le Peuple, d'un autre Côté, se fait Justice, reconnoissant combien la Condition naturelle le Doit éloigner du Concours du Gouvernement, & dans se sentiment ne se fait entendre que par Requete.*

† *Boulain. Let. sur lis an. Parl. Nat. Bacon. Hist. & Pol. Dis. —*



*Nobility* too, arising from personal Valour, or Wisdom, continued by Blood, and sometimes conferred by the Prince, however legally at first it matters not to enquire, on such as held great Offices about his Person. All these were the *Adelings*, or *Nobles*, an Handful in Comparison of the *Frilingi*, or *Freeborn*, who made the Body of the *Saxon People*. The Freedom of this People was erected on two Columns, that have proved more durable than Brass. They were Parties to the making, and to the executing all the general Laws of the Kingdom. They shared the *Legislative Power*; were joined to the *Lords* in the Administration of Justice; and no Magistrate, or Officer, could exercise Jurisdiction, nor Authority over Them, no not Ecclesiastical, without their Consent and Election. The *Comites ex Plebe*, who were chosen for this last Function, the Administration of Justice, made one Rank among the *Saxon Commonalty*. The *Custodes Pagani*, such as had an Helmet, a Coat of Mail, and a gilt Sword, for their ordinary Arms, whether They fought on Foot, or on Horseback, made another Rank; and the plain *Pagani*, or *Georles*, made the lowest. But even These were totally distinct from, and far superior to the *Lazzi*, or *Slaves*, nay to the *free Lazzi*, such as had been *Slaves*, and were become free. The *Georles* were *Freemen* to all Intents and Purposes, and in all the Essentials of *Liberty*, as much as the *Saxons* of any superior Rank, and were capable of rising to any superior Rank by Merit, or by Favour.

These are the Sources, from which all the Distinction of the Rank and Degree, that exist at this Day amongst us, have flowed. These are the general Principles of all our *Liberties*. That this *Saxon Constitution* hath varied in many Particulars, and at several Periods of Time, I am far from

deriving

denying. That it did so, for Instance, on the Entry of the *Normans*, though certainly not near so much as many have been willing to believe, and to make others believe, is allowed. Nay, let it be allowed for Argument's Sake, and not otherwise, that during the first Confusion, and the subsequent Disorders, which necessarily accompany and follow so great, and so violent a Revolution, the Scheme of the *Saxon Constitution* was broken, and the *Liberties of the People* invaded, as well as the *Crown* usurped. Let us even agree that *Laws* were made, without the Consent of the *People*; that *Officers* and *Magistrates*, civil, military and ecclesiastical, were imposed without their Election; in one Word, that these *Norman Kings*, and the *Lords* had mounted each other too high to be *Lords over Freemen*, and that the Government was intirely *Monarchical* and *Aristocratical*, without any Exercise of *Democratical Power*. Let all This be granted, and the utmost that can be made of it will amount to This, that Confusion and Violence at the Entry, and for some Time after, under the Government of a *foreign Race*, introduced many illegal Practices, and some foreign Principles of Policy, contrary to the Spirit, and Letter too, of the *antient Constitution*; and that *these Kings* and the *Lords* abused their Power over the *Freemen*, by *Extortion and Oppression*, as *Lords over Tenants*. But it will remain true that neither *Kings* nor *Lords*, nor both together, \* could prevail over Them, or gain their Consent to give their Right; or the Law, up to the King's Beck. But still the Law, remained Arbitr both of the King and People, and the Parliament Supreme Expounded and Judged both of it and Them.

\* Nat. Bacon. Summary Conclus. of the first Part of Hist. and Pol. Disc,

Tho' the Branches were lopped, and the Tree lost its Beauty for a Time, yet the Root remained untouched, was set in a good Soil, and had taken strong Hold in it ; so that Care and Culture, and Time indeed required, and our Ancestors were forced to water it, if I may use such an Expression, with their Blood ; but with this Care, and Culture, and Time, and Blood, it shot again with greater Strength than ever, that We might sit quiet and happy under the Shade of it ; for if the same Form was not exactly restored in every Part, a Tree of the same Kind, and as beautiful, and as Luxuriant as the former, grew up from the same Root.

To bring our Discourse to that Point, which is here immediately concerned ; *Parliaments* were never interrupted, nor the Right of *any Estate* taken away, however the Exercise of it might be disturbed. Nay, they soon took the Forms They still preserve, were constituted *almost* as they now are, and were *intirely* built on the same general Principles, as well as directed to the same Purposes.

When I now say that *they were constituted almost as they now are*, I do not mean to enter into any of those minute Questions, about which a Man may employ much Time and Study, and have as little true and useful Knowledge of our *Constitution* as the most ignorant Man alive. But I propose to make a short Reflection or two on the *Property* and *Power* of the *three Estates*, that compose our *Parliament*, as they stood formerly, and as they now stand ; because although our *Parliaments* were composed of *King, Lords* and *Commons* in those Days, as well as these, yet the Difference of the Weight, which each of *these Estates* hath cast into the Scale

of

of Government, at different Periods, does in Effect make some Difference, in the Constitutions of *Parliaments*; and by considering this Difference, our Thoughts will be led the better to judge of the true Poise of our *Constitution*, on maintaining which our All depends; since the nearer We keep to it, the safer our *Liberty* is, and since every Variation from it is dangerous to our *Liberty*, in a Degree proportionable to such Variation. *Property* then, and *Power* by Consequence, have changed Hands, or rather have shifted much in the same Hands, since the *Norman Æra*. *Kings*, *Lords* and the *Church* were in those Days, and long afterwards, the great Proprietors, and by the Nature of *Tenures*, as well as by the Bulks of their Estates, They held the *Commons* in no small Subjection, and seem to have governed without much Regard to Them or their Concurrence, in many Cases. But the Regard, that was not paid Them at first, the *Kings*, the *Lords* and the *Church* found it necessary to pay Them in a short Time; and that Authority, that Weight in the Ballance of Power, which *Property* did not give Them, They soon acquired, or rather resumed by their *Numbers*. and by the *Circumstances*, that followed. By the *Circumstances*, that followed, I mean the great Disorders in the State, and the civil Wars, which the Ambition of *Princes*, of the *Nobility*, and of the *Church* too, created. In all these Conflicts, some of the *Commons* \* *holding for the King, who promised Liberty, from the Lords, and others siding with the Lords, who promised Them Liberty from the King*, They came off better in the End than their *Principals*, and an Example rarely to be paralleled was set;

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for

\* *Nat. Bacon. Hist. and Pol. Disc. Conclus. of the 2d Part.*



for *general Liberty*, was nursed by these Means, under the Wings of *particular Ambition*. In later Days, when the Nation, harrassed, and spent by the long Wars of *York and Lancaster*, seemed glad to settle under any stable Government; and in this Temper gave many Advantages to the Cunning of *Henry the 7th*, which the Violence of his Son improved; it is certain that the *Commons* suffered extremely from the Avarice of *one*, the Profusion of the *other*, and the high strained Prerogative of *both*. But then their Sufferings were temporary, and may be said to have ended with these Reigns; whereas the Sufferings of the *Nobility* and the *Church* were permanent and irretrievable. *The King and Council*, says the Author I quoted last, *under Colour of Liveries and Retainers, brought the whole Kingdom to be of their Livery*. It was so. But still the *Commons* lost nothing, and gained much. They were less under Subjection to the *Lords* and the *Church*. Not only the Dependencies on *These* were broken, but the *Lords* and the *Church* were made more dependent on the *Crown* than the *Commons* had been on *Them*. The *Lords* were obliged to attend the *Court* at their own Expence, and might alienate their Estates to defray this Expence. A great Part of the Lands of the *Church* were confiscated and parcell'd out to *Those*, who could buy, at very cheap Rates; and the Increase of *Trade*, which begun about this Time to be very considerable, put the *Commons* into a Condition of being the Buyers. Thus were the old Foundations of *Property* and *Power* sapped on one Side, and new Foundations laid on the other. Some of the Weight of the *Church* continued in the Scale of the *Lords*, and some of it hath gone since into That of the *Commons*. The *Parliamentary Controul* of the *Crown* did not become less, but it became

came more equally and morse usefully placed. *Democracy* was so well poised with *Aristocracy*, after this great Change, that if They divided They could not invade one another; and if They united, They could not be invaded by the *Monarchy*. Far different was the Case in other Countries, where the *Crown* got the better of the *Lords*, and baffled, at least in some Degree, the monstrous Attempts of *Ecclesiastical Usurpation*. In *France*, for Instance, when the Incroachments of the *Papal Power* were checked, the *Church* compounded with the *Crown*, and an Alliance succeeded of the *Monarchy* with the *Hierarchy*. But if the *Church* was able to compound, the *Nobility* was forced to submit in that Kingdom; so that the Authority and Wealth of the *Church* being fixed on the Side of the *Crown*, the whole Strength and Influence of the *Nobility* being taken from Them, and incorporated with the Power of the *Crown*, and the *Commons* having nothing to do in that Government, but to pay Taxes, and carry Arms, the Kings of *France* are become *absolute Monarchs*; and whatever *Liberty*, or *Appearance of Liberty*, there was in that *Constitution*, it is totally destroyed.

When I say that *Parliaments* were intirely built on the same general Principles, as well as directed to the same Purposes as they still are, I shall be justified by the whole Tenor of our History, and of our Law. Let us consider This is a Case the plainest imaginable, tho' it suffers so much Debate through the Effrontery of some Men. Let us consider it relatively to that great Principle, that *Parliaments* ought to be independent of the *Crown*, in all Respects, except such as are settled by the Law and Custom of *Parliament*, and concerning which there is no Dispute. Now, this general Principle hath not only been always the same, but it hath been always so

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declared,

declared, in the most authentick and solemn Manner ; and *Parliaments* have not been more intent on any national Concern whatever, than on maintaining *this Principle*, and securing the Effects of it. I say *Parliaments* have been constantly thus intent, and especially in the best Times, during more than *three Centuries* at least ; for I would not go back too far, nor grope unnecessarily in the dark. What else did those Laws mean, that were made in the Time of the *Lancaster Kings*, to regulate the *Elections*, and to prevent the Influence, which *Richard* the 2d had illegally and arbitrarily employed, and which there was Room to fear that *other Princes* might employ ? What else do all those Resolutions, all those Declarations, all those Demonstrances, all those Acts of Parliament mean, that have been made so often, and enforced so strongly, from Time to Time, and from those Days to these, against the Influence of the *Crown*, either from the *Elections*, or on the *Members of Parliament* ? I should be ashamed to ask any more Questions of this Kind, or to descend into any Detail, in order to prove what every *Clerk of a Justice of Peace*, nay almost every *Day-Labourer* knows. But there is another Question which I must ask. If this be so, what do *those Men* mean, who are employed, or rather what does *He* mean, who employs Them, to plead in all Places, and on all Occasions, even the most solemn, in Favour of *this very Influence*, nay of the very worst Sort of it ; of *that Influence*, which is created immediately by *Corruption* ; for to That their Arguments reach by undeniable Consequences ? *Reason* is against Him and Them ; since it is a plain Absurdity to suppose a *Controul on the Crown*, (and They have not yet ventured to suppose the contrary, that I know of) and to establish at the same Time a Power to the *Crown* to render *this Controul* useless.

useless. *Experience* is against Them; since the Examples of other Countries, and at some Times (former Times I mean) of our own, have proved that a Prince may govern according to his *arbitrary Will*, or That of his more *arbitrary Minister*, as absolutely and much more securely with, than without the Concurrence of a *Parliament*. *Authority*, even the uniform Authority of our whole Legislature, is against Them. The *Voice of our Law* gives them the Lye. How then shall We account for this Proceeding; this open and desperate Attack upon our *Constitution*, and therefore upon our *Liberty*? Have these great Men made any nice Discovery, that escaped the blunt Sagacity of our Ancestors formerly, and is above the narrow Conceptions of all other Men, except Themselves, at this Time? Is it less fit that the Wisdom of this Nation hath judged it to be, for so many Ages, that Kings should govern under the *constitutional Controul* of two other *Estates*? Or is it less fit that They should govern so, for the Time to come, than it was the Time past? We shall hear, for ought I know, even in this Age, that *Kings are God's Vicegerents*; that They are, next to Him and his Son *Christ Jesus*, *supreme Moderators and Governors*. We shall hear again, perhaps, of their *hereditary*, their *divine*, their *indefeazable Right*, and the rest of that silly Cant, which was invented to make the *Usurpations of Prerogative* go down the better. But will even This alter the Case? Will This make it unworthy of them to submit to the full Controul of such a *Constitution* as God Himself approved, in the Institution of the *Jewish Senate*. *Moses* was undoubtedly *God's Vicegerent*. He was, if ever Man was so, next and immediately under God a *supreme*

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*Mode*



*Moderator and Governor.* He was \* inspired and assisted in a supernatural Manner; and yet He took the Advice of his Father-in-law *Jethro*, the Priest of *Midian*. He associated to Himself in the Government of the Common-Wealth, or He bad the People take, as He says in † another Place, or chuse, *wise Men and understanding, and known among the Tribes*, that they might be associated to Him. He found Himself unequal to the Task of governing alone, and He expostulated with God upon it. ‡ *I am not able to bear all this People alone. Have I conceived all this People? Have I begotten Them? If thou deal thus with me, kill me, I pray Thee, out of Hand.* Whether They, who deduce from hence the Institution of *Sanhedrins*, are in the Right, or They, who assign them a more modern Date, against the Opinion of the *Jewish Doctors* Themselves, whose Authority *our Doctors* receive implicitly enough in some Cases, and reject as arbitrarily in others, it matters not to enquire. Let us leave the Dispute to the Partisans of *Joseph Scaliger* and *Petavius*, of *Father Simon* and *Le Clerc*. Thus much is certain. A great *Sanhedrin* subsisted at *Jerusalem*, even at the coming of the *Messiah*, as well as *inferior Sanhedrins* in several Parts of *Palestine*; which Form of Government bore some Resemblance to our old *Saxon Constitution*; and He, who takes the Trouble of looking into Mr. § *Selden*, will find that the great *Sanhedrin* had as much Authority, and exercised as much Power, as ever *Parliaments* did, or *Wittenagemots* could claim. That God approved a Kind of *Parliamentary Establishment*, and a Division of the supreme Power between his

\* *Exod.* 18.† *Deut.* 1.‡ *Numb.* 11.§ *Seld de Synd. & Præf. Invid. vet. Eborum.*

his Vicegerent *Moses* and the *seventy Elders*, to whom He gave some of the *Spirit*, that was on *Moses*, the Quotations I refer to from holy Writ do sufficiently prove. After This, it cannot be said, I think, to derogate from the Majesty of any Prince, let us entertain as high Notions of this Majesty as We please, that He is relieved from the Burthen of governing *alone* ; that He is obliged to share the supreme Power with the *Nobility* and *Commonalty* of the Realm ; and that He is hindered from destroying, either directly or indirectly, that Independence of *these other Estates*, which can alone preserve this Division of the supreme Power, really, as well as apparently. But, perhaps, these *great and honest Men* have discovered a Necessity of putting the *Members* or a *Majority of the Members of Parliament*, under the Influence of the *Crown*, in order to preserve this very *Constitution*. Let us see therefore what Dangers this *Expedient* is fitted to prevent. Are We afraid that an *House of Commons*, unless restrained by *Places* and *Pensions*, should give up the Constitution to the *Lords*, and establish an *Aristocracy* ? This Fear would be ridiculous surely ; and He, who should argue against such a Supposition, would make Himself so. Are We afraid that an *House of Commons*, unless restrained in this Manner, should usurp more Power than belongs to Them, and establish a Kind of *Democratical Tyranny* ? But they would have in Opposition to Them a Power sufficient to defeat their Designs ; the united Power of the *Crown* and of the *House of Lords*. Formerly, indeed, They succeeded in an Attempt of this Kind ; and the *King* and the *Lords* may at any Time throw too much Power into their Scale, and set the Sense and Spirit of the People on their Side, as was done, unless both *King* and *Lords* conduct themselves so ill, that the Mischiefs to be apprehended

prehended from their Prevalency appear as great, or greater than Those, which are apprehended from the Prevalency of the *Commons*. Let it be remembered too that as the *King* and *Lords* may give too much Power and Popularity to the *Commons*, so the *Lords* and *Commons* may give too much Power to the *Crown*. The Difference will lye only here; that the *King* and *Lords* will never do the first designedly; whereas there is a Possibility that the *Lords* and *Commons* may be induced, in some Age less virtuous than the present, by *Places*, *Pensions*, and other *Gratifications*, bestowed on a Majority of those *Assemblies*, to do the last designedly. What now remains to be urged, in Favour of this *Expedient*? From what Dangers are We to be protected by it? Shall We be told that *Parliaments* will not pursue the national Interest, unless their Members are bought into it by the *Crown*? Something like This hath been advanced, I have heard, and nothing more impudent, nor more silly could be advanced. A *Court*, that is truly in the Interest of the Nation, will have, a Concurrence of *Parliament*, as it would be easy, if it was needful, to shew. Time and Trouble, indeed, may be sometimes required to lead *independent Men*, who judge for Themselves, and comply because They are convinced; whereas neither one nor the other are wanting to determine such as hold to a Court by a *corrupt Dependency* on it; for They are soon disciplined and ready to perform the whole Exercise of *Parliamentary Mercenaries* at the Beat of a Drum. Some Inconveniencies may likewise arise, ( for That, which I have just mentioned, does not deserve the Name ) from the *Independency of Parliaments*. *Ministers*, for Instance, may be called to Account by the Passion, by the Prejudice, if you will, of such *Assemblies*, oftener perhaps than They deserve to be ;

be; or their Errors may be censured, or their Faults be punished, in a greater Degree, and with more Rigour, not only than true *political Justice* requires, which should always be tempered with *Mercy*, but even than *strict Justice* exacts. But as one of These is a Fault, if it be a Fault, on the best Side, and as the other will certainly happen very seldom, it does not seem reasonable that a Door should be opened to *Corruption* and *Dependency*, in order to prevent them. Nay farther, this Vigilance, and this Severity of *Parliaments*, which We here suppose, will not fail to have some very good Effects, that are more than sufficient to ballance the supposed ill Effects. Among the rest, they may render the Rash, who are in Power, more cautious, and the Bold more modest. They may render Fools less fond of Power, and awe even Knaves into Honesty. It were better surely that able and good Men should now and then suffer, (nay the good Man, who suffered would be Himself of this Opinion) that the Adulation and Servility of *Parliaments*, which are the necessary Consequences of *Corruption* and *Dependency*, should ever contribute to make the *Court* become, in any future Age, a Sanctuary for *Pickpockets*, and an Hospital for *Changelings*.

I am SIR, &c.

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## LETTER XVII.

SIR,

THE great Alteration We have spoken of, in *Property*, and *Power*, brought our *Constitution*, by slow Degrees, and through many Struggles and Dangers,



Dangers, so near the most [perfect] Idea of a *free System of Government*, that nothing would be now wanting to compleat it, if effectual Means were found of securing the Independency of Parliament against *Corruption*, as well as it is secured against *Prerogative*. Our *Kings* have lost little of the gaudy Plumage of the Crown. Some of their superfluous Power, indeed, hath been bought, and more hath been wrested from Them Notwithstanding which, it is a very demonstrable Truth, that the *Crown* must sit lighter, and more secure, on the Head of a *wise Prince*; ( and no Constitution provides for, though every Constitution should provide against, a *weak Prince*) since the great Change of *Property* and *Power*, in Favour of the *Commons*, than ever it did before. Our *Kings* are no longer exposed, as some of the greatest of Them have been, to the Insults of *turbulent, ambitious Lords*, or *haughty Prelates*. It is no longer in the Power of a *few factious Noblemen* to draw Armies into the Field, and oblige their *Prince* to fight for his Crown, to fight to gain it, and to fight to keep it; as *Edward* the 4th did, I think, in nine pitched Battles. To make the *Prince* uneasy, or insecure, as We are now constituted, the *whole Body of the People* must be uneasy under his Government. A *popular King of Great Britain* will be always not only easy and secure, but in Effect absolute. He will be, what the *British Constitution* alone can make any *Prince*, the *absolute Monarch of a free People*; and this *Popularity* is so easily acquired, a *King* gains the publick Confidence and Affection at so cheap a Rate, that He must be poor indeed in all the *Kingly Virtues*, who does not purchase them, and establish *true Popularity* upon them.

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If the Condition of our *Kings* is mended in many Respects, and made worse in none, That of the *Nation* is mended in every Respect, by the great Improvements of our *Constitution*; which are due principally to the *Change* I have mentioned, as the Advances we have made in *Trade*, and in *national Wealth and Power*, are due principally to these Improvements. It is by *These*, that the Subjects of *Great Britain* enjoy hitherto such a Freedom of their *Persons*, and such a Security of their *Property*, as no other People can boast. Hence that great Encouragement of *Industry*; hence that broad and solid Foundation of *Credit*, which must always continue, unless the Weight of *Taxes*, and the Oppression of *Tax-Gatherers* make it worth no Man's while to be industrious any longer, and unless *national Credit* be reduced, by Length of Time, and private Management, to rest no longer on its *natural and original Foundation*, but on the feeble Props of *yearly Expedients*, and *daily Tricks*; by which a *System*, that ought to be the *plainest and fairest imaginable*, will become of Course a *dark, intricate, and wicked Mystery* of STOCKJOBING.

But the great Advantage We are to insist upon here, which hath arisen to the *whole Nation* from the Alteration in the State of *Property and Power*, is This; that We have been brought by it to the true Poise of a *mix'd Government*, constituted like ours on the *three simple Forms*. The *Democratical Power* is no longer kept under the same *Dependencies*; and if an *House of Commons* should now fail to assert that *independent Share in the supreme, legislative Power*, which the *Constitution* assigns to this *Assembly*, it could not proceed, as it might and sometimes did formerly, from the Nature of *Tenures*, and many other unavoidable Restraints; it could proceed alone from the *Corruption of particular Men*,  
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who threw Themselves into a *voluntary Dependency*. The *Democratical Power* of our Constitution is not sufficient to over-top the *Monarchical* and *Aristocratical*; but it is sufficient to counter-work and balance any *other Power* by its own Strength, and without the fatal Necessity of favouring the Ambition of the *Crown* against the *Lords*, or That of the *Lords* against the *Crown*. Nay more, as our Government is now constituted, the *three Estates* have not only one common Interest, which They always had; but They have, considered as *Estates*, no separate, contradictory Interest. Our *Constitution* gives so much Grandeur, so much Authority and Power to the *Crown*, and our *Parliaments* give so immense a Revenue, that no *Prince* hath any real Interest to desire more, who looks on Himself as the *supreme Magistrate of a free People*; for if We suppose inordinate Ambition, or Avarice, to make Part of his Character, these Passions are insatiable; but then for this very Reason, because they are so, there ought to be no Account held of them; and though a *Prince* may measure his *Demands*, a *People*, who are in their Senses, will never measure their *Concessions* by them.

The Property of the *Commons* is not only become far superior to that of the *Lords* upon the whole, but in the Detail there are few, very few Instances to be produced of greater Shares of private Property amongst the *latter*, than amongst the *former*; and as the Property of the *Commons* is greater, so it is equally *free*. There are no Badges of Servitude on *one Side*; no Pretence of any Superiority, except Those of *Title* and *Rank*, on the *other*. The *Peers* are, in some Points, (I speak it with all the Respect due to Them) *Commoners with Coronets on their Coats of Arms*; and affecting to act as such, it is plain They desire very wisely to be taken for such,

such, on many Occasions. The Interests of *these two Estates* then, with regard to *Property*, are the same ; and *their particular Rights and Privileges* are now so well ascertained, and so distinguished, that as the Proximity of their Interests of *one Sort* should always unite Them, so the Distance of Those of *another Sort* cannot easily make Them clash. In short, *these two Orders*, according to the *present Constitution*, (and how different is it from that of *Rome*, or, in the last Respect, even from that of *Spain*, not to mention That of *France*?) have no Temptation, and scarce the Means, of invading *each other* ; so that They may the better, and the more effectually, employ their Vigilance, and unite their Efforts, whenever it shall be necessary, against the Encroachments of the *Crown*, from whose Shackles they have both emancipated Themselves, whether the Attempts to impose these Shackles again are carried on by *Prerogative*, or by the more formidable Enemy of Liberty, *Corruption*.

It had been observed already that although the *Crown* hath the sole Power of creating *Peers*, yet the Independency of the *Peerage* on the *Crown* is secured by This, that their Rights and Privileges cannot be taken from Them, at the Will of the *Crown*. Could the *Crown* unmake, as well as make *Peers*, it would be virtually, and in Effect, but *two* ; and therefore our *Constitution* hath provided against it. But the *Commons of Great Britain* can make, and, at proper Seasons, and in a proper Manner, unmake their *Representatives* ; by which Means many Inconveniencies and Mischiefs are avoided, and many wise and just Ends obtained. The *Peers of the Realm* can, the *Commons* cannot, assemble in their *collective Body*, without exceeding those Numbers, amongst whom the Quiet, Order, Decency and Solemnity of a *Senate* may be preserved.



served. The *Peers* therefore sit in Parliament in their *collective*, the *Commons* in their *representative Body*. The *Peers* have an inherent, the *Commons* a delegated Right. The *Peers* are therefore accountable for their Conduct, as all other Men are, to *God*, to their own *Consciences*, to the Tribunal of *publick Fame*, and to no other. But the *Commons* are accountable to *another Tribunal*, as well as to *these*, to That of their *Constituents*, before which They must frequently appear, according to the true Intent of our *Constitution*, to have a Censure, or Approbation, passed on their Conduct, by the Refusal, or Grant of *new Powers* to the particular Members. Thus the *collective Body of the People of Great Britain* delegate, but do not give up, trust, but do not alienate their Right and their Power, and cannot be undone, by having *Beggary*, or *Slavery* brought upon them, unless They co-operate to their own Undoing, and, in one Word, betray Themselves.

We cannot therefore subscribe to those two Sayings of my Lord *Bacon*, which are quoted to this Effect; 'that *England* can never be undone, unless by *Parliaments*; and that there is nothing, which a *Parliament* cannot do.' *Great Britain*, according to our *present Constitution*, cannot be undone by *Parliaments*; for there is something which a *Parliament* cannot do. A *Parliament* cannot annul the *Constitution*; and whilst That is preserved, though our Condition may be bad, it cannot be irretrievably so. The *Legislative* is a *supreme*, and may be called, in one Sense, an *absolute*, but in none an *arbitrary Power*, \* 'It is limited to the *publick Good of the Society*. It is a Power, that hath

\* *Lock's Essay on civil Government*, Chap. xi. Of the Extent of the Legislative Power.

hath no End but *Preservation*, and therefore can never have a Right to *destroy*, *enslave*, or designedly to *impoverish* the Subjects; for the Obligations of the *Law of Nature* cease not in Society, &c.—If you therefore put so extravagant a Case, as to suppose the *two Houses of Parliament* concurring to make at once a formal Concession of their own *Rights* and *Privileges*, and of Those of the *whole Nation* to the *Crown*, and ask who hath the *Right*, and the *Means*, to resist the *supreme legislative Power*; I answer, the *whole Nation* hath the *Right*, and a *People* who deserve to enjoy *Liberty*, will find the *Means*. An Attempt of this Kind would break the Bargain between the *King* and the *Nation*, between the *representative* and *collective Body of the People*, and would dissolve the *Constitution*. From hence it follows that the *Nation*, which hath a Right to preserve *this Constitution*, hath a Right to resist an *Attempt*, that leaves no other Means of preserving it but Those of *Resistance*. From hence it follows that if the *Constitution* was actually dissolved, as it would be by such an Attempt of the *three Estates*, the *People* would return to their original, their natural Right of imposing a *Constitution* upon Them; and less than any *that King, those Lords, and those Commons*, who, having been intrusted to preserve, had destroyed the *former*.—But to suppose a Case more within the Bounds of Possibility, though one would be tempted to think it as little within Those of Probability; let us suppose our *Parliaments*, in some future Generation, to grow so *corrupt*, and the *Crown* so *rich*, that a *pecuniary Influence* constantly prevailing over the *Majority*, They should assemble for little else than to establish *Grievances*, instead of redressing them; to approve the *Measures of the Court*, without Information; to engage their Country in *Alliances*, in *Treaties*, in *Wars*, without

out *Examination*; and to give *Money* without *Account*, and almost without *Stint*. The Case would be deplorable. Our *Constitution* it self would become our *Grievance*, whilst this *Corruption* prevailed; and if it prevailed long, our *Constitution* could not last long; because this slow Progress would lead to the Destruction of it as surely as the more concise Method of giving it up at once. But, in this Case, the *Constitution* would help itself, and effectually too, unless the *whole Mass of the People* was tainted, and the *Electors* were become no honestier than the *Elect-ed*. Much Time would be required to beggar and enslave the Nation in this Manner. It could scarce be the Work of *one Parliament*, though *Parliaments* should continue to be *septennial*. It could not be the Work of a *triennial Parliament* most certainly; and the People of *Great Britain* would have none to blame but Themselves; because, as the *Constitution* is a sure Rule of Action to *Those*, whom They chuse to act for Them, so it is likewise a sure Rule of Judgment to Them in the Choice of their *Trustees*, and particularly of such as have *represented Them already*. In short, nothing can destroy the *Constitution of Britain*, but the *People of Britain*; and whenever the *People of Britain* become so degenerate and base, as to be induced by *Corruption* (for they are no longer in Danger of being awed by *Prerogative*) to chuse *Persons* to represent Them in Parliament, whom They have found by Experience to be under an Influence, arising from *private Interests*, *Dependents on a Court*, and the *Creatures of a Minister*; or others, who are unknown to the *People* that elect Them, and bring no Recommendation but That which They carry in their *Purses*; then may the *Enemies of our Constitution* boast that They have got the better of it, and that it is no longer able to preserve itself, nor to defend *Liberty*. Then will that trite, proverbial

proverbial Speech be verified in our Case, *that the Corruptions of the best Things are the worst* ; for then will that very Change in the State of *Property* and *Power*, which improved our *Constitution* so much, contribute to the Destruction of it ; and We may even wish for those little Tyrants, the *great Lords* and the *great Prelates* again, to oppose the Encroachments of the *Crown*. How preferable will Subjection to *those powerful Landlords*, (whom the *Commonalty* were accustomed to serve ; and by whom, if They suffered on one Hand, They had considerable Advantages on the other) how preferable, indeed, will this Subjection appear to Them, when They shall see the whole Nation oppressed by a *few Upstarts in Power* ; often by the *meanest*, always by the *worst of their Fellow Subjects* ; by *Men*, who owe their Elevation and Riches neither to *Merit* nor *Birth*, but to the Favour of *weak Princes*, and to the *Spoils of their Country*, beggared by their Rapine. Then will the Fate of *Rome* be renewed, in some Sort, in *Britain*. The Grandeur of *Rome* was the Work of many Centuries, the Effect of much Wisdom, and the Price of much Blood. She maintained her Grandeur, whilst she preserved her *Virtue* ; but when *Luxury* grew up to favour *Corruption*, and *Corruption* to nourish *Luxury* ; then *Rome* grew venal ; the Election of her *Magistrates*, the Sentences of her *Judges*, the Decrees of her *Senate*, all was sold ; for her *Liberty* was sold, when *Those* were sold ; and her *Riches*, her *Power*, her *Glory*, could not long survive her *Liberty*. She, who had been the Envy, as well as the Mistress of Nations, fell to be an Object of their Scorn, or their Pity. They had seen and felt that she governed other People by *Will*, and her own by *Law*. They beheld Her governed Herself by *Will* ; by the *arbitrary Will* of the worst of her own Citizens, of the worst of both Sexes, of the



the worst of Humankind ; by *Caligula*, by *Claudius*, by *Nero*, by *Agrippina*, by *Poppæa*, by *Narcissus*, by *Calistus*, by *Pallas* ; by *Princes* that were stupid, or mad ; by *Women*, that were abandoned to Ambition and to Lust ; by *Ministers* that were emancipated Slaves, Parasites and Pandars, insolent and rapacious. In this miserable State, the Few, that retained some Sparks of the old *Roman Spirit*, had double Cause to mourn in Private ; for it was not safe even to *mourn* in publick. They mourned the Loss of the Liberty and Grandeur of *Rome* ; and They mourned that both should be sacrificed to *Wretches*, whose *Crimes* would have been punished, and whose *Talents* would scarce have recommended Them to the *meanest Offices*, in the virtuous and prosperous Ages of the Commonwealth. Into such a State, (the Difference of Times, and of other Circumstances considered) at least, into a State as miserable as This, will the People of *Britain* both fall, and deserve to fall, if They suffer, under any Pretence, or by any Hands, *that Constitution* to be destroyed, which cannot be destroyed, unless They suffer it ; unless They co-operate with the *Enemies of it*, by renewing an exploded Distinction of *Parties* ; by electing *Those* to represent Them, who are hired to betray Them ; or by submitting tamely, when the *Mask* is taken off, or falls off, and the Attempt to bring *Beggary* and *Slavery* is avowed, or can be no longer concealed. If ever This happens, the *Friends of Liberty*, should any such remain, will have one Option still left ; and They will rather chuse, no Doubt, to die the *last of British Freeman*, than bear to live *first of British Slaves*.

I am, SIR, Yours, &c.

L E T.

## LETTER XVIII.

S I R,

**I**F We had propos'd nothing more to ourselves in writing *this Dissertation on Parties* than the Entertainment, such as it is, of our Readers, and our own Amusement, We should not have dwelt, perhaps, so much on the Nature of the *British Constitution*, nor have recur'd so often to assert the *necessary Independency of Parliaments on the Crown*. But we had another Motive, which We are neither afraid, nor ashamed to avow. This *necessary Independency of Parliaments*, in which the Essence of our *Constitution*, and, by Consequence, of our *Liberty* consists, seems to be in great, not to say, in imminent Danger of being lost. They, who are alarmed at every Thing, that is said in Favour of our *Constitution*, and of *British Liberty*, and who are prejudic'd against every Man, who writes or speaks in Defence of them, may take, or affect to take, and try to give, Offence at this Expression. But We desire to be understood, as We have explained our Meaning upon some former Occasion. We understand our *Constitution to be in Danger*, not only when it is *attacked*, but as soon as a *Breach* is made, by which it may be *attacked*; and We understand *this Danger* to be greater, or less, in Proportion to the *Breach*, that is made, and without any Regard to the Probability, or Improbability of an *Attack*. This Explanation of our Meaning is the better founded, because the Nation hath an undoubted Right to preserve the *Constitution* not only inviolate, but secure from Violations, should *Corruption* prevail among the *Members*, which We trust will never happen, as notoriously as it doth in the *Elections*

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tions of Parliament. We all know how much the Magnanimity of our *present King* would scorn to take so mean an Advantage over the Nation ; how much, on the contrary, his heroical Spirit would prompt Him to maintain the Liberty even of a *degenerate People*, who might deserve no longer the Enjoyment of so invaluable a Blessing, but who could never deserve to have it taken from Them by a *Prince of that Family*, which was raised by Them to the Throne, for no other Reason but to preserve it. All This We know ; and the Nation may have, no Doubt, the same Confidence in every *future King, of the same illustrious and Royal House*. But This will not alter the Case ; nor make That, which I call *Danger*, cease to be such. Should *Angels and Arch-Angels* come down from Heaven to govern us, the *same Danger* would exist until the *Springs*, from whence it arises, were cut off ; not because some *Angels and Arch-Angels* have fallen, and from being the *Guardians*, have become the *Templers and Tormentors of Mankind*, and others therefore may fall ; but because as *private Liberty* cannot be deemed secure under a Government, wherein *Law*, the proper and sole Security of it, is dependant on *Will* ; so *publick Liberty* must be in Danger, whenever a *free Constitution*, the proper and sole Security of it, is dependent on *Will* ; and a *free Constitution* like ours is dependent on *Will*, whenever the *Will of one Estate* can direct the Conduct of *all Three*.

Having thus explained what I mean by *Danger*, and taken away all Colour for Cavil, it remains that I prove *this Danger* to be real, and not the Phantom of a crazy Imagination, or a prejudiced Mind. This shall be done therefore as shortly as I am able, and by an undeniable Deduction of Facts.

He,

He, who undertakes to govern a free People by *Corruption*, and to lead Them by a *false Interest*, against their *true Interest*, cannot boast the Honour of the Invention. The Expedient is as old as the World, and He can pretend to no other Honour than That of being an humble Imitator of the *Devil*. To corrupt our *Parliaments* hath been often attempted, as well as to *divide our People*, in Favour of *Prerogative*, and in order to let the arbitrary Will of our *Princes* loose from the Restraints of *Law*. We observed this, in speaking of the Reign of *Charles the Second*; but the Efforts then made were ineffectual. The frugal Habits of the former Age were not intirely lost in That; and This, I presume, may be reckoned as one Cause of the noble Stands, that were then made by our *Parliaments*, in Opposition to the *Court*. But not to ascribe more Honour than is due, perhaps, to our Fathers, the *Revenue of the Crown* was at that Time so small, (I speak comparatively; for, in every other Respect, it was very ample) and the Profusion of that *Prince* on his Pleasures was so great, that no Minister of King *Charles the Second* could find Sums sufficient to buy a *Parliament*. He stood therefore on his *Prerogative*, strained it as far as He durst, and made all the Use of it he could. The *Revenue of the Crown* was greatly increased in the Reign of King *James the Second*, and was given most unwisely for *Life*. I say *most unwisely*; for as a *Prince*, who hath an Heart and Head to govern well, cannot stand in Need of *such a Grant*; so a *Prince*, who hath neither, does not deserve it; and therefore whatever the Generosity of our Countrymen to their *Princes* may carry Them to do at any Time, They might leave This undone at all Times, without any Reflection on their Prudence, or even their Generosity. The Reign of King *James* was short; and,



during this short Reign, He rested on that *Prerogative*, which He knew was a cheaper Expedient than *Corruption*, and which He vainly flattered Himself was enough confirmed to support the Measures He took, for subverting the Religion, the Laws, and the Liberty of *Britain*. Thus were Men brought, by the Conduct of *these two Princes*, to fix their Eyes on *Prerogative*, as the sole Instrument of Tyranny, and to forget that *Corruption* had been employed, though unsuccessfully, by King *Charles*, and might have been employed with greater Force, and perhaps more Success, by King *James*. The Cry of the Nation was for a *free Parliament*, and no Man seemed to doubt, in that Ferment, but that a *Parliament must be free*, when the *Influence*, which the *Crown* had usurped, in the precedent Reigns, over the *Elections*, was removed, as it was by the *Revolution*. But this general Inadvertency, as well as the particular Neglect of Those, who took the Lead in national Affairs at That Time, is the more surprizing, because *Corruption* having been so lately employed, among other Means, to render *Parliaments dependent on the Crown*, the Danger of *Corruption* was by Consequence one of those Dangers, against which the Nation had a Right to be secured, as well as a Promise of being so, according to the Terms of the *Prince of Orange's Declaration*. Those Persons especially, who had exclaimed so loudly against *Placemen* and *Pensioners* in the Reign of King *Charles*, and who complained at this Instant so bitterly of the *undue Influence*, that had been employed, in small Boroughs chiefly, to promote the *Elections of the Parliament*, which fate in the Reign of King *James*, ought to have been attentive, one would think, to take the glorious Opportunity, that was furnished Them by a *new Settlement of the Crown*, and of the *Constitution*, to secure the Inde-

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pendency of Parliaments effectually for the future. *Machiavel* observes, and makes it the Title of one of his Discourses, *that a free Government, in order to maintain itself free, hath Need every Day of some new Provisions, in Favour of Liberty.* The Truth of this Observation, and the Reasons that support it, are obvious. But as every Day may not furnish Opportunities of making some of those *new and necessary Provisions*, no Day, that does furnish the Opportunity, ought to be neglected. The *Romans* had been so liberal in bestowing the Right of Citizens on *Strangers*, that the Power of their *Elections* began to fall into such Hands as the *Constitution* had not intended to trust with them. *Quintus Fabius* saw the growing Evil; and, being *Censor*, He took the Opportunity; confined all these *new Electors* into four Tribes; put it out of their Power to turn the *Elections*, as They had done, whilst their Numbers were divided among all the Tribes; freed his Country from this Danger; restored the *Constitution*, according to the true Intent and Meaning of it; and obtained, by universal Suffrage, the Title of *Maximus*. If a Spirit like This had prevailed among us, at the Time We speak of, something like This would have been done; and surely something like it ought to have been done; for the *Revolution* was, in many Instances, and it ought to have been so in all, one of those *Renewals of our Constitution*, that We have often mentioned. If it had been such, with Respect to the *Elections of Members to serve in Parliament*, these Elections might have been drawn back to the *antient Principle*, on which they had been established; and the Rule of *Property*, which was followed antiently, and was perverted by innumerable Changes, that Length of Time produced, might have been restored; by which the *Communities*, to whom the *Right of electing* was trust-

ed, as well as the Qualifications of the *Electors* and the *Elected*, might have been settled in Proportion to the present State of Things. Such a Remedy might have wrought a radical Cure of the *Evil*, that threatens our *Constitution*; whereas it is much to be apprehended, even from Experience, that all others are merely *Palliative*; and yet the *Palliative* must be employed, no Doubt, till the *Specifick* can be procured.

But nothing of this Kind was done at the *Revolution*. Pleased that the *open Attacks on our Constitution* were defeated and prevented, Men entertained no Thought of the *secret Attacks*, that might be carried on against the *Independency of Parliaments*; as if our Dangers could be but of *one Kind*, and could arise but from *one Family*. Soon after the *Revolution*, indeed, Men of all Sides, and of all Denominations, (for it was not a *Party Cause*, though it was endeavoured to be made such) began to perceive not only that nothing effectual had been done to hinder the *undue Influence of the Crown in Elections*, and an *Over-Ballance of the Creatures of the Court in Parliament*, but that the Means of exercising *such an Influence*, at the Will of the *Crown*, were unawares and insensibly increased, and every Day increasing. In a Word, They began to see that the Foundations were laid of giving as great Power to the *Crown* indirectly, as the *Prerogative* They had formerly dreaded so much could give directly, and of establishing *universal Corruption*. The *first* hath happened, and We pray that the *last* never may.

The *Net Revenue of the Crown*, at the Abdication of King *James*, amounted to somewhat more than *two Millions*, without any Tax on *Land*, or *Malt*, and without a Multitude of *grievous Impositions* and *Excises*, that have been since heaped on the Nation. It is plain, and it was so then, that *this Revenue* might

might have been so increased, as to answer annually the great annual Expences, in which We engaged soon afterwards. In this Case, the People would not have had a greater, nay nor so great a Burthen to bear, as they had in the Course of the *two Wars*, that followed; and, at the End of *these Wars*, they would have found themselves with little or no Load upon them, instead of crouching under a Debt of *fifty Millions*. That *this Method* was not taken, furnishes Matter of very melancholy Reflection to the present, and will do so to future Generations. But these Reflections are no Part of my Subject. How it came to pass that a Method so practicable, and so eligible, was not taken, (whether this was owing to *private Interest*, to *Party-Cunning* of different and opposite Kinds, or to an unhappy Refinement in Politicks that contracting *national Debts*, under a *new Establishment*, was an effectual Expedient to attach Men to *this Establishment*) I shall not presume to say. All *three* might have their Share, perhaps, in determining for *another Measure*. At least, it is a Point, on which the Men of that Time have spoken with much Prejudice, and little Candour. But however that might be, certain it is that We began to borrow at high Interest, to anticipate, and mortgage, immediately after the *Revolution*; and having once begun, there was no Remedy; We were forced to proceed in the same Manner through the Course of *two mighty Wars*. Formerly, the whole Expence of the State was borne by the *Crown*; and when this Expence grew, upon extraordinary Occasions, too great for the *Revenue of the Crown* to bear, the People aided the *Crown*, if they approved the Occasions of the Expence. These Grants were properly *Aids*, no more; for the *Revenue of the Crown* was engaged in the first Place, and therefore it might seem reasonable that



the *Crown* should have the Levying and Management of the *whole* ; of *these Aids*, as well as of the *standing Revenue*. But it happened in this Case, as it does in many ; the *Reason of the Thing* ceased, and the *Thing* continued. A *separate, private Revenue*, or a *Civil List*, as We commonly call it, was assigned to the *Crown*. From that Time, the former Order hath been reversed. Our *Kings*, instead of contributing most, have contributed nothing to the publick Charge ; and the People of *Britain*, instead of giving occasionally *Aids* to the *Crown*, have taken upon themselves the whole Load of *ordinary and extraordinary Expences*, for which they annually provide. Notwithstanding this vast Alteration in the State of the *Revenue*, and the Interest of the *King* and the *People*, in the Management of it, the same Forms of granting *Aids to the Crown*, and of levying *Taxes*, and of managing the *publick Treasure*, have been continued ; so that the *People* stand obliged (for the *Crown*, that is trusted with the whole, is bound for nothing) to make good all *Deficiencies*, though they have no Share in the Management of the *Revenue*. Our *Kings*, since the Establishment of the *Civil List*, have not only a *private and separate Estate*, but receive a Kind of *Rent-Charge* out of the *publick Estate*, to maintain their *Honour and Dignity*, nothing else ; and whether the *publick Estate* thrive, or not, *this Rent-Charge* must be made good to Them ; at least, as it hath been settled on *our present most gracious Monarch*, if the Funds appropriated produce the double of that immense Revenue of Eight hundred Thousand Pounds a Year, which hath been so liberally given Him for Life, the whole is his, without Account ; but if they fail in any Degree to produce it, the *intire, national Fund* is engaged to make up the Difference. But although our *Kings* have thus no longer an immediate Interest

est in the *publick Estate*, They are trusted with the intire Management of it. They are not only *Stewards for the Publick*, but They condescend to be such for all those *private Persons*, who are the *Creditors of the Publick*, and have the additional Trouble of managing about *three Millions a Year*, on this Head.

Now this *new Settlement*, which appears absurd in Speculation, how wise soever it may have been thought contrived for Practice, hath had this evident and inevitable Consequence. As We have annually increased our *Funds*, and our *Taxes*, We have annually increased the *Power of the Crown*; and those *Funds* and *Taxes* being established and laid for *Perpetuity*, or for Terms equivalent to *Perpetuity*, in the Sense here intended, this *Increase of Power* must not only continue, but still increase, as long as this *System of Oeconomy* subsists. How this *Increase of Power* arises from the *Increase of Funds* and *Taxes*, and the *Influence of the Crown* grows, in Proportion to the *Burthen on the People*, heavier, hath been explained so much in the Debates on a late, *detestable Occasion*, that the less needs to be said on the Subject here. If We consider in the *Increase of Taxes* nothing more than the *Increase of Officers* first, by which a vast Number of *new Dependents on the Crown* are created in every Part of the Kingdom; (*Dependents* as numerous, and certainly more prevalent than all the *Tenants* and *Wards of the Crown* were antiently;) and secondly the Powers given to the *Treasury* and other *inferior Officers*, on Account of these *Taxes*, which are at least as great and as grievous, in this *free Government of ours*, as any that are exercised in the most *arbitrary Government*, on the same Occasions; if We consider This alone, We shall find Reason sufficient to conclude, that although the *Power of Prerogative* was more open,

and more noisy in its Operations ; yet the *Power thus acquired* is more real, and may prove more dangerous for this very Reason, because it is more covered, and more silent. That Men began to see, very soon after the *Revolution*, the Danger arising from hence to our *Constitution*, as I said above, is most certain. No less than *seven Acts* were made, in King *William's* Reign, to prevent *undue Influence on Elections* ; and one of the *Acts*, as I remember, for I have it not before me, is grounded on this Fact, \* *that the Officers of the Excise had frequently, by Threats, and Promises, prevailed on Electors, and absolutely debarred Them of the Freedom of voting.* What hath been done, or attempted to be done, since that Time, in the same View, and what hath been done, or attempted to be done, both in the Reign of King *William* and since, to prevent an *undue Influence on the Elected*, as well as on the *Electors*, I need not recapitulate. They are Matters of fresh Date, and enough known. Upon the whole, this Change in the State and property of the *publick Revenue* hath made a Change in our *Constitution*, not yet perhaps attended to sufficiently, but such an one however as deserves our utmost Attention ; since it gives a *Power*, unknown in former Times, to *one of the three Estates* ; and since *publick Liberty* is not guarded against the Dangers, that may arise from *this Power*, as it was, and as it is now more than ever, against the Dangers, that used to arise from the *Powers* formerly possessed, or claimed by the *Crown*. Formerly, *Prerogative* was kept in Sight, and Provisions were made against the Effects and Encroachments of it, as often as Occasion required, and Opportunity offered. They, who called Them-

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\* *Tertio Gul. & Mar.*

selves *Friends to the Government*, in those Days, opposed these Provisions. They, who were *Friends to the Constitution*, promoted them. That the same Thing should happen again, in a similar Case, We must expect. But as the *Friends of the Constitution*, in Times past, were not deterred, tempted, nor wearied, whilst They defended it against Dangers of *one Kind*, and by their honest Perseverance delivered it down, not only safe, but more improved, to Posterity; let us flatter ourselves with this agreeable Hope, that the *Friends of the Constitution*, at this Time, and in all Times to come, will be neither deterred, tempted, nor wearied in the same generous Cause, in watching and guarding it against Dangers of *another Kind*; and that They will deliver it down, in like Manner, to future Generations. Sure I am there are Reasons, and Those of no small Moment, why They should be more watchful, more upon their Guard, more bold, and more incessant in their Endeavours, if possible, even than the *Assertors of British Liberty* were formerly; and the Enumeration of some of these Reasons is an Article not to be omitted on this Occasion.

I am, SIR, &c.

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## LETTER XIX.

SIR,

**A**S the Means then of influencing by *Prerogative*, and of governing by *Force*, were considered to be increased formerly, upon every Increase of Power to the Crown, so are the Means of influencing by *Money*, and of governing by *Corruption*,



to be considered as increased now, upon that Increase of Power, which hath accrued to the Crown by the *new Constitution of the Revenue*, since the *Revolution*. Nay farther. Not only the Means of corrupting are increased, on the Part of the *Crown*, but the Facility of employing these Means with Success is increased, on the Part of the *People*, on the Part of the *Electors*, and of the *Elected*. Nay, farther still. These Means, and this Facility are not only increased, but the Power of the *Crown* to corrupt, as I have hinted already, and the Prone-ness of the *People* to be corrupted, must continue to increase on the same Principles, unless a Stop be put to the growing Wealth and Power of *one*, and the growing *Depravity* of the *other*. We are, to be sure, in no Danger from any Advantage his Majesty will take of this Situation; but if Advantage be not taken, in Favour of our *Constitution*, of the present most happy Reign, of the mild and beneficent Temper of our heroical Monarch, of the generous Principle, instilled by Nature, and improved by Philosophy, of his Royal Consort; it may be supposed, (for We speak hypothetically all along, as the Reader will please to remember, even where the Precaution is not used) it may be supposed, I say, that *pretended Friends to the Government*, and *real Enemies to this Constitution*, no Matter whether They are such by *Principle*, or become such by their *Crimes*, will get into superior Power, in some future Time, and under some weak or wicked Prince; and whenever This happens, the Subversion of our *Constitution*, and of our *Liberty*, by Consequence, will be the most easy Enterprize imaginable; because nothing can be more easy than the Creation of an *anti-constitutional Dependency of the two Houses of Parliament on the Crown* will be in that Case; and because *such a Dependency of the*

*two Houses* is as real a Subversion of our Constitution as an *absolute Abolishment of Parliaments* would be.

The first of those Means of *Corruption*, that have grown up, or been increased, since the *Revolution*, which I shall mention, is the Establishment of the *Civil List*; not so much on Account of the Manner, in which it was originally given, as on Account of That, in which it hath been since given, and of the vast Augmentations, that have been made to it; Augmentations, that may be doubled, or trebled, in Times to come, upon the same Motives, under the same and other Pretences, in short, just as speciously as they have been made. The Revenue of King *James* the Second, as it stood at his Abdication, hath been mentioned; and it would not be hard to shew, by indisputable Computations, that They, who apprehended He might be able to govern without *Parliaments*, or to buy *Parliaments*, if He wanted their Assistance, had good Reason for such Apprehensions, notwithstanding the Expence He was at, over and above all the *ordinary Charges of the Government*, in maintaining against Law a great standing Army of *sixteen, or eighteen thousand Men*. But to go back to the Reign of King *Charles* the Second, whose Revenue was much less. The Patriots of that Age, even when this Revenue was computed at no more than 1,200,000 *l.* a Year, took great Alarm at the *pecuniary Influence* it might create, and looked upon it, and spoke of it, as a *Fund for Corruption*. Now, if this Revenue could afford a *Fund for Corruption*, when, besides maintaining the Honour and Dignity of the *Crown*, it was to defray all the other Expences of the *State*, and among the rest Those of a *small Army*, and a *great Fleet*; what would the *same Patriots* think of a Revenue of 800,000 *l.* or a *Million* a Year, applicable to the particular Expences of the *Crown*  
alone,

*alone*, and not one Farthing of which sacred Treasure was ever diverted to any *national Use* ? They would have the same just Confidence, no Doubt, as We have, in his present Majesty ; but They would say, as We do, that so *immense a private, or separate Revenue*, may become hereafter an *inexhaustible Fund of Corruption* ; and therefore that the *Independency of Parliaments* is, and must be in real Danger, till some Remedies, as effectual against the *pecuniary Influence*, as have been found against the *Prerogative of the Crown*, are provided. They would shew that a small Sum, in Aid of *Places*, and *Pensions*, of *Fears and Expectations*, might serve for the ordinary Charge of *annual Corruption* ; and that a small Saving reserved every Year might produce, at the End of Seven, a Fund sufficient for the extraordinary Charge of *septennial and national Corruption*.

But again. If We suppose the *Civil List* to become an insufficient Fund for these Purposes, by the Profusion of some future King ; (and nothing less than the most extravagant Profusion can make it so ; ) or if We suppose that some future King may join to so many ill Qualities, as leave Him no Means of governing but by *Corruption*, a sordid Avarice, that renders Him unable to open his Coffers even for this Use ; yet will a very little iniquitous Cunning suffice to create *Funds for Corruption*, that may come in Aid of the *Civil List*. It is natural for Men to be less frugal, when others are to pay for their Want of Frugality. Our *Kings* therefore may become more apt to take, and our *Ministers* to advise such Engagements, as plunge the Nation at every Turn into vast Expence ; since the Load, which fell, in a Part at least, on the *Crown* formerly, falls intire on the *People* now. But besides this general

general Reason to promote a Want of Frugality, there may arise particular Reasons of more positive, and more pernicious Effects. A *weak Administration*, for Instance, may pretend *publick Necessity*, when *private Inability* alone hath formed the Conjunction ; and frequent and extravagant Supplies may be asked and obtained, to do, or to undo, by the Weight of *Money*, what might have been attained, or prevented, by a *little Foresight*, and by a *prudent Conduct*. A *wicked Administration* may propose to impoverish the *People* ; to render Them as submissive and as abject as the Subjects, the Boors or the Slaves, in some foreign Countries, and to *beggar* Them out of their *Sturdiness*. But there is another View, that may be common to a *weak* and a *wicked Administration* both. In such an Age as We suppose, *publick Money* will be easily granted, and *publick Accounts* rarely, or incuriously inspected. The *Ministers* therefore, though never so weak, may be impudent enough to ask, and able enough to get, *frequent Supplies*, or *national Pretences*, for *private Purposes*. The Consequences of This are manifold ; for, in general, the more *Money* passes through their Hands, the more Opportunities They have of *Gain* ; and, in particular, They may share, if They please, in every *bad Bargain* They make for the Publick ; and the worse their Bargain, the better their Share will be. Thus an *immense Subsidy* given to some *little Prince*, who deals in *Soldiers*,, or an *immense Arrear* stated in Favour of these *little Merchants of human Flesh*, may be so ordered as to steal enough from the Publick to replenish the *royal Coffers*, to glut the *Ministers*, to feed some of their *hungry Creatures*, and to bribe a *Parliament* besides. Several of these *occasional Jobs* may be, and, no Doubt will be contrived, in such an Age, and by such



such Means as We here suppose, and may be justly reckoned as so many *auxiliary Funds*, belonging to the *great aggregate Fund of Corruption*. Let us however break off from discoursing of These, which may be more easily and more frequently contrived under the *present*, but might have been contrived under the *former Constitution of the Revenue*; and let us turn our Discourse to speak of that *great Source of Corruption*, which was opened soon after the *Revolution*; which was unknown before it; and which hath spread, since it was opened, like the Box of *Pandora*, innumerable Evils over this unhappy Country.

The Increase and Continuance of *Taxes* acquire to the *Crown*, by multiplying *Officers of the Revenue*, and by arming Them with formidable Powers against the rest of their Fellow-Subjects, a Degree of *Power*, whose Weight the inferior Ranks of our People have long felt, and They most, who are most useful to the Commonwealth, and which even the superior Ranks may feel one Time or other; for I presume it would not be difficult to shew how a full Exercise of the *Powers*, that are in being, with or even without some little Additions to them, for the *Improvement of the Revenue*, (that stale Pretence for *Oppression*) might oblige the greatest Lord in the Land to bow as low to a *Commissioner of the Customs*, or *Excise*, or to some *subaltern Harpy*, as any Nobleman, or Gentleman in *France* can be obliged to bow to the *Intendant of his Province*. But the Establishment of *publick Funds*, on the Credit of *these Taxes*, hath been productive of more and greater Mischiefs than the *Taxes* themselves, not only by increasing the Means of *Corruption*, and the *Power of the Crown*, but by the Effect it hath had on the *Spirit of the Nation*, on our *Manners*, and  
our

our *Morals*. It is impossible to look back, without Grief, on the necessary and unavoidable Consequences of *this Establishment*; or, without Indignation, on that *Mystery of Iniquity*, to which *this Establishment* gave Occasion, which hath been raised upon it, and carried on, for almost half a Century, by Means of it. It is impossible to look forward, without Horror, on the Consequences, that may still follow. The *ordinary Expences of our Government* are defrayed, in great Measure, by *Anticipations and Mortgages*. In Times of Peace, in Days of Prosperity, as We boast them to be, We contract *new Debts*, and We create *new Funds*. What must We do in War, and in national Distress? What will happen, when We have *mortgaged*, and *funded* all We have to *mortgage* and to *fund*; when We have mortgaged to new Creditors that *sinking Fund*, which was mortgaged to other Creditors not yet paid off; when We have mortgaged all the *Product of our Land*, and even our *Land itself*? Who can answer that when We come to such Extremities, or have them more nearly in Prospect, *ten Millions of People* will bear any longer to be *Hewers of Wood, and Drawers of Water*, to maintain the two hundredth Part of that Number, at Ease and in Plenty? Who can answer that the *whole Body of the People* will suffer Themselves to be treated, in Favour of an Handful of Men, (for *They*, who monopolize the whole Power, and may in Time monopolize the whole Property of the *Funds*, are indeed but an Handful) who can answer that the *whole Body of the People* will suffer Themselves to be treated, in Favour of such an Handful, as the poor *Indians* are, in Favour of the *Spaniards*; to be parcelled out in Lots, as it were; and to be assigned, like these *Indians*, to the *Spanish Planters*,  
to

to toil and starve, for the *Proprietors of the several Funds*? Who can answer that a *Scheme*, which oppresses the *Farmer*, ruins the *Manufacturer*, breaks the *Merchant*, discourages *Industry*, and reduces *Fraud* into *System*; which beggars so often the *fair Adventurer* and *innocent Proprietor*; which drains continually a Portion of our national Wealth away to *Foreigners*, and draws most perniciously the rest of that immense Property, that was diffused among Thousands, into the Pockets of a Few; who can answer that *such a Scheme* will be always endured?—But I have run, before I was aware, from my Subject, which requires no more than that I should take Notice of the Establishment of the *publick Funds*, as it furnishes *new Means of Corruption*, on the Part of the *Crown*; and new Facilities to these Means, on the Part of the *People*.

Now This, I suppose, hath need of no Proof, and of little Explanation; for, *first*, the whole Art of *Stockjobbing*; the whole *Mystery of Iniquity*, mentioned above, arises from *this Establishment*, and is employed about the *Funds*; and, *secondly*, the main Springs, that turn, or may turn, the artificial Wheel of *Credit*, and make the *Paper Estates*, that are fastened to it, rise or fall, lurk behind the Veil of the *Treasury*. From hence it follows, that if *this Office* should be ever unrighteously administered; if there should ever be, at the Head of it, one of those *veteran Sharpers*, who hath learned by Experience how to improve the Folly, and aggravate the Misfortunes of his Fellow Subjects, of the Innocent, of the Poor, of the Widow, and of the Orphan, to his own, or any other private Advantage; it follows, I say, that He must have it in his Power, and there can be no Doubt of his Will, to employ *two Methods of Corruption*, without any Incumbrance of the *Civil List*. Such a *ministerial Jobber* may employ

ploy the Opportunities of gaining on the *Funds*, that He can frequently create, by a thousand various Artifices, (notwithstanding the excellent Provisions, that have been lately made against the *infamous Practice of Stockjobbing*, by the Wisdom of the Legislature, and which We promise our selves will be still improved) and He may apply the *Gains* that are thus made, to *Corruption*, in Aid of the *Civil List*. He may corrupt Men with their *own Spoils*, and bribe even *those*, whom He reduced by his *Practices* to that Penury, which could alone make Them capable of being bribed ; or, when He hath to do with Men of another Character, (for no Rank alone will be sufficient to raise Them, in such an Age, above the most direct and prostitute Corruption.) He may bribe Them by a *Whisper*, initiate Them into his *Mystery* to gain Them, and then secure Them by a Participation of the *same Fraud*, and the *same Profit*.

Though this Reasoning be hypothetical, yet the Suppositions are not strained, nor unnatural ; for as the meanest Grubs on Earth have raised Themselves by *Stockjobbing* to the Rank and Port of Noblemen and Gentlemen ; so may Noblemen and Gentlemen debase Themselves to their Meanness, and acquire the same Spirit, by following the same Trade. That *Luxury* which began to spread after the Restoration of King *Charles the Second*, hath increased ever since, hath descended from the highest to the lowest Ranks of our People, and is become national. Now nothing can be more certain than This, that *national Luxury* and *national Poverty*, may in Time establish *national Prostitution*. Besides This, it is to be considered that the *immense Wealth of particular Men* is a Circumstance, which always attends *national Poverty*, and is, in a great Measure, the Cause of it. We may apply already to our Country



Country thus much, at least of That, which *Salust* makes *Cato* say of the State of *Rome*; and I wish We could apply no more,——*Habemus Luxuriam, atque Avaritiam; publice Egestatem, privatim Opulentiam; Luxury and Avarice, publick Want and private Wealth abound.* Now, as *publick Want*, or *general Poverty*, (for in that Sense I take it here) will lay Numbers of Men open to the Attacks of *Corruption*; so *private Wealth* will have the same Effect, especially where *Luxury* prevails, on some of Those, who do not feel the *publick Want*; for there is *imaginary*, as well as *real Poverty*. He who thought Himself rich before, may begin to think Himself poor, when He compares his Wealth, and the Expence he is able to make, with Those of Men, whom he hath been used to esteem, and perhaps justly, far inferior to Himself in all Respects. He, who would have been ashamed to participate in *Fraud*, or to yield to *Corruption*, may begin to think the Faults venial, when he sees Men, who were far below Him, rise above Him by *Fraud* and by *Corruption*; when He sees Them maintain Themselves by *these Means* in an Elevation, which They could not have acquired by the *contrary Virtues*, if They had had them. Thus may *Contraries* unite in their Effect, and *Poverty* and *Wealth* combine to facilitate the Means and the Progress of *Corruption*. Thus may the *great Thieves of the Nation* do more, and less reparable Mischief, by the *Practices* They introduce, and the *Examples* They set, than by the *actual Robberies* They commit. *Plusque Exemplo quam Pccato nocent*, to use an Expression of *Tully*, in one of his Books of Laws.

Much more might be said, concerning the *Increase of Power*, that the *Crown* hath acquired, and must continue to acquire, according to the *present Consti-*

*Constitution and Management of the Revenue.* Much more might be said to shew that the *Power of Money*, as the World is now constituted, is *real Power*, and that *all Power*, without This, is *imaginary*; that the Prince, who gets *Prerogative* alone, gets a *Phantom*; but that He, who gets *Money*, even without *Prerogative*, gets something *real*, and will be as much stronger than his *Neighbours*, and his *People* too, as He hath a greater Command of *Money*. In Fine, a great deal more might be said to shew how much *Corruption* is a more deadly Weapon than the *highest Prerogative*, in the Hands of Men, who are *Enemies to such a Constitution of Government as ours is*. —But I hasten to a Conclusion.

If then a *Spirit of Rapine and Venality*, of *Fraud and Corruption* continue to diffuse Themselves, not only *Luxury and Avarice*, but every Kind of *Immorality* will follow; and the whole may be imported by such Ways as have been sketched out, and by others, whenever the Nation falls under a *bad Government*, till the *Prince* on the Throne shall not be able to say, speaking of his whole People, even That, which *Philip the Second*, speaking of the Corruption of his own Court; *They all take Money, except MYSELF and SAPENA.* Britain will then be in that very Condition, in which, and in which alone, her *Constitution*, and her *Liberty* by Consequence, may be destroyed; because the *People* may, in a State of *universal Corruption*, and will in no other, either suffer others to betray Them, or betray Themselves. How near a Progress We have made towards *this State*, I determine not. This I say; it is Time for every Man, who is desirous to preserve the *British Constitution*, and to preserve it secure, to contribute all He can, to prevent the ill Effects of that *new Influence and Power*, which have gained  
Strength

Strength in every Reign since the *Revolution* ; of those *Means of Corruption*, that may be employed, one Time or other, on the Part of the *Crown*, and of that *Proneness to Corruption*, on the Part of *People*, that hath been long growing, and still grows. It may otherwise happen, that *these Causes* remaining in Force, their *Effects* will become too strong to be checked, and will ensure the Ruin of the best Constitution upon Earth, whenever the *Men in Power* shall think their Grandeur, or their Safety, concerned in the Ruin of it. We are not exposed, at present, most certainly to any such Contingency ; but the bare Possibility of being so is a Reason sufficient to awaken, and alarm every honest Man. Hath not every such Man, indeed, Reason to be alarmed, when He hears the Cause of *Corruption* publicly pleaded, and when Men are suffered, nay paid by somebody or other, to plead this unrighteous Cause, as if it was That of our most righteous Government. Had we lived when the *Star-Chamber* tyrannized, and many other extravagant Powers were exercised, under the Authority of the *Crown*, We should have found Fault as much as We dared, no Doubt, and yet have waited patiently, perhaps for some favourable Opportunity of redressing the Grievances. But when We heard these *Acts of Power* justified as *legal* and *constitutional*, and the *Prerogative*, by Virtue of which They were done, claimed as a *Right in the Crown*, We should have taken the Alarm, I presume, as hot as our Predecessors did. Thus, in the Case now before us, *Corruption* may have been practised in some Degree, perhaps, at all Times. But then it hath been always kept under by the Shame and Danger, that attended both the *Corrupter* and the *Corrupted*. It hath been always complained of, never defended, and

and Endeavours have been used, from Time to Time, with general Applause, to prevent it. But according to the *Principles* now avowed, these Endeavours were unjust; they ought to be repented of; and the Acts made in Consequence of them ought to be repealed; for the *constitutional Independency of the Crown* cannot be supported, unless the *Crown* have the Right and the Means of taking their Independency from the *other Parts of the Legislature*, by keeping the Members of those Assemblies under a *pecuniary Influence*. Let no Man think that the Absurdity and Profligacy of *these Doctrines* secure us against the Effect of them. They may soon grow into Vogue, and be reputed as sacred Truths as any of those Falshoods, that are established by the Systems of Policy and Religion, in many other Countries. What can be too absurd, or too profligate, for an absurd and profligate, or for a superstitious People?

But if We should apprehend the Effects of *this Doctrine* as little as We esteem the *Doctors*, who preach it; yet still the Alarm is given by Them, and it would be Stupidity, or somewhat much worse than Stupidity, not to take it. We despise the *Drummers and Trumpeters of an Enemy's Army*; (for I resume the Allusion, that I applied in the first of these Discourses;) but when We hear the Noise of their *Drums and Trumpets*, We take the Alarm, and conclude the Enemy is near. The *Friends of our Constitution* therefore are in the Right to join Issue upon this Point with the *Enemies of it*, and to fix upon this principal and real Distinction, and Difference, the present Division of *Parties*; since *Parties* We must have; and since Those, which subsisted formerly, are quite extinguished, notwithstanding all the wicked Endeavours of *some Men*,  
who



who can have no Merit but *Party Merit*, nor Safety but in *Faction*, to revive them. If there was Merit, and surely there was great Merit, in opposing the Asserters of *Prerogative* formerly, when it rose so high as to endanger our *Liberty*; there is great Merit in opposing the Assertors of *Corruption* now, and in exposing the Means, by which *this Expedient* may be improved to the Ruin of our *Constitution*, and therefore of our *Liberty*. Nay, the Merit is greater in some Respects, if *Corruption* be in itself, in its own Nature, and in the present Circumstances of the Nation, and Dispositions of the People, more dangerous than *Prerogative* ever was; and if the Means of establishing a Government of arbitrary Will, by *Corruption*, be more likely to prove effectual, than Those of doing it by *Prerogative* ever were. That it should ever become harder to save our Country from the Effects of *Corruption*, than it was to defeat the Efforts of *Prerogative*, God forbid.— On the whole Matter, a *Dissertation upon Parties* could not wind itself up more properly, We think, than by shewing that the *British Constitution of Government* deserves, above all others, the constant Attention, and Care to maintain it, of the *People*, who are so happy as to live under it; that it may be weakened for Want of Attention, which is a Degree of Danger; but that it cannot be destroyed, unless the *Peers* and the *Commons*, (That is, the *whole Body of the People*) unite to destroy it, which is a Degree of Madness, and such a monstrous Iniquity, as nothing but *confirmed and universal Corruption* can produce; that since the Time, when all our Dangers from *Prerogative* ceased, *new Dangers to this Constitution*, more silent and less observed, are arisen; and finally, that as nothing can be more ridiculous than to preserve the

the nominal Division of *Whig* and *Tory Parties*, which subsisted before the *Revolution*, when the Difference of *Principles*, that could alone make the Distinction real, exists no longer; so nothing can be more reasonable than to admit the nominal Division of *Constitutionists* and *Anti-Constitutionists*, or of a *Court* and a *Country Party*, at this Time, when an avowed Difference of *Principles* makes this Distinction real. That this Distinction is real cannot be denied, as long as there are Men amongst us, who argue for, and who promote even a *corrupt Dependency of the Members of the two Houses of Parliament on the Crown*; and others, who maintain that *such a Dependency of the Members* takes away the *constitutional Independency of the two Houses*, and that, *this Independency* lost, our *Constitution* is a dead Letter, and We shall be only in a worse Condition by preserving the *Forms* of it.

To reduce therefore our present Parties to *this single Division*, our present Disputes to *this single Contest*, and to fix our principal Attention on *this Object of Danger*, too long and too much neglected, hath been and is the sole Design of these Discourses. The Design may have been insufficiently executed; but it is honest; but it is of the last Importance; and whatever the *Enemies of our Constitution*, who call Themselves the *Friends of the Government*, may say, to amuse and impose on the weak, ignorant, and trifling Part of Mankind, the Importance of it will be felt every Day, and every Hour, more and more, till it be felt by every Man in *Britain*. Let us hope, and endeavour by all possible Means, that it may not be felt too late; and to encourage the *Constitutionists*, or *Country Party*, in this Attempt, let us consider from whom an Opposition to it is to be expected—Shall it be expected then from Those,

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who

who have passed under the Denomination of *TORIES*? Certainly not. They feel as much as any Men in *Britain* the Preference that ought to be given to that System of Government, which was established by the *Revolution*, and in which They took so great a Share, and shew Themselves as ready to render that *great Work*, which was left and still continues imperfect, compleat. — Shall this Opposition be expected from the *DISSENTERS*? It cannot be. Shall They, who pretend to greater *Purity* than others, become the Advocates of *Corruption*? Shall They contribute their Endeavours to undermine the best Constitution of Government They can hope to enjoy, unless they hope to rise on the Ruins of it, and to form another on their own Model? As *religious Sects*, they deserve Indulgence, and they have it; but they are too wise not to see that, as a *Faction in the State*, they would deserve none. — In fine, shall this Opposition be expected from those, who have been called *WHIGs*? That too is impossible. Their Predecessors asserted the *Independency of Parliaments*, and struggled hard against *Corruption*, in former Reigns. When the rest of Mankind embrace the *same Principles*, and pursue the *same Ends*, shall they renounce *one*, and run counter to the *other*? Shall they own themselves against *ONE METHOD* of *destroying our Constitution*, but for *ANOTHER*? against making *KINGS independent on PARLIAMENTS* by *PREROGATIVE*, but for making *PARLIAMENTS dependent on KINGS* by *CORRUPTION*? Shall they give the *Enemies of the Revolution* a plausible Pretence to say that nothing more was meant, by *Them* at least, than a *Change of Government*, in which they hoped to find their *particular and Party Account*? This would be to *cast black and odious Colours on the*  
*Revo-*

*Revolution*, indeed ; more *black* and more *odious* than any, that it was in the Power of a *vain, forward, turbulent Preacher* to cast, by his frothy *Declamations*. But the *Whigs* are so far from opposing the Endeavours to preserve our *Constitution*, that they co-operate to promote the Success of them ; and that, however *personal Prejudices, personal Partialities, and old Habits*, that are daily wearing off, may be still entertained by some amongst them, all the *independent Men*, who pass under that Name, unite in the common Cause of *Liberty* and their *Country*.——It remains therefore that no NATIONAL PARTY can be formed in Opposition to those, who endeavour to secure the *Independency of Parliaments* against the *new Influence of the Crown*, and against *Corruption* ; nor any Strength be exerted, except that of a *Faction*, composed of the *Refuse of all Parties*, gleaned up by *One*, who hath none for Him.——I would willingly carry this farther ; and, in doing so, I shall not advance a Paradox, unless it be supposed, which I think would be a greater Paradox, that a Man may have Abilities to destroy the *Constitution*, and yet not Sense enough to see his *remote*, as well as *immediate*, his *Family*, as well as *personal Interest*. I say then that if a Design of raising the *Power of the Crown* above any Pitch of *Prerogative*, and of reducing *Parliaments* to an *absolute Dependency*, as well as a *Faction* to support this Design, be formed ; the very Man, who forms *such a Design*, and *such a Faction*, must be infatuated, if he can wish very sincerely his own Success. His first Design, We are sure, will be that of raising a *great Family*, and heaping upon it *Riches and Honours* precarious and insecure, and of entailing Servitude on his *own Race* ; for it will be impossible to exempt them from the common Ca-



lamity? Nothing but Despair, (that is Fear void of Hope) arising from a Consciousness of Guilt, can drive any Man into such a Design. But, in this Case, there will be Fear opposed to Fear, and one of these Fears may be allayed by Hope. The Fear of being called to a severe Account may be mitigated by the Hope of escaping. Where is the *insolent, rapacious, odious Minister*, that may not entertain some Hope, as well as Fear, when He sets before his Eyes the Examples of those, who have gone before Him? *Pallas* was the Favourite of *Agrippina*; He governed like the Master of the Empire, and supported her Pride and Ambition by his Councils and Services, as he had been raised to Power, and was maintained in it, by her Credit, whilst her Credit lasted. \* *Nero* dismissed him; and, seeing him go from Court with a Croud at his Heels, said pleasantly enough, as if it had been spoken of a *Dictator*, that He went to *abdicate*. But *Pallas* carried off the Spoils of the Empire with Him; all Scores were quitted between Him and the Publick; and, according to the Bargain He had made, he was called to no Account. Many such Examples might be cited to comfort with Hope the most guilty *Minister*, who is wise, if not honest enough, to stop in the Career of Iniquity, before the Measure of it be entirely filled, pressed down, and

\* *Nero insensius iis, quibus superbia muliebris innitebatur; demovet Pallantem Cura Rerum, quis a Claudio impositus, velut Arbitrum Regni agebat; ferebaturque, digrediente Eo, magna Prosequentium Multitudine, non absurde dixisse, ire Pallantem ut ejuraret. Sane pepigerat Pallas, ne cujus Facti in præteritum interrogaretur, pareſque Rationes cum Republica haberet.*

Tacit. Ann. Lib. 13.

and running over. But if one of those *Bubbles of Fortune*, who thinks He alwas shall escape, because He always hath escaped, not content to wound a *free Constitution of Government*, should resolve to make it expire under his Administration; the Condition of *such an one*, however He may flatter Himself, or be flattered by others, must be ten Times more wretched and forlorn than the worst of Those, to which his Cruelty hath reduced Multitudes—— For what?—— If he succeeds in his sacrilegious Designs, (they are of as deep a Dye, at least) He may hope for Impunity, perhaps, to his grey Hairs, and be suffered to languish through the Infirmities of old Age, with an inward Remorse more pungent than any of them; but He is sure to entail Servitude on his whole Race; and indelible Infamy on his Memory. If he fails, He misses of that Impunity, to which He sacrificed his Country; He draws triple Vengeance on his own Head; and exposes his innocent Family to a thousand Misfortunes, of which it will not be the least (whether He succeeds, or fails) that They descended from Him.—But whatever *Ministers* may govern, whatever *Factions* may arise, let the *Friends of Liberty* lay aside the groundless Distinctions, which are employed to amuse and betray Them; let Them continue to coalite; let Them hold fast their Integrity, and support with Spirit and Perseverance the Cause of their *Country*, and They will confirm the good, reclaim the bad, vanquish the incorrigible, and make the *British Constitution* triumph, even over CORRUPTION.

I have now gone through the Task I imposed on myself, and shall only add these few Words. There was an Engagement taken, in the Beginning of these Discourses, not to flatter. I have kept

this Engagement, and have spoken with great Freedom ; but I hope with the Justice and Moderation, and Decency, that I intended, of Persons and of Things. This Freedom intitles me to expect that no *Parallels*, no *Innuendo's* should be supposed, to carry my Sense farther than I have expressed it. The reasonable Part of Mankind will not disappoint so reasonable an Expectation. But there are a *Set of Creatures*, who have *no Mercy on Paper*, to use an Expression of † *Juvenal*, and who are ready to *answer*, even when They are absolute Strangers to the *Subject*. Unable to follow a Thread of *Fact* and *Argument*, They play with *Words*, and turn and wrest *particular Passages*. They have done mine that Honour, as I am told, and have once or twice seen. They may do the same again, whenever They please, secure from any *Reply*, unless They have Sense enough, or their *Patron* for Them, to take for a *Reply* the Story I am going to tell You, and which You may find related a little differently in one of the *Spectators*. The Story is This.

A certain pragmatistical Fellow, in a certain Village, took it into his Head to write the Names of the *Squire*, of *all his Family*, of the *principal Parish-Officers*, and of some of the *notable Members of the Vestry*, in the Margin of the *whole Duty of Man*, over-against every Sin, which he found mentioned in that most excellent Treatise. The Clamour was great, and all the Neighbourhood was in an Uproar. At last, the *Minister* was called in, upon this great Emergency ; a pious and prudent Divine, and the same, for ought I know, who  
was

† ——— *stulta est Clementia* ———  
——— *periturae parcere Chartæ.*

was a Member of the *Spectator's Club*. He heard them with Patience ; with so much, that He brought Them to talk one after the other. When he had heard Them, He pronounced that They were all in the wrong ; that the *Book* was written against *Sins of all Kinds*, whoever should be guilty of them ; but that the *Innocent* would give Occasion to unjust Suspicions by all this Clamour, and that the *Guilty* would convict Themselves. They took his Advice. The *whole Duty of Man* hath been read ever since, with much Edification, by all the Parishioners. The *Innocent* have been most certainly confirmed in *Virtue*, and We hope the *Guilty* have been reformed from *Vice*.

I am,

S I R, &c.

F I N I S



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